

# The Canadian Historical Review

NEW SERIES

OF

THE REVIEW OF HISTORICAL PUBLICATIONS  
RELATING TO CANADA

(FOUNDED 1896)

BOARD OF EDITORS

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
MANAGING EDITOR

W. S. WALLACE

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VOL. III.

TORONTO, MARCH, 1922

No. 1

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# The Canadian Historical Review

VOL. III.

TORONTO, MARCH, 1922

No. 1

## NOTES AND COMMENTS

THE new provincial archivist of Quebec, Mr. Pierre-Georges Roy, has just issued his first report on the work of the Quebec Archives. The contents of the report, which will be dealt with in more detail later, make it abundantly clear that the wealth of material in the Quebec Archives is very great indeed, and that Mr. Roy is performing already a notable work in making it available. We have on previous occasions noted the excellent work being done by the provincial archivists of Ontario and British Columbia; and every historical scholar is familiar with the splendid results of the work of the Public Archives of Canada at Ottawa. It is apparent that the task of collecting and properly housing the original materials of Canadian history is proceeding apace. Whether a proper co-ordination has been established between the various agencies at work is, however, perhaps questionable; and it is most desirable that such a co-ordination should be established. Might it not be possible to arrange a conference between archivists and historical scholars so as to prevent overlapping and rivalry?

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While on the subject of archives collections attention ought perhaps to be called to the fact that the archives of the Hudson's Bay Company in London appear to be still a sealed book for the investigator. "Valuable papers," writes the latest applicant for permission to consult these archives, Dr. G. C. Davidson, the author of the recent *History of the North West Company*, "on

this subject may be contained in the archives of the Hudson's Bay Company in London, but the present writer was unable to obtain permission to enter those preserves." It cannot be said too strongly that the early records of the Hudson's Bay Company are part and parcel of Canadian history, and should become the property of the Canadian people. Obstructionist tactics on the part of the officials of the company with regard to its archives have been tolerated by Canada far too long; and it is to be hoped that pressure may soon be brought to bear on the company to compel it to give historical students access to its records, or at least to permit the copying or reproduction of the more important records for use in Canada.

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Among the contributors to the present number of the REVIEW, Sir Clifford Sifton, the author of the paper on *Some Canadian Constitutional Problems*, needs no introduction. As minister of the interior in the Laurier administration from 1896 to 1905, and as chairman of the Commission on Conservation from 1909 until recently, he is admirably qualified to discuss, from a first-hand acquaintance with it, the working of Canadian government. Professor J. L. Morison, who contributes a paper on Lord Salisbury, is professor of history in Queen's University, Kingston, and was the author of a paper on Disraeli published in a previous number of the REVIEW. The paper on *Immigration and Settlement in Canada, 1812-1820*, is by Mr. A. R. M. Lower, of the Board of Historical Publications at Ottawa. The author of the paper on *The Trent Affair* is Mr. F. Landon, the public librarian of London, Ontario, who is an authority on the Civil War period of American history. The editor of the document entitled *Examination of a French Deserter in 1708* is Professor R. Flenley, formerly of the history staff of the University of Manitoba, and now of the history staff of the University of Toronto; and the note on *The Original "Salary Grab" in Upper Canada* is by the Hon. Mr. Justice Riddell, one of the high court judges of Ontario, whose contributions to the early history of Upper Canada are well known.

## SOME CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

THE Canadian constitution was framed and passed by the British parliament in 1867. It was the consummation of the constitutional development of the various component parts of Canada, and represented the mature conclusions of the most prominent and trusted statesmen of the period. It was adopted not without friction and disagreement; but, although the most prudent method of ascertaining the people's wishes was not followed, the various provinces very soon settled down and accepted the new constitution as an accomplished fact.

Looking back over a period of fifty years, one must admit that the constitution thus conferred has worked extremely well. It very wisely contained provisions for the acquisition by Canada of parts of British North America, not included within the limits of the original union. These provisions have been utilized from time to time until the whole of British North America except Newfoundland has been included in the confederation. Some friction, resulting in armed clashes, occurred in the Northwest, first upon the occasion of the Red River Settlement being taken in, and later in the farther Northwest territories. Whatever the causes of these difficulties, they are now buried and forgotten, and the country is, constitutionally, commercially, and socially, united in a fairly harmonious whole.

It is a well-understood truth amongst constitutional students that no written constitution, however detailed and exact in its provisions, can remain precisely as it was in the beginning in its application and interpretation.

The constitution of the United States, though assuming to lay down with exactness the division of legal functions, has exhibited a definite progress along certain well-defined lines. Acts which in the first year of the Republic would have been flouted as flagrantly unconstitutional are now upheld almost without question by the courts. In Canada, there has not been so definite and clear an example of constitutional growth by the science of legal interpretation, but nevertheless the Canadian constitution, as it

actually operates, is very substantially different from what it was in the year after Confederation.

There is one difference between the constitutional development of Canada and that of the United States. Changes by interpretation in the United States have largely related to matters of jurisdiction as between the federal government and the state governments, though there has been some growth also in regard to the relations of the United States to outside powers. In the case of Canada, there has been no growth in the relations of the federal to the provincial governments, or with regard to federal and provincial jurisdiction. Growth has been almost entirely with reference to the relations of Canada to the British government and foreign powers. As to the latter class of subjects there has been substantial development. Whether it has gone so far as is alleged by some statesmen, may perhaps be questioned.

Canada certainly enjoys an equal status with South Africa, and General Smuts, the prime minister of South Africa, states in unmistakable terms that South Africa is a nation—that as prime minister thereof he is equal in status with the prime minister of Great Britain. How far this is true, I shall consider a little later.

Leaving this subject for the present, I return to the question of the relations between the federal government and the provinces and of the boundaries of their respective jurisdictions. These relations have given rise with tolerable continuity to disputes and litigation. Some litigation there must necessarily be where there is a written constitution, in order to determine the general principles of interpretation, but when this is admitted it still remains that there has been a large and undesirable amount of contention on these subjects. The result has been that Canadians have to some extent been hampered in their political thought and development by constitutional uncertainty. There have been from time to time what laymen, and many lawyers, regard as conflicting decisions. Uncertainty of jurisdiction has in some cases prevented important subjects from being dealt with in the manner desired by the people. To give an instance that is familiar, it is well known that it takes legislation from both Dominion and province to deal with the liquor traffic, and even when that is forthcoming litigation seems to be almost endless.

In a late case in Manitoba the Grain Act, a very important statute, in force for twenty years and originally drawn with the utmost care, has been challenged on the ground of unconstitutionality. The question arising under this litigation is as to the powers



of the Dominion parliament with respect to "the regulation of trade and commerce". In this case, as in others, it has become very clear that the meaning of these words is not sufficiently definite, and that an amendment to the constitution making a proper definition is urgently required.

In another case before the Privy Council, known as the *Alberta Great Waterways* case, a decision was given which is interpreted by a high authority as meaning that with regard to a debt, unless both the debtor and the creditor are within the province, the legislature cannot legislate on the subject of the debt. This decision, it may be said with all deference, is of doubtful legal soundness, and if given its full and logical scope would produce serious uncertainties and difficulties. Here again exact definition is required.

There are many other cases.

To sum up under this head, it may be said that, while under a written constitution there will be some litigation to determine principles of interpretation, we are afflicted with altogether too much uncertainty. In the light of fifty years' experience, it should be possible for a committee of constitutional lawyers to make a revision of the constitution which would have a most beneficial and clarifying effect.

To turn to another phase of the subject. It is becoming increasingly evident that in this democratic community there are many lines of thought being pursued, the possibility of which was not present to the minds of the framers of the constitution in an age that was simpler in its conceptions of government and less disposed to question the traditions of the past. There are considerable classes in Canada who advocate definite and somewhat radical changes in constitutional methods and, while there is little probability of any very radical change securing the assent of a decisive majority of the whole people, it is quite within the realm of possibility that particular provinces might wish to make changes which the constitution does not sanction. Suppose, for instance, that the people of a province desired to adopt in the transaction of their provincial business the principle of the initiative and the referendum, and to provide that their executive should hold office for a fixed period of years instead of being dependent upon a day-to-day majority of the legislature. It is not a question whether the rest of the people of Canada agree with this view or not. In the provincial sphere the business is the business of the people of the province, and if they think that they can control

their government better and secure a more satisfactory disposition of public business by the adoption of these principles, it is entirely their affair.

Furthermore, there is plenty of room for argument as to the wisdom of such a course. Many thoughtful people doubt the desirability of cabinet government in the provinces. In the United States a state executive is not dependent on a majority in the state legislature. In other countries provincial government, on lines different from that which is possible under a responsible cabinet system, has worked fairly well. Anyone who gives the subject serious consideration will admit that the practice of regarding either a provincial or a Dominion government as being defeated by a catch vote on a non-essential matter of which no notice has been given is a rather absurd relic of the past.<sup>1</sup>

Now, if the people of a province desired to make such a change as is indicated above they would at once find themselves barred by the constitution. The British North America Act does, it is true, give the province power to amend its constitution, but with a most important exception, namely, that it can make no change in the office of the lieutenant-governor. The theory of the whole system is that the executive government is in the hands of the Crown—that is, so far as the province is concerned, in the hands of the lieutenant-governor. In theory, he is the administrator of all public business, acting of course on the advice of his ministers and through them, but in the result it will be seen that the provinces cannot effectively legislate to make any substantial change in the method of controlling and carrying on the executive government without touching upon the position of the Crown.<sup>2</sup>

With respect to this point, differences of opinion have been expressed; but I hardly think that anyone who has had experience in legislation and in the actual transaction of government business will deny that it is to all intents and purposes impracticable to make any substantial amendment without raising a question as to the validity of the measure. That is a practical bar to anything being done. It is, therefore, extremely desirable that there should be such an amendment to the constitution as would enable

<sup>1</sup> A Farmer Convention in Manitoba has recently declared itself in opposition to this custom.

<sup>2</sup> The Privy Council held the Manitoba statute of 1916, which introduced the initiative and the referendum, to be *ultra vires*, on the ground that it interfered with the prerogative of the Crown as administered by the lieutenant-governor.

the people of a province to simplify and more directly to control the transaction of provincial business.

A little consideration will make it evident that if changes of this kind cannot be made it tends to sterilize political thought, and either to discourage active-minded citizens from taking an interest in the conduct of affairs or to drive their mental activities into undesirable channels.

With respect to Dominion matters, the well-known illustration upon the subject is that of the Senate. The constitution of the Senate is a subject of constant discussion. Political parties have repeatedly declared for its amendment, and I believe in the late general election the Progressive party declared for its abolition. There is a very general feeling that the constitution of the Senate should be amended and brought more into line with the democratic principle. I am told that Canada has the only Senate in the British Empire which is purely the result of appointment by a political executive.

I doubt if, on mature consideration, the people of Canada would care to abolish the Senate, and try the experiment of single-chamber government. Certainly, students of the science of government in the past have declared against such a system with great unanimity. It is not probable that we should care to flout all the wisdom and experience of the past. Upon the question of a substantial reform in the constitution of the Senate there would probably be little difference of opinion, yet as matters stand at the present time any material change is impossible.

Without disclosing state secrets, I may go so far as to say that more than once the subject has been approached without any success. In actual practice the difficulty of convincing the British government of the wisdom of any particular change in the constitution of the Senate is insuperable.

There are three definite divisions into which constitutional changes, if any, would naturally fall:

(1) Those which concern the relative jurisdiction of the Dominion parliament and the provincial legislatures. I have given some illustrations above under this heading.

(2) Those which relate to proposed changes in the internal constitution of the Dominion or of any of the provinces. Under this head would fall any amendment to the constitution of the Senate or any amendment changing the nature or functions of the provincial executive.

(3) Those which relate to the position of Canada with regard to Great Britain and foreign countries.

It may be broadly stated that there is at present no satisfactory method of effecting any important change in the constitution; and such matters as I have referred to are therefore incapable of being effectively dealt with.

By law a change can only be made by Act of the Imperial parliament. The method adopted is that the Dominion government approaches the British government, and states its views with regard to a proposed change. The views of the Dominion government go before the Colonial Secretary of the British government, and presumably are considered by him in consultation with his colleagues. If the Colonial Secretary finally approves of the proposed amendment he introduces a bill into the Imperial parliament for the purpose of effecting the amendment, and causes it to be passed into an Act. This procedure is quite impossible in practice. The Colonial Secretary is, in effect, with his colleagues made the judge as to whether the proposed amendment is or is not desirable. He knows nothing of the merits of the case. He has probably never been in Canada. It is measurably certain that he would not be able to name the provinces of Canada without consulting a book, if he were asked to do so. It is also measurably certain that he has never read the British North America Act, and it is entirely certain that he has never read the leading cases upon its interpretation. He is unfamiliar with the state of facts in Canada which calls for the amendment. He has no means of acquiring a knowledge of the facts. He cannot tell whether or not the people of Canada are in favour of the change. He may find that the Dominion government desires the change, and that one or more of the provincial governments are opposed to it, or he may be advised that public opinion as indicated by the Canadian press is not unanimously in favour of the change. In any and every case, he is perfectly helpless because he has no definite and conclusive method of satisfying himself. The result is that he will not act in regard to any important change unless the change seems to be unanimously desired. Now, it is quite obvious that if the proposed amendment is of serious importance there will be differences of opinion in Canada about it, and these differences will speedily be made evident. So soon as this takes place, the Colonial Secretary will decline to proceed any further. In the result, therefore, no change whatever can be made, unless

it is on some purely technical matter, or is of such trifling importance as to excite no comment.

No one will deny, least of all the British authorities, that the people of Canada themselves should decide on any change which they desire to have made in their constitution. If that is the case, it is obvious that proper machinery should be devised to meet the requirements of the case.

In Australia, under the constitutional Act, there are ample provisions for amendment in respect to all internal affairs. In minor matters, the parliament of the Commonwealth can alter its constitution by a simple Act. In matters of more importance, section 128 of the Commonwealth Act provides a specific method for making changes. All changes under section 128 require to be submitted to the vote of the people. It is not regarded as a formidable matter in Australia to deal with a constitutional change, and referenda on such changes have already been taken some five or six times.<sup>1</sup>

In South Africa, under section 52 of the Union Act, it is provided that parliament can by law repeal or alter any of the provisions of the Act. There are some trifling, temporary, and transitory limitations, but in substance the South African parliament can change its constitution with respect to internal affairs at any time by a simple Act.

In the United States, article 5 of the constitution states that amendments can be made to the constitution on the initiative of Congress by a two-thirds majority or on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states. Such amendments become valid when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states.

I need not labour the argument by referring to other countries. It will be seen at once that Canada stands practically alone in modern, self-governing, democratic countries in her inability to change her constitution in accordance with what may be the development of political thought.

There is one fact in the case of Canada which does not exist to the same extent in other familiar cases.

The British North America Act was the result of a compact between the four original provinces. Before this compact was entered into, it was recognized that there were certain things which required special treatment. There were safeguards which

<sup>1</sup>Australia is now considering a general and very radical revision of the whole constitution.

certain elements and classes of the community insisted upon having before they would consent to the Confederation compact. These concerned the position of Lower Canada and its French-Canadian inhabitants with respect to their language and educational affairs. There was also the position of the Protestant minority in Lower Canada and the position of the Roman Catholic minority in Upper Canada. Safeguarding provisions with respect to the French language and the educational rights of the minorities of both Upper and Lower Canada were insisted upon, and were duly provided, to the entire satisfaction of those who were interested.

It must be said at once that all such provisions, and any provisions of a similar character that have come into effect subsequently, are fundamental and of the very essence of Confederation. No change can ever be made which will in any respect diminish or impair these guarantees. To suggest any such change would be to court the disruption of the Dominion. In considering the question of constitutional changes, therefore, it must be premised as a first and essential condition that all these guarantees should be protected.

This point being fully and satisfactorily provided for, there seems no reason why Canada should not be put in the same position as other democratic, self-governing communities and enabled to deal effectively with its governmental affairs in accordance with the wishes of the people. As to the particular method of bringing into effect constitutional changes, that is of course a matter for careful consideration. The nature of the provisions for effecting constitutional changes must depend upon whether it is desired to make these changes quickly and easily, or whether they are to be regarded as of such importance that very great safeguards should be thrown about them. I am a very strong adherent of the latter view.

The American provision for amendments to the constitution is an excellent one for Canada to follow, except that in the case of Canada I would require the province to ratify by popular vote instead of vote of the legislature. In fact, I am clearly of the opinion that any constitutional change, other than in matters of detail such as have been customarily dealt with by our parliaments and legislatures, should be submitted to a vote of the people before coming into effect.

I now arrive at what appears to be much the most important part of the subject. I have pointed out the divisions in to which constitutional amendments, if any, would naturally fall:



- (1) The relative jurisdiction of Dominion and province.
- (2) Possible internal changes of constitution of Dominion and province.
- (3) The relationship to Great Britain and foreign powers.

The illustrations given above, in my judgment, prove the necessity for changes under the first two divisions. It is not too radical to suggest that after fifty years' experience we should clear up the doubts, anomalies, and inconsistencies which have developed as between province and Dominion, nor will it be disputed that matters of internal economy, as, for instance, the constitution of the Senate, should be capable of amendment.

With respect to these matters, some are more urgent than others. Some might be dealt with on a first revision, and others might be left to be dealt with in the future under autonomous powers of amendment. The vital need, however, for constitutional action arises in connection with external affairs, by which I mean Canada's relations with everything and everybody outside of Canada, including the parent Empire. In respect to these relations there is imperative need of immediate action.

Our external relations are enveloped in what might be called a highly luminous but cloudy halo. The plain man who makes no pretence at the investigation of legal or constitutional subtleties must be in despair when he attempts to understand them. Not only is the subject in its very nature somewhat obscure and difficult to comprehend, but it suffers from the fact that almost everyone who debates it seems by an unhappy fatality to be seized with a desire to use high-sounding, sonorous, and sometimes self-contradictory language.

Here is a quotation from Sir Robert Borden:

Equality of nationhood must be recognized, preserving unimpaired to each Dominion the full autonomous power which it now holds and safeguarding to each by necessary consultation and by adequate voice and influence its highest interests in the issues of peace and war.

Here are three quotations from Mr. N. W. Rowell:

Does the *Globe* stand with Union Government . . . in maintaining in the councils of the Empire and at the Conference Table of the nations the unity of the British Commonwealth and the equality of the nations which compose it and that our constitutional development be along lines of consultation and co-operation be-

tween the different self-governing nations of the Empire rather than the centralization of power in the hands of one?

Canada, not only in theory but in fact, has reached the status of a nation.

On this vital matter affecting the policy of peace and war we have a right to be heard and the means is provided whereby our voice may be heard in determining those questions so vital to our future.

Here are two quotations from Lord Milner:

The United Kingdom and the Dominions are partner nations not yet indeed of equal power but for good and all of equal status.

The only possibility of the continuance of the British Empire is on a basis of an absolute out-and-out equal partnership of the United Kingdom and the Dominions. I say that without any kind of reservation whatsoever.

The resolution of the Imperial War Conference of 1917, with regard to imperial relations, may be quoted:

The Imperial War Conference are of opinion that the readjustment of the constitutional relations of the component parts of the Empire is too important and intricate a subject to be dealt with during the War, and that it should form the subject of a special Imperial Conference to be summoned as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities.

They deem it their duty, however, to place on record their view that any such readjustment, while thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-government and complete control of domestic affairs, should be based upon a full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth, and of India as an important portion of the same, should recognize the right of the Dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations, and should provide effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern, and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as the several Governments may determine.

Here are some quotations from General Smuts. Speaking of his opponents in the South African parliament, in September, 1920, General Smuts said:

They are dominated by pre-war conceptions and fail to take account of the fundamental changes which the war and the peace have effected in the constitution of the British Empire.



Subsequently, he has used such language as follows:

The British Empire as it existed before the war has in fact ceased to exist as a result of the war.

The Dominions have, in principle, authority and power not only in respect of their domestic questions but also of their international or foreign relations and the questions of peace or war which may affect them.

If a war is to affect them they will have to declare it. If a peace is to be made in respect of them they will have to sign it.

Their independence has been achieved.

The last vestige of anything in the nature of subordinate status in the relationship will have to disappear. These are not my boastful words. I quote the considered language of the present Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The South African party is out for a sovereign status for South Africa. So far as surrendering any rights to the League of Nations or to any Council of the Empire. . . . We are for the fullest development and assertion of these rights.

As regards our Imperial relationship the South African party favours the development of the periodical Conference system between the various Governments of our Commonwealth with a view to removing possible causes of friction and misunderstanding and furthering the interests of the Commonwealth and component States and discussing workable ideas of their policies.

*We are opposed to closer union.*

General Smuts's declaration is deliberate, studied, and categorical. He says in effect:

- (1) Independence of the Dominions has been achieved.
- (2) The Dominions are equal with the mother country.
- (3) The Dominion is not necessarily at war when England is at war. The Dominion is not at war until it declares war.
- (4) Conferences will be between governments regarding civil matters of common interest.
- (5) There is no question of "a voice" or "consultation" or "adequate representation" with respect to foreign policy. According to Smuts, the Dominion is supreme and independent in regard to all foreign policy, and no closer union than the above will be tolerated.

It is evident that there is a wide difference between the Canadian view of the external relations of Canada and the utterances

of General Smuts regarding South Africa. Yet the actual status of Canada and South Africa must be the same.

There has lately been another and most important declaration upon this subject. Speaking in the British House of Commons lately, upon the Irish settlement, Mr. Lloyd George, prime minister of Great Britain, went into the subject of Dominion relations very fully. I quote his words, omitting what does not bear on the point at issue:

Now I come to the question of external affairs. The position of the Dominions in regard to external affairs has been completely revolutionized in the course of the last four years. I tried to call attention to that a few weeks ago when I made a statement. The Dominions since the war have been given equal rights with Great Britain in the control of foreign policy of the Empire.....

The machinery is the machinery of the British Government, the Foreign Office, the Ambassadors. The machine must remain here. It is impossible that it could be otherwise unless you had a Council of Empire where you had representatives elected for the purpose. Apart from that you must act through one instrument. The instrument of foreign policy of the Empire is the British Foreign Office. *That has been accepted by all the Dominions as inevitable*, but they claim a voice in determining the lines of our policy and at the last Imperial Conference they were here discussing our policy in Germany, our policy in Egypt, our policy in America, our policy all over the world, and we are now acting upon the mature and general decisions arrived at with the common consent of the whole Empire.....

*The advantage to us is that joint control means joint responsibility* and when the burden of Empire has become so great it is well that we should have the shoulders of these young giants under the burden to help us along.

This is a remarkable and momentous declaration. It states definitely and categorically that all the Dominions have agreed that the foreign policy of the whole Empire (including the Dominions) should be handled through the British Foreign Office. It further states that the Dominions have become and are jointly responsible for this policy throughout the whole world, including, for example, Egypt and, if Egypt, then India.

Three remarks may be made respecting this declaration.

In the first place, joint responsibility means moral, naval, military, and financial responsibility for any and every war any-

where in the world in which the British Foreign Office or any other department of the British government may involve Britain. These henceforth will not be merely British wars, but Empire wars, to which Canada shall be bound to contribute.

In the second place, it may be definitely stated that no one ever assumed to commit Canada to such a policy, unless it was Mr. Meighen at the late Conference in London. If he did so, he has not reported the fact to the Canadian parliament or to the Canadian people. If he did so, he did it without a vestige of authority from the Canadian parliament or the Canadian people, who were up to the date of Mr. Lloyd George's speech in entire ignorance that any such proposals were being made or considered.

In the third place, there is a very clear contradiction between Mr. Lloyd George's statement upon the position of the Dominions in foreign affairs and the speech of General Smuts as above quoted. General Smuts in plain language tells the people of South Africa that the independence of South Africa has been achieved, that she is supreme in both internal and foreign affairs, that she is not at war until she declares war herself. Mr. Lloyd George says the Dominions have agreed to come in and direct foreign affairs for the whole Empire all over the world, in partnership with Great Britain, transacting the entire business through the British Foreign Office and assuming joint responsibility therefor.

I am aware that by a process of ingenious casuistry an apparent agreement between these statements can be made out. Such a process of reasoning is, however, repugnant to common sense. When General Smuts told the people of South Africa that South Africa was practically independent and would transact her own business in peace or war, domestic and foreign, and could not be involved in war except by her own declaration they certainly did not understand that South Africa had agreed to join what is practically a council for the direction of all foreign affairs of the entire Empire and that by joining such a council South Africa had accepted responsibility for every war, great and small, in any part of the world in which the Empire might in future be engaged. It is at least very possible that if the people had so understood him he would not now be prime minister of South Africa. It will be interesting to learn whether General Smuts will now agree that Mr. Lloyd George's statement is correct.

A very striking circumstance has occurred since the making of the declaration by Mr. Lloyd George quoted above. The representatives of the British government have been in con-

ference at Cannes with French representatives in regard to a proposed treaty. The treaty was reduced to writing, approved by the British representatives, and handed to the French premier. The text of the treaty is now published in Paris so that we know exactly what it was that Great Britain proposed. The draft treaty provides that, in case of direct and unprovoked aggression by Germany, Great Britain—not the Empire—will come to the assistance of France with military, naval, and aerial forces. It further provides that no British Dominion shall be bound by the treaty until such Dominion has approved it.

Consider this for a moment. This treaty was negotiated by British representatives. No Dominion representative was present. The Dominions were not consulted nor were they a party to the negotiations. This is conclusively proven by the clause which provides that they are not bound until they separately adhere. The whole proceeding is in flat contradiction to Mr. Lloyd George's statement that hereafter foreign policy was to be under the joint control of Britain and the Dominions. Mr. Lloyd George would probably say that it was not practicable to consult the Dominions and give them a voice in the negotiations. Possibly that is true. If so, it merely proves that the policy of joint control which he so eloquently announced above is impracticable and has broken down on the first trial. What we require is a policy that is not impracticable, and that will not break down.

What then is the position of Canada? Shall she approve or not? If not, how will she stand in the event of war under the treaty? Will the fact that she has not adhered to the treaty make her a neutral and save her commerce from enemy depredations?

It would take a separate article to discuss that question.

Enough has now been said to indicate the necessity of Canada's constitutional relations being defined by law instead of by stump speeches and to prove the truth of my remark that it was difficult to glean a correct idea of the true position from an examination of the utterances of our responsible statesmen.

It is desirable to make a statement on the position of Canada which shall be at once clear and definite and in accordance with law and fact.

I would state the position as follows:

Canada started in life as a subordinate self-governing Dominion. She had certain powers given her definitely. Nearly all powers relating to internal affairs were accorded, but not quite

all. She had no external powers whatever, and no relations with foreign countries. In the interpretation of her relations with the mother country the subordinate status was marked and unmistakable.

Almost immediately after 1867 the process of broadening the interpretation of the constitution began, and continuously from that time forward the interpretation has become more and more liberal. The government of the Dominion has been permitted from time to time to extend its functions, until it may now be regarded as being indisputably supreme in all matters arising within Canada, except possibly one or two in respect of which it is claimed that Imperial interests arise modifying the right to independent action on the part of Canada.

As time passed, the Canadian government was permitted to acquire certain powers with respect to foreign countries. It is now customary for Canadian ministers to negotiate commercial treaties with foreign countries under the ægis of the Foreign Office of Great Britain. No such treaty is valid without the concurrence of the British minister, and ratification would not be made by a foreign country without ratification by the British government. There is additional ratification by the Canadian parliament. A further advance has been made by the reception of Dominion statesmen in Imperial Conferences on a footing of equality for purposes of consultation and by the admission of Canadian representatives on the British Empire panel at the Paris Peace Conference. If now we regard the growth which has taken place and the statements which have been made on behalf of the Dominion governments, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, and if we add to these the statements that have been made and the practices that have been sanctioned officially on behalf of the British government, we come to a conclusion.

The conclusion is this:

The strictly legal position of the Dominion of Canada has changed little, if any, since 1867, but what may be called the constitutional growth by the passing of events has brought about a condition of affairs in which it is proposed with practical unanimity by the British government and by the governments of the Dominions that there should be a definite change in the status of the Dominions. An Imperial Constitutional Conference is mooted for the purpose of giving effect to the change and clearing away restrictions and limitations that are now obsolete; and

everyone agrees that the proposed changes must give the Dominions absolute control of their internal affairs.

Furthermore, it seems to be the opinion of General Smuts that the change must be a complete recognition of the equality of the Dominions with the United Kingdom, of the right of the Dominions to be absolutely free to participate or not to participate in any war of the Empire, and of the right of the Dominions to declare war or make peace and generally exercise plenary authority in foreign relations.

In apparent opposition to this opinion of General Smuts, it is the view of Mr. Lloyd George that in all other respects the above views should prevail but that, as respects foreign policy, war, and peace, the Dominions have surrendered their right to act individually and have agreed to come into a combination with Great Britain under which the representatives of Great Britain and all the Dominions shall determine all foreign policy whatever, acting through the British Foreign Office and accepting joint responsibility in the fullest sense.

To review the whole subject, then, the position of Canada becomes very clear. We are confronted with certain outstanding facts:

(1) The necessity of a revision of the constitution of Canada with respect to internal affairs.

(2) That changes in the relations of Canada with Great Britain and all the world are almost immediately in prospect and are due to be dealt with by a conference in London which has already been called and which is only now deferred for a time as a matter of convenience.

(3) That international affairs, like the recent Disarmament Conference at Washington, are constantly arising in which Canada's unsettled and undefined relationship with the mother country and with foreign countries gives rise to dangerous misconceptions and irritation. In the case of the Disarmament Conference fault has been found that the United States did not invite Canada directly to send a representative.

It is, therefore, essential that some proper method should be adopted whereby changes may be made in the constitution as it applies both to internal and external affairs. Every writer and speaker, Dominion or British, who has spoken or written upon the subject, agrees upon the propriety of this. Apart from this, however, it is no part of the scope of this article to argue for or against any particular change or amendment. Each proposal

must be discussed on its merits when proposed. My purpose is not at the moment to advocate any particular change, but to point out that changes are necessarily coming in the almost immediate future and that these changes should be dealt with deliberately and methodically, and not in a haphazard and accidental fashion.

At the impending Constitutional Conference in London, the subjects to be dealt with will be of far-reaching effect. The national destiny of Canada will be profoundly affected by the decisions arrived at. These decisions must be made by representatives of Canada on the one hand and representatives of the British government on the other.

Who shall these representatives of Canada be? How shall they be appointed? What will their instructions be? How will such instructions be prepared? What method will be adopted for ascertaining the wishes of the people of Canada upon the questions which are to be decided?

Hitherto it has apparently been taken for granted that in all these matters the prime minister of Canada should automatically be accepted as the representatives of Canada with such of his colleagues as he was pleased to designate or as were included in the invitation. Latterly, as somewhat of a concession to democratic ideas, it has been suggested that the leader of the opposition should be included in such a delegation, but this innovation has not yet been confirmed or put in practice.

It is to be noted that there has always been a pronounced attitude of reserve, reticence, and secretiveness on the part of the prime ministers and governments towards parliament and the people with regard to these matters. Sir Wilfrid Laurier never could be induced to discuss constitutional subjects with the House of Commons freely. Sir Robert Borden never took counsel with the House of Commons before the event, and Mr. Meighen was markedly non-committal and secretive both before and after his participation in the late Imperial Conference. I think it may be said without offence that in these matters even the colleagues of the prime minister have had difficulty in finding out what was to be done or, after the event, what had in fact been done. The disposition has been to do as little as possible, to do it behind closed doors, and to say as little as possible about it. The wise statesmen evidently were of the opinion that the less said or done, the smaller the probability of getting into trouble. All this may not have been of serious importance before the war because the



matters dealt with were not of the first importance, and the general tendency of affairs was quite satisfactory to the great majority of the people. During the war the government of Canada, like other governments, was more or less vested with autocratic powers. Since the war, however, the same practice has prevailed. Mr. Meighen went to the last Conference. His attitude upon the subject of the Japanese alliance was undoubtedly in accordance with the popular view in Canada, but his further action while in England is entirely obscure. We do not know what it was. The statements of Mr. Lloyd George quoted above contain all the information we have. Mr. Meighen has told us nothing. We do not know whether or not he agrees with the interpretation put by Mr. Lloyd George upon the proceedings of the Conference. It is a most serious matter of complaint that the prime minister of Canada should take part in important inter-imperial conferences, and make no report by which we may know to what extent he has sought to commit Canada.

If the practice of the past be adhered to, some time in the course of a year or so there will be a Constitutional Conference at London, and an invitation will be received by the Canadian government to attend it.

At that Conference the whole question of the powers and status, internal and external, of the British Dominions and their participation in the affairs of the world will be settled.

Categorically, the questions to be decided will be somewhat as follows:

(1) Shall Canada have complete autonomy in internal affairs and plenary power to amend her own constitution at will?

(2) Shall such power be accompanied by a status of complete equality with the United Kingdom?

(3) Shall Canada join with General Smuts and say, "We have achieved our independence, and we desire steps to be taken to give that independence legal and international effect?"

(4) Shall Canada assume power to deal with foreign nations as a sovereign power and settle questions of peace and war for herself, thereby gaining immunity from all wars of the Empire, and also thereby gaining plenary power to settle her own civil and trade relations with the world at large? Or,

(5) Shall Canada accept Mr. Lloyd George's definition of her status and unite with Britain and the other Dominions in directing all matters of foreign policy of Britain and the Dominions throughout the world through the British Foreign Office, thereby



incurring actual participation in and joint responsibility for every war of the Empire.

There are no questions which can ever arise with respect to any nation that are more important than these.

As I have said, an invitation will in due course come to the Canadian government to participate in the Conference at London which will settle these questions. Following the usual course Mr. King would designate one or more of his colleagues to accompany him. He might also invite Mr. Crerar and Mr. Meighen. Mr. Crerar and Mr. Meighen would probably require to be delegated by the House of Commons before consenting to go, or they might decline the responsibility altogether. But on the assumption that Mr. King, Mr. Crerar, Mr. Meighen and one or more of Mr. King's colleagues go as delegates, what is the position then?

No one in Canada knows what Mr. King, Mr. Crerar, or Mr. Meighen thinks about any of the subjects that are to be dealt with. No one of them has ever spoken or written anything, so far as we know, which in any respect whatever can be said to define his views except that Mr. Crerar has spoken against a centralizing tendency. The people of Canada, therefore, would be represented by three men whose opinions are unknown, and who have almost certainly never made any special study of the subjects that are to be dealt with. That would be rather undesirable, but it might be remedied because they can study the subjects now, and they can express their views so that people can know what they are.

There is, however, another difficulty which cannot be removed. Neither Mr. King, Mr. Crerar, nor Mr. Meighen have the faintest idea what the majority of the people of Canada think about these questions, and they have no way of finding out, even if they were willing to abjure their own views, and give effect to those of the people. If it be said that they can consult parliament, we are in no better case. The members of the new parliament know nothing whatever about the opinions of the people on these questions. If it be said that in any event it is the business of parliament to transact the nation's business, and that the opinions of the majority of parliament should govern, the answer to that proposition is conclusive. The members of the Canadian parliament are elected to carry on the affairs of the country under and in accordance with the constitution. Except in trifling details they have no authority whatever to change it.

What then are the views of the people on these questions? Nobody knows. It is quite certain that the opinions of the people are only half formed or not formed at all. Ninety-nine out of every hundred electors have never considered the questions. Before they can form their opinions there must be full discussion in the press and on the platform.

The proposition that any four or five members of parliament, however eminent, with unknown views and absolutely uninformed as to the views of the people, should blithely proceed to settle the destinies of the country, may be dismissed as unworthy of discussion. He would surely be a brave man who would accept the position of delegate under such circumstances. He might find his public career summarily terminated when he returned. Such, indeed, would be a very probable result. Public opinion in such cases crystallizes slowly, and sometimes along entirely unexpected lines. One thing, however, is absolutely certain. The people of Canada will in the long run insist on their national destiny being settled in conformity with their own views, and if anyone prematurely attempts to settle it without ascertaining their views the consequences are apt to be disastrous to the person or persons involved. This whole question is emphatically one for submission to the people. No good can come from any attempt to withdraw it from their deliberate judgment or to settle it behind tiled doors. Let us have a frank, full, and exhaustive discussion. Let everybody be heard. Let us get the best possible expression of the considered judgment of the people and accept it as final.

What method should be adopted for ascertaining the popular view upon the questions which have to be determined?

Two plans have been suggested, both of which are worthy of serious consideration.

The first suggestion is that a constitutional convention should be held composed of delegates elected directly by the people. Parliament could pass an Act dividing the country into districts, specifying the number of delegates to be elected and providing the machinery of election. If this were done and the delegates were chosen on a large scheme of proportional representation, it is probable that it would result in a fairly complete representation of the views of all sections of the community. The convention thus elected would proceed to revise the constitution.

It might be provided that the constitution so revised should forthwith be deemed to represent the wishes of the Canadian people or it might be provided that the revised constitution

should be submitted to popular vote. Both these methods have been practised at different times in the United States.

Another plan suggested is that the House of Commons should form a select committee, representing all parties, whose duty it would be to draft a revised constitution. Such a committee would no doubt secure the assistance of the best constitutional lawyers. The result of the committee work would be reported to parliament, and by parliament submitted to the people.

In the case of either of the above plans it would be quite feasible when the submission is made to the people to place the matter before them in the shape of alternative propositions so that the voters would not be bound simply to the acceptance or rejection of a single formula.

These details need present no serious difficulty. The essential thing is to have a full discussion and an informed and authoritative expression of the people's wishes.

CLIFFORD SIFTON

## THE LAST OF THE OLD TORIES:

A REVIEW OF THE EARLIER CAREER OF ROBERT, THIRD  
MARQUIS OF SALISBURY<sup>1</sup>

IN the world of British political history there are signs that the old literary ascendancy of the Whigs and Liberals is no longer to go unchallenged. The tradition, which Macaulay confirmed, had been gloriously continued by a series of literary politicians, Trevelyan, Morley, Rosebery, and yet another Trevelyan—to mention only a few obvious names. But the Tory camp is at last astir. Mr. Fortescue's Ford lectures dealt some shrewd blows at the myth of Charles Fox. The biography of Disraeli, covering as it does more than half a century of great events, offers the impartial reader a history of nineteenth century England less radical in its sympathies than the narratives of McCarthy and Paul. And now, in the fulness of time, comes the biography of one who must always remain the test and standard of genuine Tory principle. It was important that one who played so great a part in his generation as the third Marquis of Salisbury, but who remained so much aloof from his fellows, and whose views were not those likely to be favoured by the coming age, should find a sympathetic biographer. The recent life, written by his daughter, will satisfy the most exacting lover of things conservative and Victorian. Lady Gwendolen Cecil has brought to her task a perfectly honest perception of her father's principles and idiosyncrasies, and, what is even better, an entire appreciation of them. Here is the life of a very great gentleman, written with a dignity worthy of the subject, and completing the intimate story of Victorian politics in a spirit appropriate to that age.

Robert Cecil<sup>2</sup> will always remain an important figure in the nineteenth century, because, apart from the interest attaching

<sup>1</sup> The primary authority used has been *The Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury*, by his daughter, Lady Gwendolen Cecil (Vols. I and II: London, 1921). The following have also been consulted: *The Quarterly Review*, more especially for the years 1860-1867; *Essays by Robert, Marquess of Salisbury*, London, 1905; Buckle, *Life of Disraeli*, Vols. IV-VI, London, 1916-20; Lord Morley, *Life of W. E. Gladstone*, London, 1903; Lord Morley, *Reminiscences*, London, 1917; Lord Newton, *Life of Lord Lyons*, London, 1913; Churchill, *Life of Lord Randolph Churchill*, London, 1906; and other works.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Robert Cecil became Lord Cranborne in 1865 and Marquis of Salisbury in 1868.

to him as an individual, he was the representative man of a class and party now almost vanished from the public life of England—a Tory, born in the ancient principles, holding to them with clear comprehension of their scope, and not ashamed to proclaim them unmodified, and to act on them without apology. He was representative, however, not in the sense of standing for the average, but as the natural and complete expression of a tradition and a class. Within that tradition he was *sui generis*, but he could have come from no other origin.

From the first, weak health and extreme sensitiveness held him apart from his own crowd, and reinforced tastes naturally exclusive and remote. There is a touch of pathetic humour in his constant endeavours to evade his fellows; in preparatory school finding life "an existence among devils"; condemning Eton as "insupportable"; at Oxford set apart from the healthy mob by the disabilities attaching to the Oxford climate. Curiously enough the political leaders in the nineteenth century who followed most normally the regular English means of education into public life were Peelite, Whig, and Liberal. The Tory chiefs, Castlereagh, Wellington, Disraeli, and Salisbury, pursued more irregular and individual courses. In Lord Salisbury's case the habit of social aloofness followed him into his official career, and his assistants sometimes found it difficult to trace a secretary of state who spent no little ingenuity in evading their company. Three things contributed chiefly to his training as a statesman, the traditions of his class, the necessity of earning a living by his pen, and the religion which, as with his great opponent Gladstone, was always the deepest thing in him.

From beginning to end, he thought, spoke, and acted as a representative of the British landed aristocracy. Their interests, not necessarily selfish, shaped his programme, their arrogant freedom from the arts of flattery and canvassing, gave him his brusque honesty and directness of utterance; in predecessors like Castlereagh and Wellington he found his models of statesmanship; accepting society as a balance of classes, he always thought disloyalty to his own class treason to the state. He once said, with reference to religion, that it was incomprehensible to him how any man could pass the age of forty, without having finally determined upon his religious views. He could have said the same, setting a much earlier age-limit, of political views. Unlike Peel and Gladstone, he never altered, for he represented something unsusceptible to change—the natural policy of an ancient caste.

It was his good fortune that, without an easy competence, he dared to marry, and to keep house on £700 a year. That audacious act forced him into letters and made him in early manhood publicist as well as politician. His own maxim was that excellence in speaking could only be achieved by practice in writing. But writing did more for him than that. The chief danger in the way of old Tory politicians has always been that passion and prejudice have dominated their utterances, and that they neither could, nor cared to, analyse the arguments for their own side. But Lord Robert Cecil did for himself and his party a service similar to that performed by Burke for the Whigs in his pamphlets; and whatever literary reputation he possesses depends on the long series of very able political analyses and criticisms in the *Quarterly Review*, which bear the imprint, not of his name, but of his style. The *Saturday Review*, then at the height of its short-lived fame, was another standby: and we owe to Lord Morley an illuminating glimpse of the aloof and silent young Saturday Reviewer, waiting each Tuesday morning in the editorial ante-room for his commission. "He, too," says Lord Morley, "had a talent for silence, and we exchanged no word, either now or on any future occasion." It was a fortunate necessity for his party which drove Lord Robert Cecil into journalism. The Peelite schism had deprived the Tory party of its natural leaders. Lord George Bentinck had been impossible from the beginning, except as hero of what one must call the most interesting of Disraeli's political novels; Derby's indolence of mind and conscience threatened dissolution to the party; so the Tories found themselves reluctant pawns in Disraeli's great game against the Whigs for personal power. Possibly the old Tory party must end, but it was well that it should fight to the last under its old flag, not merely faithful to, but conscious of, the principles it defended. Of such stern and unbending Toryism Lord Robert Cecil was the natural spokesman.

The predominant feature in his articles is a certain fierce simplicity. There is no subtle or elegant argumentation, no spinning of ingenious fancies, or tricks of the literary gentleman, such as Bolingbroke and Disraeli loved. It is a Tory aristocrat saying forcibly exactly what he means about things fundamental to him. Lord Robert Cecil's interests were always concrete interests, and nothing infuriated him more than those fantastic abstractions and generalizations, with which Disraeli confused the public and betrayed his party. "A new error," he once said,

with an obvious glance at the man of mystery, "could never be said to have secured its footing, or to be furnished with the proper apparatus for conquering the popular mind, until its most important fallacies have been disguised in the form of catchwords or party cries." Speaking or writing from a definite, and, to him, incontrovertible position, he was naturally, not merely uncompromising, but perfectly contemptuous of his opponent. He argued for the mastery, and seldom that he might convince the unbeliever. In his daughter's admirable phrase, "It is improbable that those who differed from him in any fundamental sense were ever influenced to a change of view by his writings or speeches. He certainly did not deserve that they should be, for he never made an effort to convert them." He was neither missionary nor propagandist. It was his business to reawaken his own class and to force them to see the extent and consequences of their class programme. For the rest, it was battle *à outrance*, gladly accepted, and hotly joined.

For such work his gift of brutal honesty and piercing satire were peculiarly appropriate weapons. Indeed he lives to-day for the man in the street by virtue of his penetrating and unrestrained indiscretions. These indiscretions were the natural expression of a satiric humour, which spared sham in neither friend nor foe. They made enemies, but at least they banished cant. Other men's epigrams were blank cartridges for peaceful field-days; his were bullets aimed to kill. No collection of Victorian wit can be complete without a selection from these piercing missiles. In answer to Gladstone's abolition of purchase of commissions, he said, "Seniority tempered by selection means stagnation tempered by jobbery." He aggravated the Irish problem with his suggestion of "twenty years of resolute government"; and having injured the Irish party by his Parnell Commission report, he proceeded to add insult to injury in his contemptuous answer that the famous forgeries, in which he had much too readily believed, were of no consequence save "as proof that one nationalist could forge the signature of another." Disraeli was perhaps the only man who could have accepted with a smile the fusillade which burst on him in 1867. With unflinching urbanity he told his former colleague that the *Quarterly* article on the Conservative Surrender was "written by a very clever man who has made a very great mistake." "Everybody who does not agree with somebody else is looked upon as a fool or as being mainly influenced by a total want of principles in the conduct of



public affairs." The satiric habit did not cease when the writer had become prime minister. "I hear you've passed a Local Option Bill in your house," he genially remarked to his lieutenant in the House of Commons, W. H. Smith. "I suppose they count on a good drunken majority in the House of Lords to throw it out." It is futile to ask whether the wit was worth what it undoubtedly cost. Clever men always prefer their indiscretions to their comfort, and the world will always remain diverted, and possibly assisted, by the satiric sincerity which overthrew so many solemn plausibilities.

The most permanent force operating on Lord Salisbury's earlier life was unquestionably his religion. Yet here the accepted judgments on him as High Churchman misinterpret the man. His Christianity was fundamentally different from that of the ordinary ritualistic Scribes and Pharisees. Churchman he was, but his "high" views had some curious gaps in them. He disliked confession, except in a few special cases, and thought it "at its best, fatal to moral vigour—at its worst, an instrument of corruption or ambition." He spoke scornfully of "the chemical theory of orders," and disowned any system which pigeon-holed the mysteries of faith. The truth is that his beliefs were far too fundamental to adapt themselves to any narrow system. Like another believer of that time, Cardinal Newman, his faith was based on a most profound appreciation of the difficulty of belief. He faced all the gloomy facts, and could see little or no explanation of them save in the supernatural illumination of the Christian revelation. He had no confidence in schemes of metaphysical argument to prove that God existed; and, unlike most moderns, he owned the authority of Christ, not because His words were admirable, but because His personality was divine—for him, the divinity justified the teaching, not the teaching the divinity. Like Pascal, his God was One who concealed Himself, and who could be known usefully only in Jesus Christ. The natural world, too, seemed so little naturally Christian that he held Christianity "incapable of co-existing permanently with a civilization which it did not inspire." There was something of the Calvinist or fatalist in him. Man was in the hands of a Power to be understood only through revelation; he was an instrument used by spiritual forces beyond his control. They talked to him of "doing good" by personal service, but he answered, says his daughter, "with the rapid intense utterance which characterized his rare moments of unreserve, 'Yes, but not by you—never by



you—never allow yourself to believe that for an instant.” With much of the fatalism of the great Puritans, he had nothing of their desire for self-revelation, or their unction of phrase. His religion was a central fire, tempering his spirit and conscience but never apparent on slight occasions, and even at crises working indirectly. It was revealed through the qualities which made him a very great gentleman—his perfect honesty of soul, his belief in principle, the sense that all he did assumed without hesitation the primacy of spiritual issues.

It is impossible, within the limits of this review, to deal with the whole scope of Lord Salisbury's earlier political career. But two episodes, one domestic, the other diplomatic, occupy so great a portion of the biography, and are so entirely representative of his methods and ideas, that they must be considered in detail. The first is the Reform Act of 1867, the second the Eastern problem which found a period in the Congress of Berlin. In 1866 Lord Cranborne, as he then was, became secretary of state for India in the third Derby administration, with Disraeli as presiding genius. The situation was more than curious. For twenty years Disraeli had been reshaping the Tory party, but throughout these years the Tory gentlemen had been restive under his guidance—never quite sure whither he meant to lead them. “Opponents were wont,” said Cecil, in 1860, “to speak almost with envy of the laudable discipline of the Tory party. They little knew the deep and bitter humiliation that was masked by the outward loyalty of its votes.” They had given up protection, under Disraeli's diplomatic guidance, and had supported the futile Reform Bill of 1859. But a crisis had now arrived. Thanks to John Bright's systematic agitation, reform had become, by 1866, an unavoidable political issue; and, now that Palmerston was gone, neither Russell nor Gladstone was in a mood for holding back. Gladstone, whose feet always travelled more slowly than his head, had talked of the moral right of all, who were not explicitly disqualified, to a vote; but his bill had offered something less drastic—a borough franchise of £7 and a county franchise of £14. He had won the support of the Radicals, but his bill had been shattered by a coalition of old Whigs and Tories; and the Derby-Disraeli government was now in power, with a majority in the House of Commons, and a successful effort against Reform to its credit.

What an honest Tory thought of Reform there was little doubt, and ever since 1860 Robert Cecil had been confirming his

party's views in a series of brilliant and weighty *Quarterly* articles. The British constitution was a series of balances or compromises. There was the balance of institutions, there was the balance of classes. In the world of institutions the balance had already been overturned by the predominance of the House of Commons, and, since the British executive, unlike that of the United States, responded quickly to the slightest wish of parliament, it was of vital importance to control the system of representation which moulded the popular house. Now, in the balance of classes, there was threat of a similar predominance by democracy, that is, by classes with a far smaller stake in the community than the upper classes, and with no natural regard for property. Disaster, for Lord Cranborne, lay in the predominance of a House of Commons which should be elected by a franchise overwhelmingly democratic. The consequences of that disaster, to the publicist of 1866-67, must involve the denial of the rights of property. "Wherever democracy has prevailed," he said, "the power of the state has been used in some form or other to plunder the well-to-do classes for the benefit of the poor." It was therefore constitutional wisdom to prevent this democratic class and majority from tyrannizing over the prosperous minority. It was quite certain that Disraeli concerned himself with no such fears. Quicker-witted than his party, he saw, with a foreigner's freedom from prejudice, first that the catastrophic consequences predicted by Cranborne and his group might not occur; and, secondly, that even should there be some peril it was the price which must be paid, if the Tory party was to maintain its connection with the British nation. No doubt, as subtle interpreter of party and aristocracy, he admired party principles and class loyalty, but one might pay too much for uncompromising adherence to quixotic standards. No course seemed quite secure, but Disraeli—and in 1866 he took Derby with him—determined on a great gamble in the interests of his party, and, incidentally, of the country.

His first pronouncement was a jaunty phrase about reform being no longer allowed to decide the fate of cabinets—a piece of cynical humour towards a party whose principles demanded the instant death of any cabinet which trifled with reform. In spite of steady remonstrances from Cranborne, Carnarvon, and others, he proposed a measure extensive enough to satisfy the people, and innocuous enough to conciliate his party. Householders were to have votes, but the voting householders must

also be ratepayers; and to counterbalance the enormous extension of the popular vote, the less numerous propertied classes were to recover their control through a most complicated system of plural votes. It is possible that Disraeli never believed in the artificial safeguards he proposed. In any case they all vanished under the stimulus of radical criticism. The cabinet situation, while the bill was under discussion, was too kaleidoscopic to be described within the limits of this review; but the net result was that, on Sunday, February 24, 1867, Lord Cranborne, having a little Sabbath leisure from his India Office work, spent the spare time in calculations, and, discovering that Disraeli meant to hustle him and his party into that very surrender to democracy which he had always feared, resigned. On Monday Derby and Disraeli faced a broken cabinet, half an hour before Derby had to explain a shattered measure to his party, and two and half hours before Disraeli had to introduce the same measure to a hostile House of Commons. It is unnecessary to repeat the story of "the leap in the dark." What happened was that a Tory cabinet passed a Reform Act infinitely more sweeping than that in opposition to which they had come into office. Disraeli had annihilated Tory principles, and, in his view, saved the Tory party. In criticism of the leap in the dark Cranborne was at his brilliant best. There is something very stimulating in watching a great reactionary fight his rear-guard actions. Without disputing whether he was right or wrong on the Reform question one must admit that an historic party, pledged to an aristocratic theory of the franchise, cannot begin by fighting progressives on the point, and then, having won a victory, attempt to recommend themselves to the country by developing the actual policy which they had just defeated. It may have saved the party, but it was what Cranborne called it—"a policy of legerdemain." It was power "purchased at the cost of a political betrayal that had no parallel in our parliamentary annals." Never, even when minister in the later Disraeli cabinet, did Salisbury recover that confidence in his chief's honesty which, as Lord Cranborne, he had flung away. "He had the greatest respect for every member of the government, except one," he told Disraeli with brutal honesty in 1868, "but he did not think his honour safe in the hands of that one." It is interesting to note that, on this whole episode, the moral judgments passed by Gladstone and Cranborne were at one.

After 1868, then, the only argument which could induce Lord Cranborne, or as he must now be called, Lord Salisbury, to rejoin

a Tory cabinet, was that his presence might help to save the party from new freaks of Disraelian political adventure; and nothing but that argument forced office on him in 1874. His objectivity of mind made him accept the fact that, if the Tories must hold office, he and his kind rather than Disraeli represented that party, and his presence would be a guarantee against possible betrayals in the future.

So we come to the House of Lords, the foreign secretaryship, and the Berlin Conference. Between 1874 and 1880 diplomacy claimed Lord Salisbury for its own, and he became, for a quarter of a century thereafter, the most authoritative voice proclaiming the international policy of Great Britain. The facts of the situation, which brought Lord Salisbury definitely to the front in 1876, are too familiar to require more than the briefest of summaries. Turkish misrule had provoked one of those local and racial outbreaks—this time in Bosnia and Herzegovina—which Europe had come to accept as natural incidents in Turkish government. Discontent had grown general, and, in suppressing disorders in Bulgaria, the Turkish soldiery had exceeded even their usual limits: Russia, as protector of the Slavic and Balkan states, had stepped in, and the great despotic northern and eastern powers began to act. In consequence, Europe was for three years in constant danger of a general conflagration. Lord Salisbury's activities, first as British representative at the Constantinople conference, then as foreign minister, and finally as Lord Beaconsfield's colleague at Berlin, constitute one of the most important chapters of his life and of British diplomacy in the century.

He entered on his diplomatic career with principles and a point of view almost as clear-cut as in domestic affairs. Fourteen years before he had written a masterly estimate of Castlereagh's statesmanship, which in many ways might be accepted as a comment on his own. He had dwelt on Castlereagh's essentially pacific intentions; but it was peace based on "a willingness for good cause to go to war," not on peace, as in the late Palmerstonian days, preceded by blustering interference, and established by helpless surrender. In Castlereagh he recognized with admiration that grim repression of sentiment and blunt challenge to sentimentalists to explain how hard facts could be changed by sounding generalities, which gave his own diplomatic words and acts their peculiar quality. In answer to the charges of heartless neglect of race, and of general cynicism, which Whig critics levelled against the chief English author of the terms of 1815, he summed up the

case for the defence in a paragraph which may be applied with little modification to his own diplomacy:

Lord Castlereagh's was not a mind in which excited feelings had destroyed the proportion between different objects of desire. He knew the very different values of the boons for which men indiscriminately clamoured. The graduation in his mind seems to have stood thus: he cared for nationality not at all; for the theoretic perfection of political institutions very little; for the realities of freedom a great deal; and for the peace and social order and freedom from the manifold curses of disturbances, which can alone give to the humbler masses of mankind any chance of tasting their scanty share of human joys—for the sake of this, he was quite ready to forego all the rest.

An indiscriminating public, confusing the cheaper and more obviously advertised glories of Disraeli and Chamberlain with the quiet, detailed labours for peace which marked all Lord Salisbury's diplomatic actions, have sometimes spoken of the Victorian Tory policy as Jingo and militant. The truth, as critics like Morley and Dilke always admitted, is that extreme caution, loyal adherence to engagements, sacrifices and compromises made to stave off war, and a very real, if quiet, spirit of humanity were the marks set by Peel, Aberdeen, and Salisbury on British Tory diplomacy.

In the Eastern difficulties between 1874 and 1878 the trouble was that the cause of sanity, which Salisbury represented, had too many foes, not merely in Europe, but at home. Gladstone, who understood neither the dangers of rhetoric applied to foreign policy, nor the error of making diplomacy a party issue, was proclaiming lofty doctrines the sublimity of which was in inverse ratio to their pacific tendencies. Derby, son of the late prime minister, and Disraeli's foreign minister, imagined that because passivity was sometimes useful he might refuse to act in emergencies where inaction spelt disaster. And Disraeli, mustering his spent energies for one last glorious scene before the curtain descended for ever on his great career, was prepared for any fantastic turn which might glorify his Queen and Country and round off his own political achievements. On the continent Russia played her usual double game—protector of the Slavs and aspirant to the headship of Europe; Austria was incalculable; France, impotent but militant; and Bismarck, the temporary Providence of the diplomatic world, might be expected to act for his own inscrutable pleasure and gain

some advantages for Prussia by setting all the rest of Europe by the ears.

It was a situation unlikely to bring glory to anyone concerned, but one where a sane humanitarian, who would banish sentiment and condescend to facts, might secure a peace, temporary, but even if temporary, useful. The second volume of Lord Salisbury's biography adds to our knowledge of the episode some fundamental facts, and while nothing can deprive that inimitable actor, Beaconsfield, of the glory due to the hero of a successful melodrama, it is plain that if he brought honour home his junior colleague saw that it was in company with peace.

One may picture Salisbury's action as a composite and changing thing. It is plain that he cared nothing for the Turk. "We have not the power," he said in September, 1876, "even if we had the wish, to give back any of the revolted districts to the discretionary government of the Porte." He complained of the Greek and Anglo-Turkish cliques, who queered the course for him in Constantinople by encouraging the Sultan, and from first to last it is apparent that what Gladstone called Beaconsfield's crypto-Judaic fondness for the Turk interrupted his colleague's most skilful moves for peace. Again and again it seemed to him that partition was the only possible solution, and partition with Russia as an acknowledged partner. He had no illusions or sentimentalities on the matter. Turkey was rotten; the little Balkan peoples were then, as now, even more dangerous to peace as nations than as tributaries. He wished peace, and the retention of the Concert of Europe. The partition of Turkey and the aggrandisement of Russia must be effected if peace could be had at no other price. Unlike his countrymen, he disbelieved in the actual strength of Russia. Unlike them, too, he had gauged the fundamental dishonesty of Russian statesmen. Ignatieff, the Russian representative at Constantinople, he linked with Midhat Pasha as one of the "biggest pair of liars to be found in Europe"; and Ignatieff and his colleagues practised diplomacy on a moral level which would have excluded them from any decent gambling den in London. Still, liars as the Russians were, it was worth agreeing with them in a settlement, if peace might be preserved thereby.

Nothing is plainer in all this, than that Salisbury was no fire-eater. In the moment of his own deepest perplexity he found time to send Lytton in India a characteristic word of warning: "You listen too much to the soldiers. No lesson seems to be so



deeply inculcated by the experience of life as that you never should trust experts. If you believe doctors, nothing is wholesome; if you believe the theologians, nothing is innocent; if you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe. *They all require to have their strong wine diluted by a very large admixture of insipid common sense.*" (The italics are my own.) For a time it seemed as though the soldiers would have the last word. Partly through Beaconsfield's injudicious encouragements, the Turks proved unresponsive to the desires of Europe, and Russia struck in. It was a time peculiarly trying to Lord Salisbury. He entirely distrusted his chief. Carnarvon, his closest associate in the cabinet, and his companion in a previous retirement, resigned. Derby, the other obvious friend of peace in the cabinet, also retired. Moreover, as we now know, Queen Victoria was in a militant mood. I doubt if there is anything finer in Salisbury's earlier career than the action, and the reason for the action, taken by him as successor in the Foreign Office to Derby. He dared not leave the situation to the fantastic mercies of his chief's imagination. He had a jealous care for the reputation of his party; his unexpressed love of England bade him stand by in an awkward crisis; and he knew that, literally, peace depended on his sole action. Russia, early in 1878, was prepared to make her last desperate thrust at Constantinople. Neither Carnarvon's scruples nor Derby's love of peace mattered if Russian action forced war on Britain and Europe. So from the famous criticism of April, 1878, in which Salisbury tore in shreds the Russo-Turkish treaty of San Stephano, to the end of the Berlin Conference, the British foreign minister was playing a game, with all the cards against him, to maintain the Concert of Europe, and through concert, peace. It must be clearly understood that there was little in common between the aims of the two famous plenipotentiaries who brought Peace with Honour back from Berlin to London. Salisbury had no illusions about glorious victories, or the renovation of the Turkish state. He was bent on saving what he could out of a wreck. It was his purpose to bring the Eastern question back within the operations of the European Concert, with as much satisfaction to the subjects of Turkey, as little upset to Europe, and as secure safeguards to English interests as was possible. It was he who did all the detailed work. He proposed Cyprus as a base from which to restrain Russian operations in Asia Minor, and he attended to everything except the staging of the more melodramatic episodes at Berlin. There were characteristic differences in the attitude



of the two great English leaders towards the final settlement. For Beaconsfield, it was "roses, roses, all the way"; triumphs and feasts and honours, impossibly overdone reports to the Queen, and a world of illusions, in which that most inveterate of cynics deceived even himself. For Salisbury it was an awkward and dirty job, finished off as properly as difficult circumstances permitted. His own honest verdict came two years later: "I was only picking up the china that Derby had broken." As for his opinion concerning his illustrious chief, some admirably frank letters to Lady Salisbury—the cessation of which on her arrival in Berlin makes us grudge husband and wife their happy meeting—put the matter succinctly: "He is not exactly false, but he has such a perfect disregard for facts that it is almost impossible for him to run true. . . . This makes him very difficult to work with because, whenever he does handle a detail, he almost always does with it exactly the reverse of what he intended."

Not even success, and great success, could mislead his blunt and candid judgment as to possibilities. Even in 1878 he warned Turkey, and through Turkey Europe, of the dangers still imminent: "Whether use will be made of this—probably the last—opportunity which has thus been obtained for Turkey by the interposition of the Powers of Europe, and of England in particular, or whether it is to be thrown away will depend on the sincerity with which Turkish statesmen now address themselves to the duty of good government, and the task of reform." He never had it in his power to eliminate the disastrous consequences of parts of the Berlin settlement. But by his high sense of international honour, his love of hard fact, and his genuine desire to maintain Europe in some kind of concerted action, he secured peace and temporary stability.

We shall await with impatience the coming volumes of the biography, for they will deal with great issues—the Irish question, the relations of Britain, through twenty momentous years, with France and Germany, the long story of imperial development. But readers of Lady Gwendolen Cecil's first instalment will carry away with them impressions of a very lofty nature, inspired with a sense of honour, which national vanity likes to think peculiarly British, an entire honesty of purpose, and a capacity which delighted in concealing its most characteristic successes from the crowd, whose interests it sought, and whose plaudits it contemned.

J. L. MORISON

## IMMIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT IN CANADA, 1812-1820

THE emigration that for a century and a half had been building up the old colonies of England was only slightly interfered with by the change in the political status of those colonies after the American Revolution. After 1783 as before, every year saw the new republic enriched by thousands of settlers from the old country, while Canada remained neglected and unknown<sup>1</sup>. The war of 1812-14 to a certain extent changed this: in the first place, it made a great deal of very bad blood between Britain and her former colonies; in the second, it called attention to the existence of a British portion of the New World. That Canada got much advertisement out of the war among the emigrating masses is doubtful; that she got a good deal amongst officialdom appears fairly evident. At any rate, for several years afterwards, the war, and considerations arising out of it, governed official opinion on emigration to, and settlement in, Canada.

The necessity for defending the colonies called attention to their weakness. The most obvious thing to be done, towards strengthening them, as also the most desirable, was to increase their population and thus in time render British North America capable of defending itself. But if British North America was to remain British, great care must be taken to see that only a loyal and trustworthy population should be introduced. Whatever consistent policy the Colonial Office thereafter had was based on these two considerations. Problems of immigration and settlement were, without doubt, the major problems of the day. Owing to the small number of inhabitants and the desire of the great majority of the newcomers to go on the land, the government had to concern itself very closely with the immigrant and his affairs. It becomes of importance, then, to study the attitude assumed towards these problems by those responsible for their solution.

<sup>1</sup> A. C. Buchanan, in his report for 1831 on immigration, estimates the total number of immigrants up to 1815 to have been about 5,000.

The first step towards providing a population adequate to self-defence was taken as early as 1813 by Lord Bathurst, then but newly appointed secretary of state for the colonies. He proposed to send out a number of Scottish emigrants, to give them free passages, free land, and other assistance, and in return to secure a fairly large deposit from each head of family as a bond against removal to the United States within two years of arrival. The proposal, having been submitted to the Canadian authorities, was enthusiastically approved of by Sir Gordon Drummond<sup>2</sup>. The prospective settlers would form very valuable additions to the loyal population of Upper Canada—a province which already contained too many aliens. Moreover, the Scots would make good militia-men—a fact that would outweigh any objections to the increase in the number of mouths to be fed. Naturally enough, at such a time Drummond's interest was primarily military; he looked on immigrants as means for ensuring the retention of the colony by Britain. This view is representative in that most of the colonial officials, at that time and for some years later, held it. It was a self-evident principle to them, crowding into a very subordinate background the question of building a strong colonial state by means of whatever immigration would best secure such a purpose. It led to a careful selection of immigrants on the bases of approved loyalty and military usefulness, to attempts at the arbitrary location of settlers for strategical purposes, to experiments in settlement (such as the Rideau and Drummondville colonies, which were settlements of military men run on strictly military lines), to a vigorous and narrow anti-American policy and, generally, to an over-emphasis of considerations of defence.

This strategic motive was so dominant in everybody's mind that it will be in order, at this point, to examine it more closely.

Writing while yet the war raged, Prevost states to Bathurst (May 9, 1814) that he has desired to settle the Glengarry Fencibles in the township of Sherrington because, it being near the lines, they could defend the frontier in case of future attack. In a similar way the islands in the St. Lawrence near Kingston were held to be particularly important sites for the location of settlers who could be relied upon not to go over to the enemy, either during or after the war. The adjutant-general, Baynes, was of the opinion that these and other key-localities should be settled

<sup>2</sup>Drummond to Prevost, Feb. 19, 1814.

by ex-soldiers; other settlers would not voluntarily go near so dangerous a frontier, and if left vacant, they would soon fill up with an American population that would willingly sit on whichever side of the fence best suited for the time being. Even the soldiers would not be too reliable, for, without exception, desertion had proved a drain on every corps employed in frontier duties; "the ideal blandishments of the United States is so powerful an incitement that the corps of the highest established reputation have not escaped frequent desertions."<sup>3</sup>

After the war was over, the formation of a second line of communication between Montreal and Upper Canada was proposed. This line was to run *via* the Rideau and Trent Rivers and Lake Simcoe to Lake Huron. It was pointed out that such a line could be made in war only at great expense, but that if the country along it could be settled, when the need arose, there would be roads over the portages and plenty of transport available along the route.<sup>4</sup> This was perfectly correct, of course, and undoubtedly the St. Lawrence was a very precarious line in time of war; from Kingston to Montreal, for example, the only settlers whose loyalty could be depended on had been the Scots of Stormont and Glengarry.<sup>5</sup> If people would only go where they were told and cast their lots according to the doubtlessly sound plans of the military chiefs, the desired settlements might have been made. But pioneers, like other people, have a way of looking out for themselves first and the state afterwards, so that the second line was slow in forming, and emigrants passed by the beautiful lakes (and barren rocks) of the Rideau to the more fertile lands of the west. Not for over twelve years more was the line formed, and then not by settlement, but by the engineers of the mother country in the building of the Rideau canal.

Opinions in the matter of strategic settlement were indeed much more common than accomplishments; the Scottish settlers sent out by Bathurst (to whom we shall refer again) were, it is true, placed in the Eastern district of Upper Canada along the frontier, but the deciding motive in their case was the fact that in that locality they would be in touch with other Scottish settlers who had preceded them.<sup>5</sup> The most formal attempts made to colonize on the strategical plan were the Rideau and Drummond-

<sup>3</sup> Baynes to the governor, 18 June, 1814.

<sup>4</sup> Major-General F. P. Robinson to Bathurst, 29 July, 1915

<sup>5</sup> Baynes to the governor, 18 June, 1814.

<sup>6</sup> F. P. Robinson as above.

ville military settlements. Plans for semi-socialistic communities in British North America were, of course, legion. It was easy enough to sit in a London club and draw a picture of a beautiful little Utopia somewhere out in America where the citizens were the best of soldiers and the most industrious of pioneer farmers at one and the same time, but it was quite another matter to translate these schemes into accomplished facts.<sup>6</sup> To the credit of the Colonial Office, be it said, most of these schemes to kill two birds with one stone died a quiet death within the confines of the United Kingdom. The government's own scheme, however, was proceeded with. All disbanded soldiers were to be given land on condition of actual settlement, and the chosen band who elected to join their fellows on the banks of the Rideau or the St. Francis, were to be given much more—implements, log-cabins and food. The initial expression of opinion was voiced by Prevost in his despatch of March 18, 1815. He takes it for granted that the settlements should be made at strategic points. Debating the question as to the policy that should be pursued with regard to the frontier townships of Lower Canada, he states that the settler there would find a wilderness between himself and the St. Lawrence. He would also find easy communications leading to the United States: the inevitable consequence would be that the easy and evil communications would corrupt his good manners, no matter how loyal he had been to begin with. Moreover, the experience

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Col. David Stewart's "Observations on the Means of Obtaining from the Highlands of Scotland an Efficient and Permanent Force for the Defence of Canada in the event of Future Wars and for Promoting Cultivation and Augmenting the Population of the Colony," April 24, 1815: "One or more effective regiments may be raised from the Emigrants, for the double purpose of defence, of increased population and cultivation. The Male progeny of these emigrants would become both Cultivators and Soldiers as they arrived at the age of Puberty," thereby not only increasing the Military Defence of the Colony but Augmenting the Cultivation of the Soil." "The boon offered might be fifty acres of land to every private, seventy acres to every Non-commissioned Officer," etc. "Still more to attach the people to the soil it might be politic to stipulate that the eldest son of each Family who entered into the Army should be entitled to a freehold grant of fifty Acres." "These lands to be laid out as near as possible to the different Military Depots where Log Houses should be built by the troops for each family, the one assisting the other in clearing the Land for a Garden and Orchard, and in cultivating when they could be spared from Military duty. A Village would be thus formed in the Vicinity of every Military Depot which would rapidly rise and become of some consequence; while the Military were occupied in the duties of their profession, their children who were growing up would assist in the cultivation of their little farms. Under such circumstances a Military Force almost to any extent might be raised and ultimately supported at very moderate expense." (Canadian Archives, Series Q, Vol. 135, pt. 2.)

of the war had shown that a broad belt of wilderness was the country's best defence. Therefore the best plan was to leave the frontier alone and put the men on the St. Francis where the soil was generally good and where communication with the rest of the country was easy. A compact population would spell security. Prevost was also careful to point out that under no conceivable circumstances would regular soldiers make good farmers.

The Upper Canadian settlement met with less intelligent criticism, Lieutenant-governor Gore merely remarking that as it was apparently the government's policy to put "a consolidated loyal population" between the Ottawa and the St. Lawrence on the Rideau, he was setting aside three hundred thousand acres for that purpose.

At first only the corps specially raised for service in the colony were designated as recipients of government aid, but finally almost any discharged soldier could join the settlements and live under semi-military discipline. Inevitable blunders were soon made, leading to delays in getting the men located and consequent loss of enthusiasm. "I must apprise you that the spirit of enterprise which appeared to actuate the de Watteviles on their first arrival has evaporated in consequence of their not being placed on their lands and that some have already quitted the settlement and others have notified their intention of following their example," writes Supt. McDonald to Deputy Quartermaster-General Fowler.<sup>7</sup> Every despatch from England inculcated economy and the abolition of aid as soon as possible; less than one year after the settlements had been begun Bathurst was expecting that soldier-settlers would be able to sustain themselves, but instead of that most of the people at Drummondville, inexperienced even in agriculture, let alone pioneer agriculture, were plunged in abject misery. To make matters worse a number of Chelsea pensioners were allowed to come to Canada: these people were destitute on their arrival and many of them old and infirm. The governor protested, but further consignments continued to arrive. No arrangements were made to have their pensions forwarded to them and the spectacle was not uncommon of a soldier, who had served his country faithfully, begging in the streets. Bathurst stated that he had thought that these men would have made most successful settlers as they would have "in their pensions the means of comfortable subsistence until their lands were

<sup>7</sup> June 18, 1816.



cultivated and they would not easily be led to remove into the United States".<sup>8</sup> So much for his knowledge of the realities of colonial life.

By the end of 1819 a total of 235 people—men, women and children—had been received at Drummondville<sup>9</sup>; a considerable administrative establishment continued to be kept up. The sites of the military settlements were chosen on grounds of military expediency, but the settlements themselves appear to have been undertaken chiefly with a view to assisting the demobilized soldier—and incidentally to increasing the loyal population of the country.

Within a year or two after the end of the war the strategic note was perceptibly softened; officers who had fought were recalled; general peace had come and an active policy of defence gave way to a state of mind which, while recognizing that the Americans were no longer an imminent danger, retained all of the ill-feeling engendered during the war. Americans to the official class, whether in their own country or out of it, were taboo. Hence we have a period during which anti-Americanism bulked large. Here at least there was a clear-cut policy on immigration. It may be put in three words: "Keep them out!" That American immigrants were in general more intelligent, more prosperous, and better suited to the new country than any possible arrivals from Europe (including Great Britain), had nothing to do with the question; the Americans were factious democrats who brought with them their republican principles and their presence could only be, at the best, dangerous to the British connection, at the worst, fatal to it. Democracy was not yet popular in Canada.

But under the circumstances the attitude was an entirely natural one. During the war disloyalty had been found to be widespread; Americans who had come in previously had in numerous cases gone over to the enemy. American peaceful penetration had gone so far that "a few years would have rendered Upper Canada a complete American colony." "The population, with the exception of the Eastern District, are chiefly of American extraction; these settlers have been suffered to introduce themselves in such numbers that in most parts they form the majority, and in many, almost the sole, population. In some of the most populous parts of the Settlements, two-thirds of the inhabitants

<sup>8</sup> Bathurst to Sherbrooke, Sept. 5, 1817.

<sup>9</sup> Can. Archives, C. 625, p. 105.



have absconded, abandoning valuable farms; even Members of the Provincial Legislature have gone over to the enemy." Thus the doughty patriot, Baynes.<sup>10</sup> His views were the views of officialdom. They were put into official form in Bathurst's despatch to Drummond of January 10, 1815, in which orders were given that no land was to be granted to Americans, and that they were to be prohibited as far as possible from coming into Canada. Nevertheless, Americans kept coming and, to keep them out of Upper Canada, a rather ingenious use of a current provincial statute was resorted to. All persons who had not been resident six months in the province, or who had not taken the oath of allegiance, could be "dismissed" upon very slight grounds. Lieutenant-governor Gore ordered the magistrates not to administer the oath to any person "without a special authority"; no "special authority" being likely to be extended for the administration of the oath to Americans, they thus became automatically subject to "dismissal".<sup>11</sup> In addition, all children of Loyalists when applying for their land-grants were required to furnish a certificate proving their loyalty during the war.<sup>12</sup> The refusal of the oath of allegiance was continued during the following years, and residence in the United States during the war became prima-facie evidence of enemy nationality.<sup>13</sup> On the other hand, we have a glimpse of slowly changing public opinion in some "Resolutions proposed to the Commons House of Assembly on the 3rd April, 1817" and published in the *Kingston Gazette* of April 12. These seek to establish by existing statutes (13 Geo. II and 30 Geo. III) that Americans, despite the Revolution, still have the rights of natural-born citizens, and claim that, as the country needs, above all else, population to fill up its vacant lands, Americans should be allowed to take the oath of allegiance.<sup>14</sup> In the same year, James Buchanan, British consul at New York, submitted a proposal for the admission of American immigrants and argued that there was no danger of their disloyalty as self-interest would bind them to their new home. But the weight of public opinion seems to have been against American immigration.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>10</sup> June 18, 1814.

<sup>11</sup> Gore to Bathurst, October 17, 1815.

<sup>12</sup> Canadian Archives, "Upper Canada Sundries," January 27, 1815.

<sup>13</sup> Minutes of the Executive Council, Upper Canada, January 22, 1817.

<sup>14</sup> These resolutions are not found in the Journals of the House.

<sup>15</sup> See the *Quebec Mercury* of November 14, 1820: "We are well aware of the prejudices of the country on this point," etc.

An interesting phase of the immigration from the south was the movement initiated by Buchanan, having for its aim the sending of British subjects already in America to Canada. He got permission to issue passports to these people (strictly excluding those who had been there during the war) and, painting in glowing terms the prospects awaiting them in Canada, he managed to induce several hundred to go there; he judged the hatred they had conceived of everything American—presumably owing to their lack of success among the Americans—would be most useful in Canada. Buchanan's zeal outstripped his prudence and some of his immigrants were refused admittance by Gore on the grounds that they were seditious Baltimore Irish and a very bad lot indeed. But the consul, elated with his success, got permission to advance the fare of such others as were willing to go. Finally the stream of work-hungry men began to dismay leisurely Canadian officialdom, and Buchanan, *viâ* London, was ordered to restrain his enthusiasm. It is stated for he forwarded "about 3,000 poor Irish who are chiefly located in the township of Cavan and have prospered".<sup>16</sup>

Turning now to the attitude, more particularly, of the Imperial government on emigration to British North America, we find that, during the war it had appeared as if a well-considered and comprehensive scheme were about to be embarked upon. The Scottish settlers, to whom we have referred above, were quickly got together, brought to Glasgow, looked after until embarked, and on arrival had land allotted to them. Everything was carefully supervised, and apparently a fair measure of success was obtained. The authorities were very careful to explain that their motive was the diversion from the United States of inevitable emigration—a motive which was as much stressed then as now. Bathurst terms it "too obvious to require observation",<sup>17</sup> "one of the great objects of His Majesty's Government",<sup>18</sup> and so on. It is very explicitly stated in the official notice of the discontinuance of free passages<sup>19</sup> that "it cannot be too much impressed on the minds of applicants that the wishes and instructions of Government are directed not to the increase of emigration from this part of the united kingdom [*i.e.*, Scotland] but to direct to the British Provinces in North America, the surplus population that would

<sup>16</sup> A. C. Buchanan's Report on Emigration, 1831.

<sup>17</sup> To Drummond, June 13, 1815.

<sup>18</sup> June 12, 1815.

<sup>19</sup> Copy of notice published in Scotland, in Campbell to Goulburn, March 27, 1816.

otherwise proceed to the United States". Letters having "diversion" for their theme rained upon the government. Typical examples are those of a Mr. Bell (June 22, 1814) from Scotland, who claims that the system of farming in vogue is drawing men overseas daily and that free passages will take them to Canada in preference to the United States; and of the lieutenant-governor of Guernsey (April 21, 1816), who forwards a long list of Channel Islanders who will go to the United States if some inducement to go to Canada be not given them.

The Hundred Days put a stop to government aid to emigrants; under the altered circumstances, writes Bathurst five days before Waterloo, no government encouragement to go to Canada is for the present to be given to anybody, and the administrator need not expect nearly as many families as it had previously been intended to send.<sup>18</sup> This cessation of an active colonizing policy, it was thought, was only temporary; but, as it turned out, direct aid, insofar as free passages and other direct assumption of expense by the Home government went, was not resumed. The need for economy at home, and perhaps the influence of those land-holders hostile to a policy which threatened to rob them of their tenants, brought the movement to a close; on March 23, 1816, official notice was given that no more free passages would be provided. A despatch of the following summer curtailed aid to the land grant alone,<sup>20</sup> and a recommendation of Sherbrooke's that settlers be given subsistence for one year after arrival met with a discouraging negative.<sup>21</sup> The following spring a few were given agricultural implements (at the province's expense), and free land was given to approved settlers, who, by the way, had to leave England before June 1,<sup>22</sup> but thereafter, with every outward despatch, the need for economy is inculcated. The era of paternal colonization ends.

What followed it? If we look for any broad and well-defined policy of emigration and settlement, we shall be disappointed. Whatever policy there was, was a hand-to-mouth policy, based on parsimony; of organized effort to colonize and settle the new country, there was none. In fact, English public opinion seemed to be quite hostile to the colonization of Canada, even when privately undertaken. A prevailing view was that British North America must, sooner or later, be absorbed by the United States,

<sup>18</sup> July 13.

<sup>21</sup> Sherbrooke to Bathurst, December 19, 1816.

<sup>22</sup> Bathurst to Sherbrooke, April 14, 1817.

and that money and men sent there would thus be wasted. Hence we find *The Times* (April 5, 1817) contending that North America is no proper place for British emigration. In another war, Canada could not be defended and would be lost outright, together with its British population. If it could be defended the emigration of disbanded soldiers and the unemployed might be in order, but in any case emigrants passed over to the United States and became a net loss to the Empire. "The Western Hemisphere from Hudson's Bay to the Straits of Magellan seems destined by Providence for other nations." Such extreme opinions were probably not representative, but they help to explain why the authorities were unwilling to adopt an aggressive policy.

Towards the end of 1817, the Colonial Office began to discriminate against the poor emigrant. Persons to be favoured were now to be those "who shall be possessed of some means to carry out and maintain a certain number of Cultivators".<sup>23</sup> As securities would be required from these people, it was hoped that the evils occasioned by the influx of needy emigrants during the last year would be obviated. In 1817 there had been 6,800 immigrants, nearly all desperately poor; great numbers were maintained at the colonial government's expense and by charity.<sup>24</sup> Insomuch as this policy determined that the Canadas were not to be a happy hunting ground for the Motherland's poor, it was sound. Unfortunately, it did not last, and in succeeding years British America again became the objective for hordes of hungry paupers, while the well-to-do tended to go to the United States. In 1818 the policy was reaffirmed.<sup>25</sup> One of the first settlers to proceed under it was a Mr. Milburn, who was recommended to Sherbrooke by Bathurst (as all settlers of this type were supposed to be) and noted as leaving for Canada with a number of "followers" and as a suitable person for a grant. No further change in the official attitude arose during 1819, the end of the period under review.

We have now reviewed the characteristic policies and opinions of the authorities, both home and colonial, in respect to immigration into Canada during the five years' post-war period. We have found little of a constructive nature, but despite the absence of lead or encouragement, immigration steadily grew. In 1816, there came by sea to Canada 1,250 immigrants; in 1817, 6,800;

<sup>23</sup> Bathurst to Sherbrooke, Nov. 10, 1817.

<sup>24</sup> Sherbrooke to Bathurst, Despatches Nos. 148 and 149.

<sup>25</sup> Bathurst to Sherbrooke, May 16.

in 1818, 8,400; in 1819, 12,800; and thereafter increasing numbers. Canada had emerged somewhat from the total obscurity of pre-war days, and had begun a period of sound growth.

A. R. M. LOWER

## THE TRENT AFFAIR OF 1861

THE *Trent* Affair of sixty years ago has been described as "the most farcical incident in the history of Anglo-American relations".<sup>1</sup> It was farce, however, that seemed for a time to be nearing the border of tragedy; and its results, particularly the alienation of British sympathy from the North during a large part of the Civil War period, were regrettable. Sixty years afterwards, one may well wonder how either nation would have justified itself to posterity had war actually come; and there is room for speculation as to what would have been the future of Canada had the British provinces been the battle-ground of a second Anglo-American struggle.

The beginning of the incident need be reviewed but briefly. In the autumn of 1861 the government of Jefferson Davis decided to send to Europe commissioners in the persons of James Murray Mason and John Slidell, both of whom had been formerly senators at Washington. No two men were more hated in the North, and when, on the morning of November 8, Captain Wilkes, of the U.S. sloop *Jacinto*, halted the British steamer *Trent*, plying between Vera Cruz, Mexico, and the Danish islands of St. Thomas, and by force removed the two southerners, there was wild enthusiasm all through the North. It was the first effective blow that had been struck at the South in months, and from cabinet secretaries down to the meanest citizen there was nothing but praise for Wilkes, who at once became a national hero.

There was no cable to carry the news swiftly to Europe and thus, although the capture took place on November 8, and became known in the United States on the 15th, it was not until the 27th that anybody in England knew about it. In those latter twelve

<sup>1</sup> Villiers and Chesson, *Anglo-American Relations, 1861-1865*, London, 1919, p. 51. Mr. Charles Francis Adams says: "Seen through the perspective of fifty years, it may now, with reasonable assurance, be asserted that in the controversy which ensued, the United States did not have, and never had, in reality, a justifying leg to stand upon, and least of all was there any justification for the course pursued by Captain Wilkes" (*Amer. Hist. Rev.*, vol. xvii, no. 3, p. 544).

days there was quite a cooling off in some quarters in America, doubts arising in a few men's minds as to the legality of the seizure by Captain Wilkes, but while doubts were arising in the United States, war fever was at a tremendous height in England, and Henry Adams, son of the ambassador at London, could write to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., at Boston: "This nation means to make war. Do not doubt it."<sup>2</sup>

Henry Adams, in London, was astonished at the childish way in which his own people across the Atlantic were treating the incident. "There's Judge Bigelow," he wrote, "parading bad law 'at the cannon's mouth', and Governor Andrew all cock-a-hoop, and Dana so unaccustomed confident, and Mr. Everett following that 'great authority', George Sumner, into a ditch, 'blind leader of the blind'."<sup>3</sup> There does not seem to have been any fever for war with Great Britain in the circle in which the Adams family moved in Boston. "We have been quaking over the seizure of Mason and Slidell," wrote C. F. Adams, Jr. on November 10, and he expressed a suspicion that Seward was trying to get the United States into a foreign war.<sup>4</sup> This suspicion was in the minds of many other people, including Lord Lyons, the British ambassador at Washington, in whose correspondence the idea recurs again and again. Lord Lyons had a marked dislike for Seward even before the latter had taken office. "I cannot help fearing that he will be a dangerous foreign minister," he wrote early in 1861, and again, "His view of the relations between the United States and Great Britain has always been that they are a good material to make political capital of. He has even to me avowed his belief that England will never go to war with the United States".<sup>5</sup> The British ambassador was uneasy over the character of the Lincoln cabinet generally. "Neither the president

<sup>2</sup> *Cycle of Adams Letters, 1861 to 1865*, edited by Worthington Chauncey Ford, 2 vols, Boston, 1920, I, 76, letter of November 30, 1861. This was but three days after the news had reached London.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 83, letter of December 13, 1861.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 70, letter of November 10, 1861. In a letter written on November 19 Charles Francis Adams, Jr., says that "at first every one thought it must be a violation of national law," but opinion changed when "Dana crowed with delight" (*Cycle*, I, 71). Lord Lyons noticed that mixed with the enthusiasm there was a certain amount of fear of the consequences. Writing to Lord John Russell on November 25, he says: "The people here are extremely frightened about the capture on board the *Trent*. The New York money market gives signs of this. Another indication is the moderation of the newspapers which is, for them, wonderful" (*Lord Lyons*, I, 57).

<sup>5</sup> Lord Newton, *Lord Lyons, a Record of British Diplomacy*, 2 vols, London, 1913: Lyons to Russell, vol. I, p. 30.



nor any man in the cabinet has a knowledge of foreign affairs," he wrote to Lord John Russell.<sup>6</sup> All through the spring months of 1861 the ambassador's anxiety increased, so apparent were the signs that, in the minds of many, a foreign war would be the solution of the distracted domestic situation in the United States.<sup>7</sup> The culmination of his anxieties came in June when he reported to the British government his discovery that Seward had prepared a despatch which was all but a direct announcement of war, and that it was only the intervention of the president and of the more reasonable members of the cabinet which prevented its being sent to the American minister in London.<sup>8</sup> In the summer of 1861, however, Lord Lyons thought that matters were improving and in August he wrote to the governor of Canada, Sir Edmund Head, that relations were more peaceful than they had been in some time. He attributed this improvement to the firmness with which the British government had stood for its rights and to the preparations for defence.<sup>9</sup> Writing to Lord Malmesbury he said: "I should hardly say that the bulk of the common people are hostile to the old country but I think they would rather enjoy seeing us in difficulties."<sup>10</sup>

The elder Adams was undoubtedly right when he sent word from London: "This nation means to make war." Almost daily the old Duke of Cambridge was busy inspecting troops that were setting out for Canada, and indeed some of the finest regiments in the British army were crossing the Atlantic. Especially among the upper classes was there a readiness for war. "England," wrote a prominent foreign office official, "is naturally and rightly furious at this outrage. Apart from this, ministers and the upper

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 37.

<sup>7</sup> "I am so seriously alarmed by what I see passing around me here, and especially by the conduct of the cabinet, that I have thought it my duty to call the attention of our government to the danger which I conceive to exist" (Lyons to Sir Edmund Head, May 22, 1861, quoted in *Lord Lyons*, vol. I, p. 39). To Sir Edmund Head he also wrote: "Canada is, as you know, looked upon here as our weak point. There are in the cabinet men who are no doubt as ignorant of the state of feeling in Canada as they were of that in the Southern States and who believe that there is a strong American feeling in Canada. You will not have forgotten that Mr. Seward, during the presidential canvass, publicly advocated the annexation of Canada as a compensation for any loss which might be occasioned by the disaffection of the South" (*Lord Lyons*, vol. I, p. 40).

<sup>8</sup> *Lord Lyons*, vol. I, pp. 46-47.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 50.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 16.

classes are in favour of the South, while the Queen and the lower orders favour the North."<sup>11</sup>

Thus was the situation neatly and concisely put by one of the upper class. England was quite right in the stand that she took with regard to the action of Captain Wilkes, but there was a bitterness of feeling towards the North during 1861 that stands out in striking contrast to the Anglo-American courtesy of recent years. The leaders in *The Times* were often savage, so much so that in October of 1861 John Bright was moved to complain that "in *The Times*, the most powerful representative of English opinion, at least of the richer classes, there has not been, since Mr. Lincoln took office in March last, one fair and honourable and friendly article on American affairs".<sup>12</sup> What must Bright's feelings have been, about a year later, when he read in *The Times* this sentiment: "Is the name of Lincoln ultimately to be classed in the catalogue of monsters, wholesale assassins and butchers of their kind?"<sup>13</sup> Perhaps, had war actually come, we should to-day have reason to place a part of the blame on the newspapers both in England and America. Lady John Russell, writing to Lady Dunfermline, said Lord John felt that "not a word had been spoken, not a deed done by him but what showed the friendliest feeling to the United States, and the strongest wish to remain at peace with them". But she added:

I wish the newspapers were blameless; but there was a sneering, exultant tone in many of them after the military disasters of the North which was likely to irritate. Mr. Motley said long ago that *The Times* would, if possible, work up a war between the two countries, and though I can't speak from my own knowledge, as I have seldom looked at its articles, I have no doubt from what John and others say that he was right. . . . There can be no doubt that we have done deeds very like that of Captain Wilkes—not exactly alike because no two cases ever are so—but I wish that we

<sup>11</sup> F. W. H. Cavendish, *Society, Politics and Diplomacy, 1820-1864*, London, 1913, pp. 362-363. In his diary for December 3 Cavendish wrote: "I hear Lord Palmerston wrote a violent despatch to go to Washington, which the Queen and Prince Albert modified. France is warmly backing us up while Russia, Austria and Prussia are most sympathetic."

<sup>12</sup> Speech at Rochdale, Sept. 4, 1861.

<sup>13</sup> *The Times*, October 14, 1862. It is to the credit of *The Times*, however, that during the actual crisis of the *Trent* affair its editorials, while firm, were not too aggressive and many public men wrote to Delane thanking him for his attitude on the issue. See Sir Edward Cook, *Delane of the Times*, New York, 1916, p. 131.

had not done them, and I suppose and hope that we shall admit that they were wrong.<sup>14</sup>

When the crisis was passed, the United States having acceded to the British demands and surrendered the two Confederate commissioners, Lady John Russell was sufficiently observant to note the "very tempered joy, or rather the ill-concealed disappointment of London society" over the outcome.<sup>15</sup> Not all the jingoes were in Washington in November and December of 1861.

The part played by the dying Prince Consort in smoothing out the difficulties must not be overlooked. The last official act of his life was the revision of the despatch that was to go to Washington. "A violent despatch," was the way a foreign office official could describe the document which was sent to the Queen for approval. At seven o'clock on the morning of December 1, the Prince Consort wrote, with a quavering hand, a series of suggestions for alterations to the draft. It was a softening down of its wording sufficient to leave the way open for peace. Two weeks later, the Prince was dead. His last act had materially aided in averting war.<sup>16</sup>

Lord Lyons, the ambassador at Washington, deserves credit too for the manner in which he played his exceedingly difficult part. His own view was expressed in his letter to Lord John Russell on December 23, 1861, when he said: "I am so convinced that unless we give our friends here a good lesson this time, we shall have the same trouble with them again very soon, under less advantageous circumstances, that even my regard for them leads me to think it all important that they should receive the lesson."<sup>17</sup> In his dealings with Seward there was no trace of either bullying or weakness, and Seward, when he was finally cornered, had to admit that the British note was "courteous and friendly and not dictatorial or menacing."<sup>18</sup> He could hardly have said that of the original draft of the despatch.

What of the Canadian provinces during this period when it appeared that they might become the battle-ground of a great war? There was evidence of the possibility of war in the steady movement of garrison troops westward to the lake borders and in

<sup>14</sup> *Lady John Russell, a Memoir*, London, 1910, p. 194.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 195.

<sup>16</sup> See Sir Theodore Martin, *Life of His Royal Highness the Prince Consort*, London, 1875-1880, vol. v, pp. 416-427.

<sup>17</sup> *Lord Lyons*, I, 69.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 65-66.

the arrival of the fresh British troops a little later on. There was great activity in the volunteer militia, and a patriotic wave swept the whole country. But patriotic fervour did not blind clear minds to the horror of a possible war. The *Toronto Globe* expressed this feeling when it said, in its issue of December 13, 1861:

The Canadian people do not desire war with the United States. On the contrary, and notwithstanding the hot feeling now rising, a war with the Americans would be regarded with horror by the great mass of the community.

At an earlier date the *Globe* had pointed out:

The danger is that hard feelings may be incited . . . and that pride may prevent justice being done on one side or the other. Patriotic men on both sides of the line should use all their exertions to prevent that result.

The *Toronto Leader* was less temperate in its comment. It was regarded as the newspaper voice of the government of the day, so that its utterances were of some weight. Eventually, probably under pressure from the government, the *Leader* found it necessary to present prominently a statement that it was not to be regarded in its editorial utterances as voicing the views of the administration. There was a good deal of quarrelling between the rival *Toronto* journals, the *Leader* charging the *Globe* with pandering to "Yankee bluff" and the *Globe* in turn charging its rival with seeking to bolster up a tottering ministry by stirring hatred against the United States.<sup>19</sup>

In December of 1861, while the excitement was at its height, the Hon. A. T. Galt, then finance minister, was in Washington and had an interview with President Lincoln of which the details have

<sup>19</sup> The *Leader* had on its editorial staff for a time one George Sheppard, lately come from Richmond, Va. The *New York Times*, in its issue of January 1, 1862, hinted that the *Leader's* editor was in the pay of Jefferson Davis. The *Leader* took note of this and denied it on January 6, 1862. The *New York Commercial Advertiser* was quoted by the *Globe* as saying: "We are loth to apply any harsh epithets to a part of our Canadian neighbours, much less to all. But if such journals as the *Toronto Leader* were to be accepted as the mouthpiece of public sentiment they would do their best to make us believe hard things of those of whom we have always thought and spoken in the kindest spirit" (*Globe*, Dec. 27, 1861). An example of the *Leader's* bitterness might be quoted from its issue of January 4, 1862, in which it said: "The government of Mr. Lincoln is a standing monument of incompetence and wickedness." The occasion of this denunciation was the sinking by the federal authorities of some old stone hulks to block the entrance to the harbour of Charleston, S.C.

been preserved.<sup>20</sup> Lincoln disclaimed for himself and his cabinet all thought of aggression towards Canada and said that he himself had been opposed to Seward's circular putting the coasts into a state of defence, but had been overruled. Galt asked what was meant by the recommendations to erect fortifications and provide depots of arms on the Great Lakes, to which the reply was: "We must say something to satisfy the people." About the Mason and Slidell case Lincoln remarked: "Oh, that'll be got along with," and he also volunteered the observation that if he could not within a reasonable time get hold of Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri, and keep Maryland, he would tell the American people to give up the contest, for it would be "too big" for them.

Lincoln impressed Galt with his sincerity and honesty of purpose, but Galt was of the opinion that there was a considerable lack of harmony in the cabinet. He brought back with him to Canada a letter from Lord Lyons to the governor-general of Canada, urging the necessity of immediate further preparations for defence.

It is interesting to note that during the crisis of the *Trent* incident the French-Canadian press and the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Quebec took a decided stand with regard to preparations for defence. In its issue of January 4, 1862, the *Toronto Evening Leader* said:

There is not a single organ of French-Canadian opinion that has not urged the necessity of being prepared for war; and done more or less to inspire its compatriots with a sense of duty on the approach of danger.

The administrator of the diocese of Quebec, the Rev. Charles François Baillargeon, issued a pastoral letter to be read in all the churches of the diocese, urging the young men to join the militia and ordering special prayers "for the preservation of peace or for the happy success of our arms, if war takes place".<sup>21</sup>

The *Trent* incident, perhaps more than any other single incident during the Civil War period, was an influence in the development

<sup>20</sup> Galt's memorandum on his interview with Lincoln, dated December 5, 1861, is printed in full in Skelton, *Life and Times of Sir Alexander Tilloch Galt*, Toronto, 1920. See also Newton, *Life of Lord Lyons*, vol. I, p. 60. In a letter to his wife, Galt said of Lincoln: "I went by appointment last night to see the President and had a long and satisfactory private interview. He is very tall, thin, and with marked features, appears fond of anecdote, of which he has a fund. I liked him for his straight-forward, strong common-sense." Of Seward, Galt wrote: "He did not impress me much, seemed fidgety and out of temper" (Skelton, *Life of Sir A. T. Galt*, pages 314-315).

<sup>21</sup> *Evening Leader*, January 4, 1862.

of the transportation systems of both Canada and the northern states. There was an immediate movement, through the north-western states in particular, for the building of larger canal systems that could not be troubled by "the ghost of British fleets upon the lakes". The danger of war had probably been much exaggerated in the Northwest, and some of the resolutions that were passed by state legislatures and conventions of various kinds have within them more or less indication of panic. In June, 1863, at a ship canal convention held in Chicago, and attended by five thousand delegates, it was urged that the federal government be asked to aid in the construction of a waterway from the Mississippi to the lakes and from the lakes to the Atlantic. While the federal finances did not permit acceptance of such plans, there was a decided impetus given to the development of internal waterways. The restrictions that were being placed upon the Canadian canal system also encouraged the states to develop their own waterways.<sup>22</sup>

The *Trent* incident and its attendant difficulties were presented to the British government as good reason for assisting with the building of the Intercolonial Railway.<sup>23</sup> An application for aid made in 1857 by Macdonald and Rose had failed, but in 1861, with the possibility of war ahead, the home government looked at the railway project in more favourable light and agreed to extend a guarantee to the road. But, since it was for military purposes that the road was being considered by the British government, strong pressure was brought to bear to have a route well separated from the Maine boundary. In Canada there was a fear that unless the "northern route" were adopted the imperial authorities would be disinclined to extend their guarantee, and so in a sense we owe the present inconvenient route of the government railway through the maritime provinces to the act of Captain Wilkes and its consequences.

F. LANDON

<sup>22</sup> See Callahan, *The Lake Frontier during the Civil War* (American Historical Association, annual report, 1896, vol. I, particularly pages 340-342). In the same way needs of defence had had much to do with developing the Canadian canal system at an earlier date.

<sup>23</sup> See *Canada and its Provinces*, vol. x, pp. 417-419.

## NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

### EXAMINATION OF A DESERTER FROM CANADA ABOUT 1708

The document reproduced below is contained at f. 174, vol. 102, of the Clarendon MSS. in the Bodleian Library, amongst the papers of Lord Cornbury, the grandson of Clarendon and the governor of New York from 1701 to 1708. The document is unsigned and undated, but is clearly the report of the examination of one Pierre Barbecq, a French soldier in Canada, by the English to whom he had deserted. Its date may be fixed at 1708 from the mention of the fort at Detroit having been begun seven years before. In 1708 also, as is stated in the text, Vaudreuil was governor of Canada, the Raudots, father and son, shared the intendant's office, and Subercase was governor of Acadia. Information of the sort Barbecq might give would be specially looked for by the English in 1708, since in this year plans were made for the abortive land and sea expedition of 1709 against Quebec.

The information contained in the document is mainly military. There were in Canada, Barbecq tells us, twenty-eight companies of regular troops, the same number, we may note, as in 1701. These companies, however, instead of being fifty strong, averaged only fourteen or fifteen, the strongest being eighteen. This made the total of regular troops not more than four hundred—a third only of those in Canada seventeen years earlier. The decline is in part explained by Barbecq's statement that no reinforcements had reached Canada from France since the arrival of four hundred troops seven years before. Since then had come the heavy demands made on France by the war in Europe. Barbecq's figures agree with those of Vaudreuil in his report of 1709, where the number of regular troops is given as three hundred and fifty, exclusive of the Detroit detachment, though sailors, militia and Indians brought the total available force of the colony above three thousand.<sup>1</sup> Apparently the regular troops were not only reduced in numbers, but were also ill-supplied, if we may credit

<sup>1</sup> *New York Documents*, ix, 725, 833, 841.



Barbecq's statement that no clothing had come for them for five years. We know from other sources that the British capture of the King's ship *La Seine*, with its valuable cargo of supplies for the colony in 1705 had caused considerable distress there.<sup>2</sup> The English troops in New York were reported a few years earlier as no better off for clothing than their rivals.<sup>3</sup>

Regarding the disposition of the regular troops, we learn that there were thirteen companies at Montreal—presumably under two hundred men—with eight hundred militia. At Three Rivers there were three companies, at Sorel one ridiculously weak "company" of four to six men; the number at Quebec we are not told. There is some information about the defences along the St. Lawrence basin, in particular around Montreal, but the information is limited. Sorel had a stone fort with a garrison of eighteen to twenty men, apparently not all regulars. Three Rivers had no fort, and there was no fort in the thirty leagues between that place and Quebec. Of the fortifications at Quebec itself, all we are told is that they were being added to year by year. Montreal itself is described as fortified with stone, and within its government were a number of forts. At Saut des Recollets was a small stone fort and a large wooden one; at Bout de l'Ile a stone fort with a garrison of eight men; at Chambly a wooden fort with a garrison of sixteen. The importance of Chambly for the defence of Montreal and the threat to it in 1709 led to the commencement of a stone fort there in 1710.<sup>4</sup> Barbecq mentions the names of the other "forts" near Montreal, but says nothing as to their nature or garrisons. Further afield, whilst he omits Fort Frontenac, he mentions Detroit with Fort Pontchartrain, which last had, he says, a garrison of two hundred soldiers and habitants under La Mothe Cadillac. He also knows of the mission of Clerambaut D'Aigremont (D'Egremont), who was sent in 1707 to report on conditions at Detroit and Michillimackinac, and also to consider whether it was worth while to place a fort at Niagara. He is apparently wrong in saying that D'Aigremont had either prepared plans for such a fort or gone to France to present his report, for D'Aigremont reported against the proposal, and Pontchartrain dismissed the project as "not

<sup>2</sup> Kingsford, ii, 420; *New York Documents*, ix, 758.

<sup>3</sup> Parkman, *Half Century of Conflict*, 6, 7.

<sup>4</sup> Kingsford, ii, 451.

expedient" in a letter to him the following year.<sup>5</sup> Yet the English were naturally alarmed at the idea, as the examination shows.

Pierre Barbecq, having thus given his brief account, steps back behind the curtain with a reminiscent appreciation, probably sharpened by seven weeks in the wilds, of the "bonnes maisons" he had left behind him at Montreal.

R. FLENLEY

[*Transcript.*]

Pierre Barbec de Valenciennes age de vingt et cinq ans dit qu'il a demeuré sept ans à Paris ou il s'enrola dans un regiment de marine commandé par Monsieur de Ramsay ou il s'engagea pour trois ans, et vingt en Canada il y a neuf ans, il a reste deux ans en Quebec, et environ sept ans à Montreal dans la compagnie de Monsieur La Mesni, il a este au Detroit pres d'un an, le detroit est a trois cent lieues de Mont Real (le detroit est a deux cent lieues d'albanie). Dans tout le Canada il y a vingt et huit compagnies de troupes réglées qui composent un Regiment, la plus forte Compagnie est composée de dix et huit hommes les autres de moins et ne font en tout pas plus de quatre cens hommes. Dans la gouvernement de Mont Real il y a huit cens hommes de Millice, le gouvernement de Mont Real contient Sorelle,\* St. Tour, Contrecoeur, La Corne, Verchierre, Le Cap St. Michel, Le Cap Varrennes, le village de Varrennes, Boucharville, Le Tremblay, Longueille, La Prairie St. Lambert, La Prairie de la Madelaine, Le Saut St. Louis, Chateau Gué, tout au sud, Bertier, Repentigny, La Rivière des Prairies, L'Isle Jesus, La Chesnaye, Le Saut des Recolets, il y a un petit fort de pierre et un grand fort de bois, Le Pointe de Tremble [aux Trembles], La Longue Pointe, Mont Real fortifié de pieux, a treize compagnies de garnison, Le fort Curie, Le fort Remy, Le fort Roland, Le bout de Lisle d'en haut un fort de Pierre, garnison de huit hommes, le fort de Chambly, de bois a seize hommes de garnison, Les trois Rivières a trois compagnies mais point de fort, entre Quebec et Trois Rivières trente lieues mais point de fort, entre Trois Rivières et Mont Real trente lieues. Ou travaille a fortifier Quebec de pierre, peu a peu toutes les annees, dans cinq annees il est arrivé tous les ans un vaisseau du roy et trois ou quatre vaisseaux marchands, il y a cinq ans que les soldats ne sont pas habillés, il y a sept ans qu'il vint quatre cents soldats de France en Canada, depuis il n'en est point venu. Il y a sept semaines qu'il a quitté Mont Real, il a deserté parce que ou voulait l'envoyer au destroit, Le destroit est un nouveau

<sup>5</sup> *New York Documents*, ix, 805, 819, 826.

\* Compagnie entière 4, 5, à 6 hommes, etc, fort de pierre 18 ou 20 hommes.

établissement commencé il y a sept ans par l'ordre de Monsieur de Pontchartrain, un nomme Le Mothe commandoit la, il y a un fort nommé le fort de Pontchartrain, ou il y a deux cent hommes, soldats et habitants, un nomme Degremont a este à Niagara pour en faire le plan et il est allé en France pour faire son rapport, pour qu'il soit fortifié. C'est un endroit qui estant fortifié empechera nos sauvages d'aller à la chasse, il y a cent et vingt grandes lieues d'albanie à Niagara, de Niagara au Destroit il y a quatre vingt lieues au sud ouest. Monsieur de Vaudreuil est gouverneur du Canada, Monsieur Rodeau [Raudot] le pere est intendant du Canada, le fils Intendant pour les troupes, Monsieur Supercasse [Subercase] est gouverneur de l'Acadie. D'Albany a Chambly il y a 80 lieues par eau, de la par terre a Mont Real il y a sept lieues mais par eau il y en a 36. Le grand portage est de quatre lieues. Il y a des bonnes maisons a Mont Real, cet homme icy est charpentier de son metier.

#### THE ORIGINAL "SALARY GRAB" IN UPPER CANADA

When Upper Canada set up as a country legislating for herself, her constitution was described by her first lieutenant-governor, Colonel John Graves Simcoe, as "the very image and transcript" of that of the mother country.<sup>1</sup> Nor was this wholly untrue. There was an Executive Council corresponding to the ministry, and responsible to the governor representing the king, a Legislative Council not wholly unlike the House of Lords (the members having a life tenure but the office not being hereditary) and a Legislative Assembly of elected members which claimed the privileges and sometimes used the name of the House of Commons.<sup>2</sup>

The members of the Executive Council, which as such was no part of the parliament, were paid by the imperial government

<sup>1</sup> Speech from the Throne on prorogation, October 15, 1792; 6 Ont. Arch. Rep. (1909), 18.

<sup>2</sup> *E.g.*, on June 17, 1793, a resolution was carried in the Assembly "That the Speaker do inform N. B. Sheehan, Esquire, Sheriff of this District [the Home, formerly the Nassau, District], that the House entertain a strong sense of the impropriety of his conduct towards a Member of this House in having served a Writ of Capias upon the said Member contrary to his Privilege, and that the House has only dispersed with the necessity of bringing him to their Bar to be further dealt with from a conviction that want of reflection and not contempt made him guilty of an infringement upon the privileges of the House" (6 Ont. Arch. Rep., 1909, 21, 22). So, too, the members had the same privilege from arrest from forty days before to forty days after the sitting of the House. Rex, Gamble and Bolton (1832), 9 11. C.R. 546; Cix and Prior (1899), 18 P.R. 492.

£100 sterling each.<sup>3</sup> The legislative councillors had to take their pay in the honour of their position, but the members of the Legislative Assembly were not so patriotic. The province was a country of magnificent distances, and the members of the Assembly were, for the most part, men who were without means except the land which they held for themselves and their children.

In the first session there was considerable private discussion—I do not find that the matter was brought up in the House—as to the members being paid; and Simcoe reported officially that “many of the Members were not averse to Parliamentary wages.”<sup>4</sup>

In the second session, beginning May 31, 1793, a bill was introduced, and read the first time on June 18, to provide a fund for paying the wages of the “Members of the House of Assembly”. The bill was much more comprehensive, and it received its proper name on going into committee on June 25—“An Act to authorize and direct the Laying and Collecting of Assessments and Rates in Every District within the Province and to provide for the Payment of Wages to the Members of the House of Assembly.” The bill passed the committee, and was read the third time in the House, and sent up for the concurrence of the Legislative Council on July 4: it was read there the first time on the same day, the second and third times the following day, but did not finally pass until July 6, when it was sent back to the Assembly with amendments. The house concurred in the amendments, and returned the bill to the Council: it was then assented to by Simcoe on July 9, and so became law.<sup>5</sup>

This Act is not only the first for the payment of parliamentary wages in Canada, but also the first of a long train of Assessment Acts. It provided for taxation to pay for gaols, gaolers' salaries,

<sup>3</sup> Reduced very considerably sometimes by income tax and exchange. In those days £9 sterling equalled £10 currency. The “old par” of £1 sterling equalled \$4.44; £1 currency, \$4.00.

<sup>4</sup> See the very interesting despatch of Simcoe to Dundas, dated Navy Hall, November 4, 1792 (Can. Arch. Q. 279, Pt. 1, pp. 79 sqq.). Simcoe says of the members of the Lower House: “The persons who composed . . . the House of Assembly consisted chiefly of the most active characters in the several Counties. It was impossible to obtain any knowledge of the temper and disposition of the several candidates from the want of Intercourse and Communication, and perhaps had any wishes been formed for the success of any particular candidate, they must have been unavailable as no means could have been found to suggest them.” He was right; the members of the first House were in almost every instance outspokenly independent of governmental wishes.

<sup>5</sup> 6 Ont. Arch. Rep. (1909), pp. 32, 36, 39, 40, 42; in the Legislative Council, 7 Ont. Arch. Rep. (1910), pp. 29, 30, 33. The Act (1793) 33 George III, C. 3 (U.C.).

houses of correction, coroners, bounty for destruction of bears and wolves, "and other necessary Charges within the Several Districts of this Province". Section 30, after reciting that "it was the ancient usage of that part of Great Britain called England, for the several members representing the Counties, Cities and Boroughs therein to receive wages for their attendance in Parliament", enacted that every member of the House of Assembly should be entitled to demand, from the justices of the peace of the district in which his riding was situated, a sum not exceeding ten shillings<sup>6</sup> for each day he had been engaged in attendance in the House, and had been necessarily absent from his home, the amounts to be paid by local assessment provided for by the same Act. Simcoe did not like the Act. Although he gave the royal assent, he wrote in his official despatch to Dundas that the fund to be raised would, after the county charges had been paid, "leave a sufficiency for wages for the members . . . and some members insisting upon the payment of wages it was thought most equitable that they should be paid by the several constituencies to those who chose to demand them by a particular vote upon the plan of the District Assembly," *i.e.*, the quarter sessions of the district. Simcoe adds: "This project has already created some disgust and will probably lead to offers of unrewarded service from the candidates at the next elections".<sup>7</sup>

There is no extant contemporary account of any disgust being expressed except by those who did not receive wages, and there is no instance on record of any candidate offering his services without wages or reward, since few could afford it.

Dundas was as indignant as Simcoe himself. Writing on March 16, 1794, shortly after Simcoe's despatch must have reached him, he says of the members of the assembly: "Much is to be allowed to the novelty of the duties imposed on them and to the light in which they are called upon to view things, namely as not connected with them or that local consideration, but with the Protection and Welfare of the Province at large . . . a mode of viewing things naturally repugnant to the first impressions created in their minds. Nothing could tend more completely to the continuance of such first impressions and of course to a narrow and contracted policy than the idea of the members receiving

<sup>6</sup> Ten shillings currency, or nine shillings sterling, say \$2.20—not an extravagant amount when day-labourers received four or five shillings per day.

<sup>7</sup> Simcoe to Dundas, "York (late Toronto)", September 16, 1793 (Can. Arch. Q 279, pt. 2, pp. 335 sqq.).

wages from their several Constituencies, an idea which I trust will not be entertained by the Assembly for a moment."<sup>8</sup> *De haut en bas*.

However, the mischief was done; and while it is practically certain that had Simcoe received this despatch before the prerogation of parliament he would have reserved the bill for the royal assent, it was not thought wise to take any action in the matter. After all it was the money of Canadians, and not that of the Mother Country, which was to be used in this way.

There can be no doubt that the payment of wages by constituencies to their representatives in the House of Commons was the "ancient custom", but it had long been obsolete. Indeed, while there were "isolated instances of local payment of wages during the Commonwealth, as for instance at Newcastle-on-Tyne in 1654, such payment had long ago generally disappeared and it may be concluded that Andrew Marvel was the last member to receive wages regularly and freely paid by his constituents"<sup>9</sup>. Simcoe's expectation of the result from members claiming wages had much justification in the history of parliamentary wages in the Old Land: claims for wages were frequently made by retiring members of the House of Commons in England by way of a lever to secure their easy re-election on condition that they would not press claims. So common was this scandal that at one time a bill was introduced to put an end to wages for members. This bill failed of passage, however, and there was no prohibition against such claims. In Scotland, there were instances of members being elected on the express condition of charging no fees: no wages were paid there after the Union of 1707. In Ireland, such arrangements were not uncommon: on the eve of the dissolution of 1666, the House freed the constituencies from the payment of wages, for the parliament then approaching its end, by resolution "that in respect of the poverty of this Kingdom and the many taxes now upon it the members of the House do freely remit their several wages due to them for sending them to parliament." This did not quite put an end to the practice, for as late as 1727 members made agreements with their constituencies not to

<sup>8</sup> Dundas to Simcoe, Whitehall, March 16, 1794 (Can. Arch. Q 278 A, pp. 35 sqq.; Q 280, pt. 1, pp. 16 sqq.).

<sup>9</sup> E. Porritt, *The Unreformed House of Commons*, Cambridge, 1903, Vol. I, p. 51. In Vol. II, pp. 34-36, 76, will be found an account of such wages in Scotland. They were not paid after the Union. As to Ireland, wages there came to an end practically in 1666.

charge wages for their services in parliament.<sup>10</sup> The method provided by the Act of 1793 for the payment of the wages of members of the Assembly did not prove at all satisfactory. The statute reads: "It shall and may be lawful for the said Justices [*i.e.*, the justices of the district in which the riding was situated] to levy by assessment to be made on each and every Inhabitant Householder in the several Parishes, Townships, reputed Townships or places within the County or Riding represented by such Member by virtue of and in pursuance of an Order to be by the said Justices made for that purpose to the High Constable of the District who shall and may thereupon issue his Warrant to the Assessors of the Several Parishes, Townships, reputed Townships and places as aforesaid who shall assess the same . . ."; and in case any person should refuse or neglect to pay his assessed quota, the amount was to be levied by distress.

It requires no great effort of the imagination to recognize the unpopularity of such a special tax, and the members of the assembly found it unpopular. The matter was frequently mentioned in the general election of 1797 for the second parliament, and some of the candidates promised relief.

Nothing was done in the House in the session of 1797, so far as existing records show; but the proceedings of this session in both Houses are missing. In the session of 1798, which opened on June 5, David McGregor Rogers, member for Prince Edward and Adolphus, obtained leave on June 7 to bring in a bill "to remedy the inconveniencies arising from the present method of levying supplies to defray the expenses of members of the House of Assembly." It received its first reading; the next day it was read the second time, and went into committee of the whole. On June 11 it was passed and sent to the Legislative Council.

The change to be effected by this bill was to make the members' wages part of the expenses of the whole district, to be levied as part of the general rate.

The Council made some amendments, in fact emasculating the bill, and making the member's wages payable as before out of the taxes of his own constituency. The Assembly declined to agree to the amendments, and the bill dropped<sup>11</sup>.

<sup>10</sup> *Op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 34-36, 76, for Scotland; pp. 186, 194-198, 202, 328, for Ireland.

<sup>11</sup> In the Assembly: 6 Ont. Arch. Rep. (1909), pp. 58, 59, 60, 61, 65. In the Council: 7 Ont. Arch. Rep. (1910), pp. 60-63.



The Assembly was not at all pleased with what it considered the cavalier treatment of its bill: on June 30, Rogers moved and Dr. Solomon Jones, member for Leeds and Frontenac, seconded a motion "for leave to bring in on Monday a Bill to provide for the expenses of the Members of the Assembly while attending their service in Parliament." On Monday, July 2, the bill was read for the first and second times, and went to committee of the whole; the Committee promptly reported it, and it was the next day read the third time, and sent up to the Council, where it received the "three months' hoist" the same day, July 3.<sup>12</sup>

Thus far, the Assembly was within its undoubted rights, while the Council cannot be blamed for the implied rebuke of its peremptory treatment of the last-named bill whereby the Assembly had tried to get round the action of the Council on the former.

But now the Assembly went quite astray, and tried to bring about the first "salary grab" in Canadian history.

There was a provincial fund for paying the salaries of the officers of the Legislative Council and Assembly and for defraying the contingent expenses, stationery, etc. This was made up from licence fees from liquor dealers, and those who kept houses of public entertainment<sup>13</sup>. There were also certain licence fees from distillers<sup>14</sup>.

The House went into committee of the whole on the public accounts on June 15, 1798, and had obtained full information concerning the receipts and expenditures. It was found that there was a surplus, and when the news came that the Legislative Council had killed the Assembly's bill, the committee of the whole, on July 5, "after mature consideration recommended to the House to vote . . . sums . . . to reimburse twelve members their travelling expenses and during their attendance in Parliament this Session, the new mode of assessment not taking place this year". Parliament was prorogued the same day, the last

<sup>12</sup> In the Assembly: 6 Ont. Arch. Rep. (1909), pp. 81, 84, 85. In the Council: 7 Ont. Arch. Rep. (1910), p. 75.

<sup>13</sup> (1793) 33 George III, cc. 10, 13 (U.C.); (1797) 37 George III, c. 11 (U.C.). Liquor vendors paid £1/16 sterling per annum to an imperial fund. The colonial Act imposed a further sum of 20 shillings currency (say \$4.50). The keeper of a house of public entertainment paid the same, but was to be relieved of the 20 shillings tax from and after April 5, 1796. (1794) 34 George III, c. 12 (U.C.), regulated such houses and vendors, as did (1796) 36 George III, c. 3 (U.C.) and (1797) 37 George III, c. 11 (U.C.).

<sup>14</sup> (1794) 34 George III, c. 11 (U.C.).

act of the committee being to resolve that a copy of their journal should be presented to the House as their report, and the last act of the Assembly the adoption of their report<sup>15</sup>.

The Speaker sent, on July 9, to Peter Russell,<sup>16</sup> the President and Administrator his certificate of the various sums which had been voted payable out of the Provincial Fund. Russell recognized that the fund had been formed by parliament for a particular purpose, and that the one House had no power to change its destination. He laid the matter before the Executive Council on July 9, and the Council were unanimous that he could not honour the vote of the House.

Russell, accordingly, wrote to David William Smith, Speaker of the Assembly, on July 14, that he "was struck by the singularity of this application of the present Revenue which appeared to me to have been destined by the three branches of the Legislature to another service and consequently not at the disposal of any single one to be diverted into a different channel without the joint concurrence of the other two." He rather cruelly added that the opinion of the Council was based upon the fact that "the law had already made an ample provision for the

<sup>15</sup> 6 Ont. Arch. Rep. (1909), p. 91, for the resolution as to reimbursement and p. 92 for the action of the committee and House. The twelve members in attendance, not including the Speaker, who was paid £200 currency (say \$900), were:

Richard Wilkinson, Glengarry, 1st riding.  
John Macdonell, Glengarry, 2nd riding.  
Robert Isaac Dey Gray, Stormorel.  
Capt. Thomas Fraser, Dundas.  
Major Edward Jessop, Grenville.  
Solomon Jones, M.D., Leeds and Frontenac.  
Christopher Robinson, Ontario and Addington.  
David McGregor Rogers, Prince Edward and Adolphus.  
Richard Beasley Durham, York and 1st riding Lincoln.  
Samuel Street, Lincoln, 2nd riding.  
Benjamin Hardiston, Lincoln, 4th riding and Norfolk.  
John Cornwall, Suffolk and Essex.

The Speaker was the Hon. David William Smith, afterwards Sir David William Smith, Bart., and pensioner.

<sup>16</sup> Peter Russell, president of the Executive Council, became administrator of the government on Simcoe's departure for England on leave of absence in July, 1796, and continued in that office until the arrival of Lieutenant-governor Peter Hunter in August, 1799. He did not know much law, although he acted as judge of the Court of King's Bench for several terms; but he had a fund of shrewd common sense. He is perhaps best known for his acquisitiveness when head of the Government. "I, Peter Russell," granted much land to "you, Peter Russell". His property was the foundation of the Baldwin fortune.

payment of their wages", and "no other made could be adopted except by passing a new Act to constitute another made for that purpose".<sup>17</sup>

And thus that "salary grab" failed<sup>18</sup>.

WILLIAM RENWICK RIDDELL

<sup>17</sup> 6 Ont. Arch. Rep. (1909), p. 103.

<sup>18</sup> An attempt was made in vain by the Assembly to pass the desired legislation in 1799: see 6 Ont. Arch. Rep. (1909), pp. 105, 106, 108-111, 117. In 1803, the Act was finally passed: see 6 Ont. Arch. Rep. (1909), 375-377, 379, 381, 382, 392, 393, 399, 409, and 7 Ont. Arch. Rep. (1910), 195, 196, 198. The Act was (1803) 43 George III, c. 11 (U.C.), which provided for the Speaker giving to any member demanding it a warrant upon the quarter sessions for the payment out of the funds of the district the amount to which the member was entitled (sec. 1). Sec. 30 of the Act of 1793 was repealed (sec. 2). The assessment for this purpose to be made and levied like any other assessment, and the rate paid in to the treasurer of the district. There are many entries of such payments extant in the proceedings of quarter sessions: see Riddell, *Some Early Legislation and Legislators in Upper Canada* (Canadian Law Times, 1920).

## REVIEW OF BOOKS

*The Lands of Silence: A History of Arctic and Antarctic Exploration.*

By Sir CLEMENTS R. MARKHAM. Cambridge: At the University Press. 1921. Pp. xii, 539.

THIS long and ambitious work, which was hardly completed when the author died in 1916, aims at telling the story of exploration and discovery in both the Arctic and Antarctic Circles from the beginning up to the present time. Part I, which deals with Arctic explorations, contains naturally much that touches on the geographical aspects of Canadian history. It contains accounts of the voyages of the Northmen, of Frobisher and Davis, of Baffin and Hudson, of Hearne and Mackenzie, of Ross and Franklin, of Amundsen and Bernier—to mention only the most outstanding of the explorers who have contributed to the making of the map of northern Canada.

The attempt to include, within the covers of a single volume, an account of the work, not only of these explorers, but of other Arctic explorers as well, and, in addition, the whole story of Antarctic exploration, has imposed on the author a brevity and succinctness which makes the book at times reminiscent of the Anglo-Saxon chronicle. One result of this brevity is that the author is occasionally too dogmatic. One would never guess, for example, from his pages that there was any doubt or controversy over the location of Vinland:

Karlsefni had discovered America. His first land was what is now called Baffin Land, his next the coast of Labrador, and the Vinland of Leif is the east coast of Newfoundland (p. 45).

It would be pleasant to be able to settle insoluble historical problems in this way with a mere *ipse dixit*.

The fact, however, that the book was not revised by the author before his death, and that one or two chapters were actually unfinished, disarms criticism. Possibly, had he been able to prepare his manuscript for the press, and had he been able himself to revise the proof-sheets, Sir Clements Markham might have made many changes. As the book stands, it is the result of enormous labour and much erudition, and serves to give the reader a view, within reasonable scope, of the whole history of the Polar Regions. It should be added that through the pages of the book are interspersed many admirable maps and charts.

W. S. WALLACE

*Letters of Members of the Continental Congress.* Edited by EDMUND C. BURNETT. Volume I: August 29, 1774, to July 4, 1776. Washington: Published by the Carnegie Institution of Washington. 1921. Pp. lxvi, 572.

PROBABLY no period has been examined more thoroughly than that of the American Revolution. A separate biography has been written even of nearly every secondary figure in the great struggle. Every campaign has been studied exhaustively. Travellers such as Benjamin Lossing have visited the places connected with the history and described not only the events of the past but the conditions existing at the time of the visit. Collections have been issued of the writings of such persons as Washington, John Adams, Franklin, Jefferson, and Madison, who sat in the Continental Congress. A vast literature lies open to the student. But it is a rather odd fact that, until now, no attempt has been made to give as full a record as possible of the proceedings of the Continental Congress under whose authority the struggle was conducted. There is a bald official record of the Congress, but it lacks colour. Not only were the sessions held in private, but the members were under a pledge of secrecy even in talking to their friends. In their most private letters they were guarded and sometimes they apologized for the necessary lack of candour. The only possibility in our time of giving life to the proceedings of the Congress was to collect from letters, journals, and any other conceivable source, anything of value that was recorded at the time about the Congress. This Dr. Burnett, with an industry and a method beyond praise, has now done. The result will be six portly volumes telling the story of the Congress from its beginning, when in it sat the best men in the colonies, to the later days when, forlorn and discredited, it ceased to exist, to the relief of the new nation which it had brought into being.

This first volume contains much of interest in regard to the history of Canada. During the period covered (to July 4, 1776), we have fulminations against the policy of the Quebec Act, followed by the outbreak of war with Great Britain. Then came the decision of Washington that, since British naval power could use the St. Lawrence and make Quebec and Montreal a perpetual menace to the lines of the Hudson, the occupation of Canada was vital to the American cause. The two-fold and ultimately disastrous invasion of Canada followed. Meanwhile, however, the British were driven from Boston and, until their capture of New York later in the year 1776, they had no foothold, south of Canada, on the coast of what is now the United States. And when the British were preparing for great and, as they were to prove, successful efforts to occupy New York and Philadelphia, Congress, on July 4, 1776,

took the irrevocable step and passed the Declaration of Independence. The leaders of the Revolution rarely lacked self-consciousness. Abraham Clark of New Jersey, who joined in the Declaration, writes grandiloquently, "I am among a Consistory of Kings"; and he called the Congress "the greatest Assembly on earth." John Adams wrote that "the greatest question was decided which ever was debated in America, and a greater, perhaps, never was nor will be decided among men." It is singular that, in spite of the painting by Trumbull in the Capitol at Washington, depicting the scene, the Declaration was apparently not signed at the time by the members present. Already the jest was current that the revolutionists must hang together or hang singly, but they signed singly as occasion offered, when, weeks later, the Declaration had been engrossed. It was signed even by members who had not been present at its adoption. In such ways does the cynical jade of history pour scornful ridicule on popular traditions. The signing of the Declaration, like Wolfe's repeating of Gray's "Elegy", has got into the wrong place in the popular mind.

It does not greatly matter. What matters is the filling in of sober background in great epochs, and this volume plays its part in this useful work. The Continental Congress faced two great problems—the determining of the relations of the colonies with Britain and the carrying on of the war. Pervading the writings here is a deep sense of responsibility, a conviction that a vital issue is involved, and a resolve to go on without feeling any panic because of apparent failure. The background is very obviously the late eighteenth century. In spite of a serious effort to move to Hartford, because of its nearness to the scene of conflict in New England, the Congress continued to sit in Philadelphia until, in 1777, the British took that place. John Adams describes houses there as "grand", "spacious", and "elegant"; he is lodged at the most "genteel" tavern in America, and coaches drawn by "four beautiful horses" are driven by Philadelphia magnates. Congress sits from nine to three nearly always and sometimes on to four or even six, with the result that the members complain of overwork and lack of exercise. John Adams describes his day: "We go to Congress at nine, and there we stay, most earnestly engaged in debates upon the most abstruse mysteries of state, until three in the afternoon; then we adjourn, and go to dine with some of the nobles of Pennsylvania at four o'clock, and feast upon ten thousand delicacies, and sit drinking Madeira, Claret and Burgundy, till six or seven, and then go home fatigued to death with business, company, and care. Yet I hold it out surprisingly" (p. 60).

There is much admiration of the eloquence not only of speeches and sermons, but also of prayers. The chaplain, Mr. Duché, opened the Congress in 1774 with a prayer "which it was worth riding one hundred miles to hear." Though an Anglican, he "prayed without book about ten minutes so pertinently, with such fervency, purity and sublimity of style and sentiment . . . that even Quakers shed tears." This scene reminds us inevitably of Oliver Cromwell and his fellow officers praying together at Windsor before they took the momentous decision which brought Charles I to the block. Already Patrick Henry was holding that the tyranny of George III had dissolved all government in the colonies and brought that "state of nature" on which a new structure might be built. We wonder whether Henry was thinking of Rousseau and the social contract. Certainly the members were examining the foundations. The difference between Freemen and Slaves, it was said, lay in the fact that Freemen were not bound to submit to the arbitrary will of another.

There was from the first much debate about Canada. Washington, described in 1774 as tall with a rather hard face, "a very young look and an easy soldier-like air and gesture" (p. 28), was from the first convinced that the side which held Canada would win the war. This feeling was fortified by the passion against the Quebec Act, setting up arbitrary government and the Roman Catholic faith at Quebec. It was believed that the French would welcome deliverance from the yoke of Britain. When Washington was at Cambridge, holding Gage shut up in Boston, he planned two expeditions, one open, the other secret. There is bare mention of Benedict Arnold's secret adventure, but we hear much of that of Schuyler and Montgomery. With Montreal taken, came the exultant belief that Canada was secure. A Canadian convention should be called to send delegates to Congress. In any case Britain had no right, it was said, to hold all of Canada. Had not colonial soldiers done much of the work of conquest?

The Canadian horizon soon clouded. Montgomery's army was ill-disciplined and disobedient. There was lack of "hard" money, in a word of gold and silver, and the Canadians resented the offering to them of the paper money already on its down grade to worthlessness. Then, on the last day of 1775, came the tragedy of Montgomery's failure and death before Quebec. Only slowly did the news reach Philadelphia. But on January 18, 1776, it was proposed in Congress that the members should wear mourning for Montgomery during a month, that there should be a public monument, and a memorial service with a sermon. The monument was to come from France at a cost of not more than three hundred pounds. The funeral oration was delivered some weeks



later by Dr. Smith, Provost of the College at Philadelphia, a man at heart a Loyalist. Thus it happened that "certain political Principles were thought to be interwoven with every part of the Oration which were displeasing to the Auditory. It was remarked that he could not even keep their attention. A Circle of Ladies, who had seated themselves in a convenient place on purpose to see as well as hear the Orator, that they might take every Advantage for the Indulgence of Griefe on so melancholy an Occasion, were observed to look much disappointed and chagrined" (p. 365). So incensed was Congress at the tone of the oration that it refused to order it to be printed. Censorious John Adams called it "an insolent performance". Thomas Paine's *Common Sense*, which came out about the same time, was assuredly a vigorous corrective.

With matters going badly in Canada, Franklin was chosen as the chief member of a committee to go there. Not only his wisdom and experience but his knowledge of French and of France led to his selection. "The Unanimous Voice of the Continent is Canada must be ours; Quebec must be taken," said John Adams. With Franklin was to go Chase of Maryland and Charles Carroll of Carrollton. Adams wrote of Carroll:

He has a Fortune as I am well informed which is computed to be worth Two hundred Thousand Pounds Sterling. He is a Native of Maryland, and his Father is still living. He had a liberal Education in France and is well acquainted with the French Nation. He speaks their Language as easily as ours; and what is perhaps of more Consequence than all the rest, he was educated in the Roman Catholic Religion and still continues to worship his Maker according to the Rites of that Church. In the Cause of American Liberty his Zeal Fortitude and Perseverance have been so conspicuous that he is said to be marked out for peculiar Vengeance by the Friends of Administration; But he continues to hazard his all, his immense Fortune, the largest in America, and his Life. This Gentleman's Character, if I foresee aright, will hereafter make a greater Figure in America. His abilities are very good, his Knowledge and Learning extensive (p. 354).

Carroll's brother, a priest, was also to go. And to command the army in Canada was to be sent Charles Lee, the general who ranked next to Washington in the public eye as a soldier.

The only result in Canada was failure and, with this sinister cloud darkening in the north, Congress took the finally decisive step. Individual colonies had voted for independence. Massachusetts, the scene of war, was for independence at an early date, and John Adams records his growing objection to the use of the terms "colony" and "mother country". But the middle colonies had seen no war and were still for reconciliation, while the southern states were monarchical in feeling and dreaded the excesses of democracy. The tide was, however,

irresistible. On July 2, 1776, Congress voted unanimously, not by individuals but by states, for independence, and, on July 4, the formal declaration was made which broke up the older British Empire.

From the proceedings of the Congress it seems clear that, for the time at least, the political difficulty could have been solved short of independence, had it not been for the resentment aroused by the shedding of blood. Each side could say, of course, that the other began it, but the new-made graves lay in colonial soil and were a perpetual text for homilies on the cruelty and bloody-mindedness of the British ministry. No one in Congress seems to have thought it possible that Canada should remain outside the so-called Continental Union. Most of the colonial traders who had sought fortune in Canada were on the side of revolution. It is one of the paradoxes of history that, had Canada been more completely anglicized in 1776, it would probably to-day be a part of the United States. The French element did not save Canada to Britain by any feats of arms; but they proved a non-conductor to those currents of opinion which brought even the monarchical south into the republic.

GEORGE M. WRONG

*A History of Minnesota.* By WILLIAM WATTS FOLWELL. In Four Volumes: Volume I. Saint Paul: The Minnesota Historical Society. 1921. Pp. xix, 533.

It is difficult to realize that until the end of the eighteenth century, and indeed for some years after that, the history of Minnesota was part of the history of Canada. Minnesota was first explored in the seventeenth century by explorers from New France; it was, during the whole of the eighteenth century, exploited almost exclusively by Canadian fur-traders; and, although British authority was finally withdrawn from it by Jay's treaty in 1794, the Union Jack still flew for twenty years afterwards over the trading-posts of the North West Company within its boundaries. The first three chapters of this first volume of the *History of Minnesota* which Dr. Folwell, the president emeritus of the University of Minnesota, has undertaken, do little more, therefore, than cover a particular phase of the history of Canada; and in the chapters that follow there are constantly recurring passages which have a distinct interest for students of Canadian history.

Seldom has local history been presented in a more attractive and scholarly way than in Dr. Folwell's pages. Though apparently not a professional historian (for he began his academic career, it seems, as a professor of mathematics), he has all the necessary equipment of an historical writer. His style is clear and picturesque; he marshals his materials with masterly precision; and into his copious footnotes there

is thrown a wealth of bibliographical lore. These footnotes, indeed, are alone well worth the perusal of Canadian historical scholars, if only for the titles of western publications regarding some of the early explorers and fur-traders, with which otherwise they might not readily become familiar. With regard to Radisson, for instance, there are listed the titles of a number of papers written and published in the Middle West of the United States which do not appear to be listed anywhere else.

Dr. Folwell's pages do not perhaps add anything new to our knowledge of Canadian history; but it is useful to have the story of the outer fringe of the Old North West told in such detail as here, and with such a clear handling of the facts. The later volumes of Dr. Folwell's work will no doubt contain less material of interest to the student of Canadian history, but the relations between Minnesota and the Canadian North West have been, even during the past century, so close and intimate, that we may perhaps expect to find in Dr. Folwell's subsequent work not a little that bears on Canada.

*McGill and its Story, 1821-1921.* By CYRUS MACMILLAN. Toronto: Oxford University Press, Canadian Branch. [1921.] Pp. 304. (\$3.00.)

THE will of the Hon. James McGill of Montreal, who died in 1813, left £10,000 and about forty-six acres of land for the foundation of a college or university. In 1821 the proposed college received a royal charter, but for many years did no teaching, its only degrees being those awarded from 1829 on in medicine to the students of the affiliated Montreal Medical Institution, which had been founded in 1824 by the zeal and energy of the local practitioners. In the elaborate report on education in Lower Canada submitted to Lord Durham in 1839 by Arthur Buller (Appendix D to Lord Durham's *Report*), "McGill's College" is dismissed in a few lines, and the view taken that "the proper seat of an university would seem to be Quebec." Not till 1843 were any buildings opened, and except in medicine little work of a university standard was done until 1855, when Sir William Dawson came as principal from Nova Scotia. Under Sir William Dawson (1855-93), Sir William Peterson (1895-1919) and Sir Arthur Currie, the small college has steadily grown into a great university.

Professor Cyrus MacMillan's work contains some useful documents, is well printed and well illustrated, but it is difficult not to feel that it was hurriedly put together for the centenary of October, 1921. The causes of the long delay in utilizing James McGill's noble gift are a part of the history of Canadian education, and could have been much more clearly set forth. The projected college was drawn into the long, half-

hearted attempt to Anglicize and Anglicanize the French Roman Catholics of Lower Canada. The story of the Royal Institution for the Advancement of Learning, which too long controlled the endowment of McGill, is one which reflects credit neither on the statesmanship of the Home government, nor on that of the Church of England authorities in Lower Canada. Lack of discernment of the signs of the times and undignified personal squabbles mark the history of McGill's benefaction from 1813 to 1855. But instead of a vivid and sympathetic history, we are too often put off by Professor MacMillan with vague references to "numerous other differences of opinion" (p. 98), or to descriptions of narrow-minded ecclesiastics as "men of far and clear vision, of unfaltering courage and unwavering faith." The well-known opposition of the Roman Catholic Church in the early nineteenth century to the proselytizing of the Royal Institution and similar attempts to Anglicanize them is thinly disguised as "opposition from one section of the community" (p. 18). But while Professor MacMillan has not seized the opportunity of writing a definitive history of McGill, the volume is a fitting memorial of the hundredth anniversary of the founding of this great institution.

W. L. GRANT

*Policing the Plains, being the Real-Life Record of the Famous North-West Mounted Police.* By R. G. MACBETH. Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton. 1921. Pp. 320.

*Sergeant 331: Personal Recollections of a Member of the Canadian North-West Mounted Police from 1879-1885.* By F. J. E. FITZPATRICK. New York: Published by the Author. 1921. Pp. ii, 126, iii-v.

BOTH these books are contributions of original value to the history of that famous scarlet-coated force which, after keeping the King's peace for nearly half a century on the prairies of the Canadian West, passed out of existence in 1920 as "the Royal North-West Mounted Police", and became merged in "the Canadian Mounted Police". The story of the North-West Mounted Police is one of the shining pages of Canadian history, and anything which serves to throw light on it is welcome.

Mr. MacBeth's book, which is the more ambitious of the two, aims at telling the story of the R.N.W.M.P. from first to last. As a history, it can hardly be said to supersede the semi-official history of the force, entitled *The Riders of the Plains*, published by Mr. A. L. Haydon in 1910, to which, indeed, it seems to be indebted in no small measure, and without acknowledgment. The style of the book is in places popular, not to say colloquial; at other times it is rhetorical and grandiloquent. Superlatives are piled up with unnecessary frequency: one would have

thought that the deeds of the Police might have been left to speak for themselves. Tributes to the work of the force are quoted from a great variety of sources, as though the author were commending to his readers some patent medicine of sovereign qualities. Numerous poetical quotations interlard the text. Nowhere are authorities cited, nor is there in the book either bibliography or index.

The book, nevertheless, has real value. The author was born and brought up in the West, where his ancestors belonged to the old Kildonan settlement founded by Selkirk, and, though he has never been a member of the Mounted Police, he has been familiar with them and their work from early boyhood. During the North-West Rebellion of 1885, indeed, he was brigaded with them. With practically all of their senior officers he has been personally acquainted; and his pen-pictures of them are among the most valuable portions of his book. The result is that his narrative takes on occasionally the character of that of an eye-witness. In regard to the North-West Rebellion, for instance, he is able to adduce evidence, not only from his own "close personal contact with the situation", but also from the experiences of other members of his family, with reference to the relations that existed between General Middleton and the North-West Mounted Police. "I feel," he says, "that General Middleton rather resented the dominant place of the Mounted Police in the mind of the West, and was more ready to make slighting remarks about them than to take their counsel" (p. 117). Touches like this give to Mr. Macbeth's book something of the character of an original document.

Mr. Fitzpatrick was, unlike Mr. Macbeth, a member of the Mounted Police in the early days. He entered the force as a constable, and he rose to the rank of sergeant. His period of enlistment covered the critical years of the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway and the second North-West Rebellion. His book is merely a plain, unvarnished narrative of his experiences in the force during these years, with the object of giving the reader "a vivid idea of the everyday life and the general details of a Mounted Policeman's duties". In attaining this object, the book is remarkably successful. It is written in a lucid, straightforward, and effective way, "without fuss or feathers"; and it contributes to the stock of stories about the Police a number which have not hitherto become current. Mr. Fitzpatrick does not vouchsafe any information as to whether his narrative is based on a diary or notes made by him at some previous date, or merely on his memory of events which occurred forty years ago, but his story is so clear-cut that it carries conviction with it. There is nothing which will give the reader a better idea of the life of the Police in the early days. It may be added

that the book is written with a modesty and simplicity beyond praise, and that it is "dedicated by Sergeant F. J. E. Fitzpatrick, N.W.M.P., to his daughter, Sergeant Azilda M. L. Fitzpatrick, Motor Corps of America".

*The Men of the Hudson's Bay Company.* By N. M. W. J. MCKENZIE. Fort William, Ontario. [1921.] Pp. 214.

THIS book is an autobiography. The author is a native of the Orkney Islands—that breeding-place of Hudson's Bay men—who came out to Canada in 1876 as a carpenter in the service of the Hudson's Bay Company. He rose rapidly to positions of trust, and at the time of the North West Rebellion of 1885 he was in sole charge on one of the Indian reservations. He eventually became the fur-trader inspector of the Company, and occupied in turn the position of district manager of several of the Company's most important districts before he retired in 1916. "I had attained," he says, in referring to his resignation, "the ideal position that I had laid out for myself to reach in the service, and was now, as far as my official position was concerned, only second to the Fur Trade Commissioner, and had gained my promotion from the bottom by merit alone."

Mr. McKenzie's *apologia pro vita sua* is written with an almost complete absence of literary art. Violence is done to the English language on many a page. But one could wish that there were more books of this sort which had seen the light. The very artlessness of the book is one of its chief recommendations. To have the plain, unvarnished autobiography of a man who has spent forty years in the service of the Hudson's Bay Company, who has lived through all the formative stages of western development, and who has played an active part in the story he tells, could hardly fail to be a matter for congratulation. When to this is added the fact that Mr. McKenzie writes with a wealth of intimate detail which a less ingenuous author might have avoided, it will be seen that the book is one of distinct value to the historian.

There is not lacking an abundance of material on which the political historian of Canada can draw at will, but the materials for the economic historian are not so plentiful, nor are they so available. Often the details of the early economic history of Canada are to be found only in rare company reports in pamphlet form, or in advertisements in old newspapers, or in faded account books; and this information is, as a rule, tantalizingly meagre. For the history of the Hudson's Bay Company since 1876, however, Mr. McKenzie's pages supply just that sort of detail which is generally lacking. Perhaps the quotation of a few

sentences will serve, better than anything else, to indicate the character of the material the book contains:

Mr. Calder was now full-fledged District Accountant, and was daily absorbed in books, figures and accounts. He had laid away as curiosities the old grey goose quill pens, and had adopted the Waverley and other makes of steel pens, to do duty. A new era had dawned. There was also a new innovation of wrapping paper and bags for the store. The old style was that when an Indian bought a pound of tea he had also to buy a 25 cent handkerchief of Royal red to wrap it up in. Now he could have his parcels neatly tied up in paper without cost. So many white settlers were now customers at the store that this new method of wrapping purchased goods had become an absolute necessity. Drever said the introduction of this custom had spoiled the sale of many a good handkerchief (p. 68).

This picture of the passing of the old order in the Hudson's Bay Company would alone redeem Mr. McKenzie's book from unimportance as an historical document.

W. S. WALLACE

*The Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier.* By OSCAR DOUGLAS SKELTON. Two vols. Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1921. Pp. 485; 576.

THIS is a work of quite exceptional importance in the fields of Canadian biography, history, and literature. As the authorized life of a very distinguished Canadian whose official career coincided with a period of unique national development, its appearance has been awaited with great interest. If the sympathetic skill of the biographer, combined with the judicial temperament of the trained scholar in economics and history, should prove at all equal to the task imposed and the opportunities afforded, it was certain that the work would take a high place in Canadian literature. That it is being eagerly read over a wide area, and critically examined from many different points of view and angles of interest, whether of sympathy or prejudice, goes without saying. But, however varied be the judgment in relation to any of the multifarious interests which filled the long and crowded life of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, few candid minds will be able to deny that these volumes are entirely worthy of the highly important and varied task assigned to the author. In point of form, also, the work is of high literary quality.

In selecting Professor Skelton as the person to whom he could unreservedly entrust the varied public, private and confidential materials available for an historical biography, Sir Wilfrid was actuated by the consciousness that, as his life's work had been almost entirely devoted to the public service, to ensure an adequate record of that life in its public features was the last obligation which he owed to his country. He was conscious also that the treatment which would accord most



impartial justice to his life as a servant of his country, would do most justice to himself as a private individual. It was, indeed, one of the remarkable characteristics of Sir Wilfrid Laurier that few men of his personal distinction have lived their lives so completely in their public functions, a personal peculiarity which would have rendered it nearly impossible for him to have retired to the position of a private citizen. His private life was indeed singularly placid and happy, an ideal recruiting retreat from the strenuous demands of his public functions; but it was the happiness which presents no annals, and would have been difficult for one of his interests and experiences to sustain alone. The outcome of Professor Skelton's labours has amply justified the wisdom of Sir Wilfrid's choice.

In estimating such a work it is necessary, of course, to recognize at once the limitations and obligations under which a competent biographer works. Few biographies have been more adequate and more successful than Morley's *Life of Gladstone*. It serves, indeed, as a high standard with which to compare this life of Laurier. From it we recognize the necessity for a biographer to enter sympathetically into the life of his subject. He must be able to appreciate the actuating motives and the larger ends to be realized, the methods and resources with which the materials at hand are utilized, and the obstacles to be faced or evaded or disposed of. Undoubtedly the biographer must be sympathetic towards the fundamental principles and general political and social policy of his subject; although this by no means involves a support of all the methods and means adopted to promote various ends, or to meet the attacks of opponents, whether based on principle or on the mere effort to thwart and discredit. In the case of a political biography, the author must thoroughly understand and present the main historical incidents which constitute the political atmosphere of the period within which the life falls, but he is called upon to treat with detail only those features in which his subject was specially interested, or which gave occasion for his chief activities. Naturally his history must be sound and fair to all interests, yet his task is not to write a general history, but an adequate personal biography, the features and incidents of which will be broad or narrow according to the interests and activities of his subject. Judged by such standards the biography before us amply justifies itself as a whole, although exception may be taken, on different grounds, to special sections of it.

It is significant, from the point of view of intellectual and spiritual eugenics, that Sir Wilfrid was descended from both of the two most notable stocks settled in French Canada—Maisonneuve's, pioneers of Montreal, and the members of the Carignan-Salières regiment brought

out by Tracy to subdue the Iroquois. His native ability, chiefly contributed, as with most men of distinction, from the mother's side, was brought forward, as usual, by the happy combination of opportunities and circumstances. Notable among these was the opportunity afforded of residence for a time in English-speaking families, and especially his association with a Scottish Presbyterian family, which enabled him to acquire unconsciously a knowledge of the inner life and sentiments of another race than his own; thus furnishing a solid foundation for subsequent relations with his fellow-citizens of British descent. Thus was nourished also that native spirit of freedom and equality which became so fundamental a motive in his public life, and which, because so greatly needed and so sorely tried, was the basis of his chief contribution towards Canadian national life. Further opportunities for developing his personal tastes and social and national sentiments were furnished by his association with kindred spirits, especially in Montreal, where, with limited knowledge and experience, but with the rigorous logic and enthusiasm of youth, were applied the principles of freedom and reform to the social, religious, and political conditions of the time.

In the second chapter some interesting extracts are given from Sir Wilfrid's comments, at a later period, on the earlier history of the struggle for responsible government in Canada, and the attitude of Lord Durham, after the defeat of the exclusively French nationalist movement. In this we find that Sir Wilfrid had evidently not made a first-hand study of the development of events before the Union, but had simply accepted the traditional views and representations of the Papineau section. He was thus under the impression that only the French, and not the English, section of Lower Canada, had suffered repression during the racial struggles in that province between 1791 and 1838. His view of Lord Durham and his report is entirely coloured by these traditional views. Thus we find him in a logical mystification as to how a radical British reformer such as Durham could be so hopelessly reactionary as regards Canada. But he ends, as our author says, by condemning Durham's policy and defending his character (Vol. I, p. 70). Yet Sir Wilfrid himself was to fight many a battle, not always successfully, and frequently misunderstood and misrepresented, in a life-long political effort to mitigate, and, if possible, subdue ultimately just that racial antagonism which Durham recognized as the curse of Canada, but which as he saw, could be settled only in Canada, and not from Downing Street.

Papineau, with logical consistency as the champion of French nationalism, for Lower Canada at least, refused to the end to accept the union. But after Lord Sydenham's demonstration that the union

could be maintained, Lafontaine and the more practical French-Canadians gave up the struggle for an exclusively national government, and settled down to make the most of a possible control of the union government. This latter section of the Rouges Laurier followed, but he developed from it, with Confederation, into the virtual leadership of the larger and wiser policy of developing a distinctively Canadian nationality, unfettered by the narrow sectional and racial conceptions which had consumed the strength of the older provinces in futile internal strife.

It was characteristic alike of Laurier's personal temperament and of his early associations, that he should be found in the following of those more advanced young Liberals of Quebec who were the leaders of the Rouges. In the second chapter we have a very adequate presentation of the difficulties in which that connection involved him, more particularly as regards the relations of church and state. A special feature of this was the famous struggle between the bishops of Montreal and Three Rivers and the Institut Canadien, of which Laurier was a prominent member. Although still a disciple rather than a leader, he sympathized entirely with the valiant fight for the freedom of political convictions from the dominating control of ecclesiastical authority. As, however, the ardour of youth gave place to the moderation induced by the wider knowledge and the larger experience of later years, though sacrificing little in point of principle, he moderated his attitude of aggression towards the intolerant episcopacy. The leaders of the church also abated much of their claim to the right of interference in political issues and between political parties. The atmosphere of political and ecclesiastical conflict in which he spent his early manhood naturally forced him to mature and define his political principles with more definiteness and range than was customary for the vast majority of his fellow-citizens. His extensive reading was also influenced by the same conditions, arousing a strong interest in the political experiences of France, Britain and the United States. In British political history, and especially in British political biography, he found most assistance in maturing his views on the larger issues of life and fixing his fundamental principles. So far as his political principles can be summed up in one phrase he may be said to have been a typical Gladstonian Liberal. His political career, however, was to be run in Canada, and his own personality and method of dealing with special political problems as they arose gave a very special application to these ultimate convictions. When, therefore, he entered the legislature of Quebec in 1871, at the age of thirty, it was soon recognized that a quite new element had been added to the political life of the province. His first speech attracted

much attention. It certainly presented several novel features in that atmosphere. He advocated industrial development for the province, and proposed the encouragement of immigration, even the immigration of British artisans and other aliens, the special horror of the nationalists of pre-union days. In fact, he frankly repudiated the practical ideals of French-Canadians down to that time, and indeed, as events were to prove, down to a much later period. The English, even more than the French, journals noted this new French voice, and more than one of them predicted indefinite possibilities for the new-comer, especially in the federal sphere where his advanced views seemed to indicate that he would be more at home and more surely bring distinction to his province.

The revelation of his quality and the reception accorded did not escape his old enemies, the ultramontane leaders of the church, who fully appreciated the dangers to their interests which were threatened by the advanced liberal views of the highly-gifted young leader. Naturally, therefore, they devoted much of their far-reaching powers towards obstructing the progress of the influences they had most occasion to fear. The details of these struggles are set forth in the third chapter, the culminating note of which is the great speech of Laurier before the Club Canadien of Quebec, on June 26, 1877, in which he laid down the fundamental principles of liberalism as he understood it, with special application to the proper relations of church and state. By this time he had transferred, as was anticipated, from the provincial to the Dominion House, having been returned for Drummond-Arthabaska in the general federal elections of 1874.

In chapter four we have a very interesting and well-balanced historical sketch and analysis of the coming to power of the Mackenzie government and its career between 1874 and 1878. The great speech of June, 1877, had marked Laurier as the most original and distinguished of Quebec Liberals, and thus led to his elevation to cabinet rank in the federal government, as minister of inland revenue, in October, 1877. His defeat in the by-election incident to his appointment to office resulted in a change of his constituency to Quebec East, which he represented throughout the remainder of his political career.

The defeat of the Mackenzie government in 1878 placed the Liberals in opposition for nearly twenty years. In view of the long and unrelenting demands upon Laurier's time and energies during the crowded period of his premiership, this sojourn in the wilderness had its compensations. It enabled him to become thoroughly familiar with Canadian political conditions, domestic, imperial, and foreign. As leader of the opposition, from 1887, it enabled him to gain a thorough knowledge of the management of men, and to become known and appreciated by

the Dominion at large. When Edward Blake, discouraged and worn out as leader of the opposition, insisted upon resigning and named Laurier as the only possible successor in the leadership, the latter was but slightly known to the rank and file of the party or to the country at large. Time was required to confirm the wisdom of Blake's choice. This period, with its formative and seasoning influences for Laurier, occupies the remainder of the first volume. It covers the interesting story of the organization and building of the Canadian Pacific Railway, in which some quite new features are introduced, and also the opening of the North West, the second Riel Rebellion and the Manitoba school crisis. The two latter features served incidentally, along with the first Riel Rebellion, to demonstrate how thin is the film of national unity which slowly forms, in years of quiescence, over the molten lava in the crater of Canadian racial animosity and Christian emulation. These were questions, then, as they were later, in connection with the provincial autonomy of the western provinces, and the recent incidents as to national unity in the face of the war, which were particularly trying for a French-Canadian leader in parliament, whether in opposition or in power. Incidentally they served to bring out the remarkable shrewdness, resourcefulness, and diplomacy of Sir Wilfrid. When he became prime minister, he was thoroughly matured in all these respects. It only remained to put in practice and thereby reveal the unique personal power and resources of one whose distinction of person, unaffected dignity, and gentlemanly bearing alone indicated that he was a man of exceptional quality. His courteous manners, unruffled temper, and moderate treatment of even the most critical of issues, seemed to be characteristics quite unsuited to the rough game of politics and the control of the very mixed elements and interests which necessarily compose any political party attempting to represent all sections of Canada. Yet, before his premiership had reached beyond the first parliament, active participants and onlookers alike were to realize that the bland and courteous exterior and unaggressive manner did not indicate a want of knowledge of human nature, or an inability to grapple with the most complex situations or the cleverest of manipulators. His lack of interest in the mysteries of finance and in the details of industry and commerce did not argue lack of knowledge of the larger economic interests and motives of men and corporations. The apparent devotion to abstract principles and ideal standards, which many of his most effective public speeches might seem to indicate was, in his case, quite consistent with his being, in the best sense of the term, a consummate opportunist. Well aware, from long experience, that the average good citizen cherishes high ideals and responds with enthusiasm to their

skilful presentation, he was yet equally aware that in practice the same citizen falls far short of their attainment, and to count on his realizing them is to court disaster. A slow and steady improvement, with bursts of zeal and inevitable relapses, is the most to be hoped for. Sir Wilfrid, therefore, while ever ready to encourage worthy aspirations and to applaud even the most modest success in their attainment, never expected too much from human nature, and was therefore not unduly disappointed or gruffly pessimistic at finding the actual course of events so much below the lofty expectations which heralded them. Genial cynicism may be said to express his estimate of the men most commonly met with, alike in the inner and outer circles of political life. In consequence of his clear vision of the realities of human nature and its environment, he was seldom taken by surprise and never disconcerted. Virulent personal and political attacks he met calmly and turned adroitly, thus at once disconcerting the attacker and paralysing his shafts. Slow to take offence and still slower to show resentment, he passed by the attacks of the vulgar and abusive, and adroitly parried the skilful attacks of the more courteous opponents, frequently showing no little zest in the political game of thrust and parry. He thus contributed to raise distinctly the tone of political debate, and to eliminate from it the all-pervasive element of personal bitterness which was so characteristic of the parliamentary speeches of an earlier date.

In his relations with his cabinet, as his biographer has pointed out, he was a very indulgent leader. He evidently rode with a loose rein, with excellent results for all concerned. He had neither the knowledge nor the interest for mere details of departmental administration. Once a common policy of the government was determined upon, each minister was supposed to carry it out as it affected his own department. So long as the ministers were men of high calibre, personal honour, and inclined to give attention to the vital features of their departments, Sir Wilfrid's policy was entirely justified. If, however, any minister should lack one or more of these essential qualities, no amount of attempted supervision or interference on the part of the prime minister would afford an effective remedy. Treasury control, as in Britain, which involves a close supervision of the essential features of all departments by a body of experts, drawn chiefly from tried veterans of the general service, can alone avail, and must some day be adopted in Canada, as indeed was recognized by Sir Wilfrid in the latter days of his premiership. While great freedom was allowed to the individual members of the cabinet, yet no minister could presume on such freedom to adopt a course of his own to the weakening of the general policy of the government, as was amply demonstrated in the cases of Tarte, Blair, and others. Nor was Sir Wilfrid



to be caught napping in the event of any outside conspiracies aiming at the overthrow of his administration, as was demonstrated in the case of the interesting Russell-Greenshields conspiracy (Vol. 2, p. 203).

Our author has no difficulty in establishing, incidentally to many issues rather than by set argument, the genuine quality and high value of Sir Wilfrid's efforts to develop better relations between the French and the other races of Canada, the others being usually included under the term English or British, because they had adopted British national principles. From Confederation at least, Laurier's personal convictions, and from his selection as leader of the Liberal party, his personal and private interests all lay in that direction. But his persuasive eloquence reached but a limited number on either side, while the ideal of racial separation and nationalist integrity, which he had supported in his earlier days, had deprived the masses of the two elements of any common meeting-ground or means of direct communication. Hence, as he was forced to recognize in his closing years, the fruits of his labours were meagre, though possibly with more hopeful prophecy for the future. As preparatory to the election of 1911, an equally gifted and much more logical voice, that of Mr. Bourassa, had taken up the sacred theme of French nationality and separated much of Quebec from its most distinguished son. On the other hand, the masses of the other voters, compelled as usual to take their information about French Canada at second-hand, were roused by the typical racial and anti-British appeals so profitable in gaining votes in Quebec. Even as regards Sir Wilfrid their doubts were once more revived as to whether anything really good could come out of the French-Canadian Nazareth. In the last election in which Sir Wilfrid took part, that over the head of conscription, whether conscription itself was necessary or unnecessary, wise or unwise, there was no longer any question for the general body of the English-speaking electors, as to the essential disloyalty of the French-Canadians and their slackness in the war. Thus did Sir Wilfrid see the hard-earned fruits of his labours towards the establishment of permanent harmony between the French and other races apparently swept away, while Lord Durham's analysis was once more vindicated.

A very picturesque and yet highly important feature in Sir Wilfrid's career was his first visit to Britain and Europe, in connection with the Diamond Jubilee of 1897. He had just attained to the premiership, established his new cabinet, and passed in its earliest form the British preferential tariff, and was in a mood thoroughly to enjoy that great pageant. His wide and constant reading of French and British literature, and especially British political history and biography, had rendered him mentally familiar with the salient features of the mother lands. He



was eager to visit these scenes in person. He did so under the most ideal conditions. As a French-Canadian of distinguished personal appearance and most attractive personality, holding the premiership of the most important of the British Dominions abroad, he was the most outstanding personage amid hosts of notabilities. His intellectual and artistic interests and his whole temperament eminently fitted him to respond to the attentions which were showered upon him, with a combination of modesty, dignity, and unfeigned appreciation, which entirely captivated both the populace and the dignitaries. It was a trying experience for one unaccustomed to the social atmosphere of Britain, especially under such exceptional circumstances. The imperial spirit was then in full swing, and most of the other colonial representatives were obviously carried away by it. To the eye of a fertile imagination such as Sir Wilfrid's, there appeared the possibility of a later French-Canadian carrying off oratorical honours in Westminster itself, the possibility indeed of such a successor carrying his own experience into still loftier regions and becoming prime minister of a world encircling empire. All things were possible in the atmosphere he was then breathing, and several of his public utterances seemed to make answer to the persuasive apostles of empire, "Almost thou persuadest me to be an imperialist." Salutory reflection, however, and that well-seasoned clearness of vision which enabled him to see, through the glamour of the immediate, the permanent array of cold facts, convinced him that this was not the pathway which the spirit of permanent good relations between Britain and the outlying members of the Empire must follow. Hence, in the brief conferences which followed the Jubilee festivities, and with increasing clearness and firmness, at subsequent Colonial Conferences, Sir Wilfrid steadily argued against formal documents and binding obligations, as shackling the limbs of imperial good will. In this respect his services to the Empire were to prove greater than he himself or anyone could have foreseen. At the close of the Great War, in which Canada had spontaneously joined, making enormous contributions and sacrifices as a free nation, Sir Robert Borden, at one time the white hope of the imperialists, not only adopted the Laurier policy of free co-operation, but carried the independent status of Canada to unlooked-for lengths, with the enthusiastic approval of both British and colonial statesmen.

The details of the various imperial conferences in which Sir Wilfrid shared, and the historical background for them, are admirably developed in their due sequence. The chapter dealing with the relations with the United States, over the head of the functions of the joint high commission and the subsequent settlement of the Alaska boundary, is not so happy

as most other sections of the work, either in the presentation of the facts or in the spirit in which they are treated.

Professor Skelton has evidently made an admirable selection from Sir Wilfrid's letters, for purposes of reproduction; so much so that one cannot but regret that more of them were not included. One gathers, however, from the brief preface to the work, what will be fully recognized by those familiar with Sir Wilfrid's methods and characteristics, that he was not a voluminous letter-writer, and that he much preferred, in the case of matters of vital importance, to deal with them in direct conference, being much more interested in satisfactory results than in the means and methods by which they were secured. Hence, one can quite understand that the letters dealing with matters of special importance were rare and, where there was no special occasion for temporizing, brief and to the point.

Where so much of the ground covered in this biography deals with matters affecting so many and such vital interests, and so many public characters, it is inevitable that most of it will be treated at one time or other from different points of view, and with variations in the background of facts available. But, just because of the assurance of a perennial interest in the personality, motives, and achievements of the central figure in a very important epoch of Canadian history, these volumes will continue to furnish a mine of reliable historical data and information, and their value will be enhanced through time.

ADAM SHORTT

*The Friendly Arctic, the story of five years in polar regions.* By VILHJALMUR STEFANSSON. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1921. Pp. xxxii, 784; illustrations.

THE fascination of the Arctic regions has been repeatedly illustrated by the devotion of explorers, many of whom return again and again to its apparently inhospitable ice and snow, and would have us believe that their only motive in doing so is zeal for discovery or the quest of a chimera like the north pole. Mr. Stefansson is no less devoted than his predecessors to the cause of discovery, but he frankly puts his devotion on a less exalted plane by admitting that he likes the country and the life better than southern climes and civilization. There is nothing forbidding to him in masses of floe-ice or stretches of snow-covered land. He finds food in abundance under the ice or upon it, and the nearest snow-drift is the quarry from which in an hour he builds a comfortable house, draught-proof, sound-proof, and easily warmed even to the temperature of a Pullman car. Mr. Stefansson possesses indeed all the

physical qualifications for travel in the Arctic region, splendid health, wonderful powers of endurance, an invariable appetite for fresh-killed game and nothing else, a well-trained aptitude for hunting, skill in keeping a straight course over land or sea-ice under all circumstances of weather, and, above all, unfailing resourcefulness in emergencies. Many instances of the exercise of these powers occur in his narrative and constitute the most interesting and attractive parts of the book. Valuable also are his observations and *excursus* on natural conditions that he has studied, such as the habits of the dogs and the wild animals, or the behaviour of floe-ice under varying stresses, or the description of his own practice in hunting or in finding his way through fog and blizzard.

Mr. Stefansson's explorations of the unknown were made in journeys with dog-sled over the sea-ice in four successive seasons of spring and early summer. On the second and third of these he was successful in discovering new land, first a large island which he named Borden Island, to the north-east of Prince Patrick Island, with a few adjoining smaller islands, and then another island of no great extent, north-east of Ellef Ringnes Land, which he named Meighen Island. On his fourth journey he succeeded in disproving the existence of the large island marked on recent maps as King Christian Land, which was inferred from hasty observations by Isaachsen and Hassel of the Sverdrup expedition to extend to the south-west of Ellef Ringnes Land, and instead of it he replaced on the map Osborn's Finlay Land, which he mapped almost completely and renamed Lougheed Island. Besides these greater discoveries he made corrections in the accepted coast-line of some of the other large islands on which he hunted and spent his winters. His first journey, made in 1914, discovered nothing. Indeed it is hard to understand why it was made at all. A march of two hundred miles or so, due north over the Beaufort Sea, was reasonably certain not to be rewarded by the discovery of land, ever since Leffingwell and Mikkelsen, in their expedition of 1906-07, established by soundings for one hundred miles to the north of Flaxman Island that the continental shelf extends but a little way from land and is succeeded by oceanic depths. Mr. Stefansson shows by a reference to this expedition, on page 129, that he was aware of their results, but later in the book he appears to have forgotten them entirely, both during his own journey and when composing his narrative. Lest we should be thought to misrepresent Mr. Stefansson on this point, his own statements are appended; the italics are ours.

It had been a theory with many geographers that the ocean north of Alaska was shallow, its bottom an extension of the continental shelf with a consequent average depth of under 400 meters and a concomitant probability of numerous islands studding this shallow sea (p. 216).

And he quotes from his diary:

We have carried a line of soundings . . . through four degrees of latitude and nineteen degrees of longitude, most of it unexplored *and all of it unsounded ocean*. We have determined the continental shelf off Alaska and off Banks Island (p. 236).

We have not Mikkelsen's own book at hand, but the following sentence from a review of it in the Bulletin of the American Geographical Society for the year 1909 will sufficiently indicate what the opinion of competent geographers on the subject must have been since 1909 when the book was published:

They found that the continental shelf was very narrow, and, long before they reached their highest point, they stood above waters of oceanic depth, which, according to present theories, discredits the supposition that there is land to the north of that part of the Arctic.

The line of the continental shelf, it may be added, has long been determined and was marked on Admiralty charts of a much earlier date.

In other instances also Mr. Stefansson's acquaintance with the performance of his predecessors in Arctic exploration is incomplete. His references to McClintock, while complimentary in general terms, too often betray strange unfamiliarity with the printed record of that great explorer's achievements. After a mystifying passage on the identification of the island named Ireland's Eye by McClintock, Mr. Stefansson concludes thus: "Ireland's Eye is upon the map, but no one knows whence it came or how it got there." As a matter of fact, the island so named is distinctly shown and named on McClintock's chart, and on the Admiralty charts upon which Mr. Stefansson's map is based. It is identical with the island named Brock Island by Mr. Stefansson.

There are a few favourite topics to which Mr. Stefansson recurs frequently in the course of his narrative. One of these is his method of "living on the country", in other words depending for food and fuel upon what the district traversed will supply instead of hauling large quantities of both with him. He does not claim credit for having invented the method, but he frequently makes disparaging allusions to the failure of his predecessors to adopt it. For instance, on page 323, he quotes an entry in McClintock's diary, "No fuel could be got," as the text for a criticism of McClintock for not using for fuel the blubber of seals killed *en route*, instead of hauling fuel from the ship. But McClintock's own narrative repeatedly mentions the use of seal-blubber in this very way. The particular occasion on which the above entry in the diary was made may have referred to a day when seals could not be found. Stefansson himself was not always successful in finding them. The inference, however, from the quotation followed by the criticism is that McClintock was ignorant of the fact that seal-blubber could be

used as fuel, than which nothing could be farther from the truth. It would be about as fair to quote from Mr. Stefansson's book some sentence in which he alludes to the supply of kerosene carried on the sled running low and then lecture him for not realizing the advantage of depending on seal-blubber. As a matter of fact, Mr. Stefansson, like a sensible man, always carried supplies both of food and fuel with him on his sled journeys, in spite of his theory of living on the country, and used them to supplement seal meat and blubber whenever the latter were hard to obtain. McClintock and other Arctic explorers, as far back at least as Dr. John Rae, have lived on the country also, as well as they could with inferior weapons to the splendid rifles now in use, but likewise being sensible men they have been careful to carry with them sufficient food to take them back to known supplies in case of failure to find game. When we discover later in the book that two members of Mr. Stefansson's expedition, old and experienced hands at Arctic travel, died of starvation on a sled journey to his advanced winter camp, we realize that the abundance of the Arctic, which is one of the author's favourite themes, is still largely a matter of good hunting and perhaps in no small degree of good luck, and that the old-fashioned practice of carrying sufficient food to take the party in case of accident to the nearest depot of supplies is not likely to be discontinued in future by prudent people. Mr. Stefansson overstates his case here, just as he does in making light of the Arctic cold.

Very early in the book Mr. Stefansson pokes fun at the scientists for not knowing that sea-ice a year old melts into fresh water, and he says that "although some polar explorers knew that sea-ice becomes fresh a large number never discovered it." He mentions no names either of those who knew or of those who did not know, so he gives us no sure clue as to whether he considers this a recent discovery or not, but in connection with his gibe at the scientists of his own party we get the impression that the knowledge is of comparatively recent date and concealed from ordinary inquiry. In McClintock's narrative, however, published in 1859, occurs the following passage, under date of November 25, 1857:

By my desire Dr. Walker is occupied in making every possible experiment upon the freezing of salt water; the first crop of ice is salt, the second less so, the third produces drinkable water, and the fourth is fresh. Frosty efflorescence appears upon ice formed at low temperatures in calm weather—it is brine expressed by the act of freezing.

Having before him such a statement in a classic of Arctic travel like McClintock's book, it is unlikely that any explorer since McClintock's date would be ignorant of the scientific result so clearly demonstrated,

nor does McClintock write as if the mere fact of sea-ice becoming fresh were unknown previously, but implies that he conducts an experiment to determine under what conditions the salt may be entirely eliminated. In his log, under date of June 17, 1853, he plainly states that he and his men drank the water that lay in hollows of sea-ice.

The above are perhaps the most conspicuous instances of Mr. Stefansson's unfamiliarity with the work done by earlier explorers. There are many minor inaccuracies. On page 31 Franklin is said to have been scarcely a sailor "in the proper sense." In what sense would he consider a captain in the Royal Navy to be a sailor? The expedition of Nares was in 1875-6, not 1878 (p. 3). It is not correct to say that part of the coast of Prince Patrick Island remained "unexplored" by Mecham's party in 1853 (pp. 300 and 312). About fifteen miles of coastline were unsurveyed, but were seen and sketched by Mecham, as he relates. Reynolds Point on Victoria Island, twenty miles east of Hornby Point, not the latter, was Wynniatt's farthest (p. 430).

Mr. Stefansson's book raises questions also of a more serious character. The expedition, as a whole, was fitted out by the Canadian government. It was divided into two sections, one under Mr. Stefansson for exploring, the other under Dr. Anderson for scientific research about Coronation Gulf. Mr. Stefansson was named as leader of the whole expedition. For his special purposes the *Karluk* was equipped, while other and smaller vessels were to be at the service of the Coronation Gulf party. As is well known, the *Karluk* was caught in the ice before reaching Herschel Island and carried to the neighbourhood of Wrangell Island off Siberia, where she was crushed and sank. Most of the stores of the entire expedition were lost with her. Mr. Stefansson himself was fortunate enough to have left the ship for land before the storm which carried her far away from the Alaskan coast, but he found himself in consequence without a ship and without much needed equipment for his journeys. Under these circumstances he appears to have assumed that as leader he was entitled to draw for his own purposes upon the resources of the expedition as a whole and to requisition the vessels and supplies originally destined for the use of the scientific section. His authority to do so was disputed, and, although some compromise was eventually arrived at, his book is full of complaints that his orders were disobeyed, and of references to what he might have accomplished had they been carried out. This is not the place to discuss whether Mr. Stefansson is right or wrong in these statements. We have before us only his own side of the case, and doubtless there is another side which will be put before the public in due time. That such differences arose is very much to be deplored, and these and other difficulties encountered later

in connection with Captain Gonzales produce the impression that Mr. Stefansson's conduct of the expedition and management of his men left much to be desired. In these respects, at any rate, the modern explorer might well learn from his predecessors. The reports of McClintock and other great Arctic explorers of the nineteenth century contain no stories of mutinous or disobedient subordinates or of conflicts of authority.

The loss of the *Karluk* was more than an embarrassment to Mr. Stefansson's plans, it was one of the tragedies of Arctic exploration, for it involved the death of eleven men, as appeared later when the survivors were rescued from Wrangell Island. Captain Bartlett, the sailing-master of the ship, has already written and published his account of the disaster, and his narrative includes a statement of how the *Karluk* came to enter the ice from which she was never afterwards free until she sank. Mr. Stefansson also gives an account of the same fateful step. The two accounts may be compared. Capt. Bartlett says:

We started on our way again, on the morning of Aug. 12, steaming through the loose ice and keeping as near the shore as possible. . . . We steamed along through the open water and because the ice near the shore was closely packed, we were driven farther off shore than I liked. We had to follow the open lanes, however, and go where they led.

Mr. Stefansson says:

Bartlett and I discussed these things fully, and decided for the more conservative alternative. We steamed inshore according to local practice and followed the edge of the ice until, when it prevented further eastward progress, we finally anchored at Cross Island. . . . We have outlined the two main views of ice navigation—the bold Atlantic policy of “keep away from the land, face the ice and take your chances”; the cautious Alaska one of “hug the coast, play safe, and if you don't get there this year you may have another chance next”. . . . After tying at Cross Island for several hours, discussing theories and plans, we hove anchor and steamed deliberately north, away from land, threading our way between ice-cakes and occasionally ramming them to break a way. “It may be safe but I don't think so”, said Hadley. Everyone else seemed delighted with our adoption of what they considered the bolder and more sportsmanlike policy. Relentless events were to prove this decision my most serious error of the whole expedition (p. 48).

The differences are so marked in these two accounts that it is hard to believe they refer to the same incident. In Bartlett's story, the course taken by the ship was inevitable, and she followed the only open lanes available. According to the other story, there was a consultation followed by a deliberate abandonment of safe anchorage and a bold attempt to penetrate the ice pack. Which is the correct account? Both cannot be right. Upon the answer which the reader makes to himself will depend much of the value for him of Mr. Stefansson's book.

H. H. LANGTON



*An Outline of Provincial and Municipal Taxation in British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan.* By A. B. CLARK. [Winnipeg. 1920.] Pp. 97.

*Recent Tax Developments in Western Canada.* By A. B. CLARK. (Reprinted from Proceedings of the National Tax Association. Vol. xiii.) National Tax Association. 1921. Pp. 22.

THE most interesting feature of these pamphlets is the light which they throw on the results of single-tax experiments in western Canada. During the ten or fifteen years preceding the war, many western cities adopted the policy of exempting improvements and incomes to an increasing extent from municipal taxation. The increase of speculative prices and the corresponding high assessment of land, accompanied by general prosperity, made this policy tolerable for a time, although the "single tax" did not justify the predictions of Henry George by checking speculation. When the boom collapsed and land values fell to a more reasonable level, the weakness of the system became apparent, and Professor Clark shows the dangerous financial situation to which a number of cities were brought by tax arrears, which could not be collected because public opinion would not sanction extensive tax sales on the falling real estate market. The result has been the broadening on the basis of taxation in many places by subjecting improvements, incomes, etc., once more to taxation. All this Professor Clark has well explained, with much detail.

The general description of the western methods of taxation is clear and systematic, and the pamphlets should be of value to the student of Canadian public finance. One would have liked, however, some information as to the extent of double taxation. There is a well-known case in which the province of British Columbia, insisting on its right to tax the whole estates of deceased residents, no matter where these estates were situated, demanded from the executors several thousand dollars more than the whole value of the British Columbia property involved. It would be of interest to know how far this is still possible, and whether anything like it exists in other cases. H. R. KEMP

*Canada at the Cross Roads.* By AGNES C. LAUT. Toronto: The Macmillan Company. 1921. Pp. 279.

MISS LAUT asks in this book a very pertinent question. Why is it that, in the Dominion of Canada with its immense natural wealth, its almost boundless opportunities for advancement and prosperity, there are barely eight and a half millions of people, a mere handful compared with the number the country might support? Miss Laut's answer to this conundrum is that Canada has never really pulled together, never made a

concerted effort to come into and to enjoy its heritage. Canadians have been too modest, she says. They have always meekly accepted the statement that the United States was the country of promise, the land of milk and honey, and so for decade after decade the young men and women of Canada have been drawn away to the south, heedless of the opportunities that have lain at their very doors. The time has come, says Miss Laut, when Canada stands at the cross-roads. One road leads to a great and rich Canada, the other leads to a Canada which is nothing more than a hanger-on, a poor relation of the United States. What Canadians have to do is to believe in their own country, to believe that within its own borders lie opportunities for careers for the most ambitious ; in short, to stay at home and build a greater Canada than has been. Too many young men and women have left Canada to find careers elsewhere, while they might have done equally well, perhaps better, by staying at home. Only too often the Canadian universities are training men and women not to be leaders of Canadian life and thought, but to be recruits for positions in the United States. What is wanted is more confidence in Canada.

Such is Miss Laut's thesis, and she backs up her contentions with some very telling figures and facts. Miss Laut knows her Canada; she writes at first hand and from intimate knowledge; and the feeling that she has something to say that ought to be said makes her very vigorous in the saying of it. She is not ashamed to be a booster; she boosts with great energy, and the effect is sufficiently striking. If we may make one criticism, and it is a kindly one, and made in all good will to the author, it is that Miss Laut's somewhat *staccato* style is a little wearing on the reader. What may be entirely admirable in a newspaper or magazine may be a trifle out of place in a book.

H. MICHELL

*Commonwealth or Empire. Which Should It Be?* By ERNEST LAW.  
London: Selwyn and Blount. 1921. Pp. 122. (5 sh.)

THIS volume is an attempt to discuss the connotations of the titles "Empire" and "Commonwealth" as used to describe the countries and the peoples owing allegiance to the British Crown. Mr. Law's method consists in examining the use of each word in history, law, politics, and literature. He moves along well-known lines, and it is rather significant that he makes no reference to Dudley's *Tree of the Commonwealth*, although there was an admirable, if limited, reprint of it in the middle of the last century. His book, however, will be useful for convenient reference.

Mr. Law decides in favour of the use of the term "Commonwealth." His discussion, however, is highly academic. Historical interpretations

are of small value in this connection, as the rank and file of British citizens are fully aware that the possessions of the Crown might be called "zero", without any idea of linking them up with detrimental associations. In spite of the "school of sophists", names do not matter when the facts are clear. Indeed, it is impossible not to believe that Mr. Law's book is not a *tour de force*, owing its origin to the present interest in imperial affairs. In so far as it is symptomatic it is so much to the good. But the problem of empire is threadbare save for those who are qualified to bring to bear on it a wider and newer conception of political philosophy than Mr. Law appears to possess. His pages disclose nothing new either in fact or in interpretation, and his style is so journalistic and so full of strong and excessive epithets that it creates misgivings.

There are some errors. Canada was not called "the United Provinces" in the first five drafts of the B.N.A. Act. The term appears in a subsection of the draft usually known as the "third", where, however, the general title is "Kingdom". The latter term is thus specifically used earlier than the "sixth" draft to which Mr. Law assigns its first appearance. If two incomplete drafts are included, this "third" draft might be known as the "fifth"; but no numbering of the documents can make it the "sixth". In discussing the origin of the final title, Mr. Law gives the well-known story from Mr. [sic] Joseph Pope, but he appears to believe that the substitution of "Dominion" for "Kingdom" had in it something deeper than the story implies, and was due to an intentional slur on the part of the imperial authorities. He fails to note the use of the word in the "third" draft, itself the product of the colonial delegates: "one united dominion under the name of the kingdom of Canada." This phrase appeared in the final draft with the words "united" and "of the kingdom" deleted, and "dominion" turned into a proper noun. This seems to be the real origin of the title. When imperial objections were raised to the term "Kingdom", some one crossed out a few words at a united conference, and an excellent title, colonial in its origin, automatically emerged. Lastly, it is somewhat surprising to find the delegates to London in 1867 called "Canadian", and reduced to three in number.

The mechanical side of the book is good. There is unfortunately no index, a fact which tells against any use that the book may possess.

W. P. M. KENNEDY

*Final Report of the Royal Commission on the Natural Resources, Trade and Legislation of Certain Portions of His Majesty's Dominions.* (Cd. 8462.) London: H.M. Stationery Office. 1918. Pp. xv, 499. (1 sh. 6d.)

MANY citizens of the British Empire are familiar with the work of the Dominions Royal Commission who remain in blissful ignorance of its longer, but far less expressive, title. For while other such bodies have often been unhonoured, if not indeed unknown, its work was done in a shifting blaze of publicity. Including in its membership a representative from each of the self-governing Dominions (among them Sir George Foster), and fortified with the wide experience of Sir Rider Haggard, it travelled in search of wisdom about the British Empire. No less than eight hundred and fifty-one witnesses were examined altogether; two hundred and eighty-six of them in Canada. Five years were spent in making and co-ordinating its inquiries; and the present volume (apart from the detailed findings which it contains) summarizes all this information admirably.

The terms of reference precluded any finding which might encroach upon the rights of the Dominions. In particular, the fiscal question was left outside the scope of the commission. The result is a series of recommendations (some of them entering into very minute detail) intended, in the first place, to strengthen the bonds of Empire, and, in the second place, to render it as far as possible independent of external pressure.

In more senses than one, its labours mark the close of an epoch. Appointed in April, 1912, it took more than five years to complete its task. Much of its work was done in the stress of wartime, and here and there (as in Chapter V, on "The Control of Natural Resources During the War") specific reference is made to war expedients; but, as a whole, it represents a tremendous stocktaking of resources, in men as well as in materials, as they were immediately before the war began. As such it is an historic document; and, although very different in the purpose of its compilation, it suggests from time to time an inevitable parallel with the Domesday Surveys.

It is to be hoped, too, that it is only the first of a series of similar inquiries; for none of the problems here considered is ever likely to be settled once for all, and some, such as shipping, cables, or migration, cannot be treated successfully, either by the Mother Country, or by any one of the Dominions, acting in isolation. Problems of common concern demand research as well as action on a common basis; and although the establishment of an Imperial Development Board might render unnecessary the appointment of another Dominions Royal Commission within a generation, to create such a Board would in fact be to maintain in continuous session a successor to the Dominion Royal Commission.

The character of their task gives flavour and piquancy to the first pages of the commissioners' *Final Report*. There is a lyrical note in their general survey which is seldom found within the covers of a blue-book. It is an open secret that the panorama here presented comes from the pen of Sir Rider Haggard. His description begins with the tour of Canada, very much as it seems to have been made on this occasion, and he has never written with less effort or more vividly. But the succeeding chapters are a series of severely scientific studies, each of them confined within too small a compass to permit of the grand manner. Their merits of style consist in the presentation of a solid edifice of fact, from which the scaffolding of statistical operations has been skilfully removed. A noteworthy conclusion (in view of widely-held opinions to the contrary) is that the number of women, who were of ages suitable for emigration and had no statistical prospect of marriage in the United Kingdom was actually less, at the census of 1911, than the surplus male population of the Dominions. It is open to question whether the disproportion between the sexes which exists in almost every part of the British Empire where Anglo-Saxons predominate (and which results in an unnecessarily low birth-rate per 1,000 of population), can conceivably be remedied. War casualties have in any case increased it. But it is reassuring to students of migration to find it by no means so hopeless as it has sometimes seemed.

To summarize the findings, which are in themselves "an imperial reconstruction policy", would be too long a task for a reviewer. Some of them have already been noticed in the *CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW*. Informal co-operation between the British and Dominion governments has already translated into action a few of the most urgent. The British employment exchanges are aiding in the selection of immigrants, for whom the Canadian department of labour, and the parallel authorities elsewhere, can guarantee secure employment. Land settlement schemes have been inaugurated on an extensive scale. An exchange of school teachers has produced the happiest results. A conference of statisticians has been held in London as a preliminary to the building up of an imperial statistical service. These are excellent beginnings. It is a pity that the Bill of 1918, which would have established a central emigration authority, representing the Dominions as well as Great Britain, was allowed to lapse. But it was open to serious objections; and the measure which is promised for the session of 1922 will perhaps be free from them.

G. E. JACKSON

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO CANADA

(Notice in this section does not preclude a more extended notice later.)

### I. THE RELATIONS OF CANADA TO THE EMPIRE

LUCAS, Sir CHARLES. *Balance of power within the Empire* (United Empire, January, 1922, pp. 17-25).

An attempt to formulate a philosophy of the British Empire.

——— (ed.). *The Empire at war*. Edited for the Royal Colonial Institute.

Vol. I. By the editor. London: Humphrey Milford. 1921. Pp. xi, 324.

To be reviewed later.

MARRIOTT, J. A. R. *Empire partnership* (Fortnightly Review, December, 1921, pp. 949-960).

A study of recent developments in the constitutional framework of the British Empire.

POLLARD, A. F. *The Dominions and foreign affairs* (History, July, 1921, pp. 84-98).

A paper read before the British Institute of International Affairs on Empire Day, 1921.

ROSEBURY, Lord. *Miscellanies, literary and historical*. Two vols. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1921. Pp. 350; 347.

Contains an address, delivered in 1900, on "Questions of Empire", and another, delivered in 1909, on "The Press of the Empire."

SCHUYLER, R. L. *The climax of anti-imperialism in England* (Political Science Quarterly December, 1921, pp. 537-560).

A brief, but scholarly, study of anti-imperial tendencies in English government during the decade, 1861-1870.

### II. HISTORY OF CANADA

#### (1) General History

BORDEN, Right Hon. Sir ROBERT LAIRD. *Canadian constitutional studies*. (The Marfleet lectures, University of Toronto, 1921.) Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1922. Pp. 163. (\$1.00.)

To be reviewed later.

FOLWELL, WILLIAM WATTS. *A history of Minnesota*. In Four Volumes. Volume I. Saint Paul: The Minnesota Historical Society. 1921. Pp. xvii, 533.

Reviewed on page 72.

GOSSELIN, Chanoine. *La paroisse du Canada* (Bulletin des recherches historiques, vol. xxvii, no. 12, pp. 361-372).

A valuable sketch of the history of the parish, both as an ecclesiastical and as a civil subdivision, in French Canada.

HINKS, ARTHUR R. *Notes on the technique of boundary delimitation* (Geographical Journal, December, 1921, pp. 417-443).

Contains an account of the boundary disputes between Canada and the United States.

HISTORIC LANDMARKS ASSOCIATION OF CANADA. *Annual report, 1921*. Ottawa: The Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada, Department of the Interior. [1921.] Pp. 64.

Contains a number of summaries of addresses on Canadian landmarks: "Some historical points in Toronto", by the Hon. W. R. Riddell; "Footprints in the history of Montreal", by Pemberton Smith; "Two memorable landmarks of British Columbia", by Judge Howay; "Mission of the Historic Sites and Monuments Board", by Brig.-Gen. E. A. Cruikshank; "Unmarked landmarks of western Ontario", by Dr. J. H. Coyne; "National parks and playgrounds", by J. B. Harkin; and "A forgotten project of the far west", by C. M. Barbeau.

WRONG, GEORGE M. *Ontario public school history of Canada*. Authorized by the minister of education for Ontario. Toronto: The Ryerson Press. [1921.] Pp. 365. (25c.)

An elementary text-book.

## (2) The History of New France

*Lettres inédites du gouverneur d'Argenson* (Bulletin des recherches historiques, vol. xxvii, no. 10, pp. 298-309; no. 11, pp. 328-339).

Hitherto unpublished letters written by the Sieur d'Argenson, governor of New France, in 1658.

MASSICOTTE, E.-Z. *Notes sur la culture et l'usage du tabac dans la Nouvelle-France* (Bulletin des recherches historiques, vol. xxvii, no. 10, pp. 289-297).

A sketch of the history of the growth and use of tobacco among the inhabitants of New France.

THOMPSON, JOSEPH J. *The time and place for a monument to Marquette* (Illinois Catholic Historical Review, October, 1921, pp. 115-134).

A proposal that, on the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of Father Marquette's first landing at the mouth of the Chicago River, a monument should be erected to his memory at that spot.

## (3) The History of British North America before 1867

ANDREWS, EVANGELINE WALKER (ed.). *Journal of a lady of quality; being the narrative of a journey from Scolland to the West Indies, North Carolina, and Portugal, in the years 1774 to 1776*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1921. Pp. 341.

An admirably edited journal, which recounts the experiences of a Scotch "lady of quality" who visited America at the outbreak of the American Revolution, and which throws light on the treatment meted out in 1775 and 1776 to the loyalists.

CRUIKSHANK, Brig.-Gen. E. A. *Documents relating to the invasion of the Niagara peninsula by the United States army, commanded by General Jacob, in July and August, 1814*. (Niagara Historical Society: No. 33.) Published by the Niagara Historical Society. [1921.] Pp. 99.

A series of important documents illustrating the history of the American campaign of 1814 in the Niagara peninsula, drawn from letter-books in the Library of Congress and the Navy Department at Washington—the whole forming a supplement to the editor's *Documentary History of the Campaign on the Niagara Frontier in 1814*.

FISH, ANDREW. *The last phase of the Oregon boundary question* (Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society, September, 1921, pp. 161-224).

To be reviewed later.



LANDON, FRED. *A daring Canadian abolitionist* (Michigan History Magazine, vol. v, nos. 3-4, pp. 364-373).

A sketch of the life of Dr. Alexander M. Ross, a Canadian born in Belleville, Ontario, in 1832, who played a conspicuous part in the abolitionist movement in the United States.

MAHON, Major-Gen. R. H. *Life of General the Hon. James Murray, a builder of Canada; with a biographical sketch of the family of Murray of Elibank*. London: John Murray. 1921. Pp. ix, 457. (21sh.)

To be reviewed later.

RANDALL, JAMES G. *George Rogers Clark's service of supply* (Mississippi Valley Historical Review, December, 1921, pp. 250-263).

A study of one phase of George Rogers Clark's campaign for the conquest of the Old North West in 1778-1780.

RIDDELL, Hon. W. R. *The Blackstones in Canada* (Illinois Law Review, December, 1921, pp. 255-267).

A paper sketching the lives of the son and grandson of Sir William Blackstone, the author of the *Commentaries on the Law of England*, the first of whom settled in Canada in 1797, and both of whom lived and died in Canada.

#### (4) The Dominion of Canada

BROWN, Sir GEORGE McLAREN. *Lord Mount Stephen* (United Empire, January, 1922, pp. 9-10).

An obituary notice.

CHARTIER, Chanoine EMILE. *Le Canada français: L'avenir du Canada et du Canada français* (Revue Trimestrielle Canadienne, décembre, 1921, pp. 370-389).

A discussion of the political future of French Canada.

HOPKINS, J. CASTELL. *The Canadian annual review of public affairs, 1920*. Twentieth Year of Issue. Toronto: The Canadian Review Company. 1921. Pp. 909.

This invaluable review of public affairs in Canada during 1920 contains sections dealing with "Financial Conditions of 1920", "Agricultural Conditions and the Farmers' Movement", "Industrial Conditions and Problems", "Transportation Interests and Affairs", and the political history of the Dominion and of each of the provinces.

LAUT, AGNES C. *Canada at the cross roads*. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada. 1921. Pp. 279.

Reviewed on page 92.

MARTIN, PERCY F. *Overseas political confederation* (Quarterly Review, January, 1922, pp. 188-202).

A discussion of the movement looking toward political union of Canada and British West Indies.

MEIGHEN, Right Hon. ARTHUR. *Overseas addresses, June-July, 1921*. Toronto: The Musson Book Company. [1921.] Pp. 82. (\$1.00.)

Speeches and addresses delivered by the recent prime minister of Canada while he was in Great Britain attending the Imperial Conference of June and July, 1921.

RAFFALOVITCH, A. *Le Canada pendant les six dernières années, 1914-1920* (Journal des Economistes, juillet, 1921).

A survey of events in Canada since the beginning of the Great War, from the economist's point of view.

SKELTON, OSCAR DOUGLAS. *The life and letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier*. Two vols. Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1921. Pp. 485; 576.

Reviewed on page 77.

THOMPSON, BRAM. *Who owns Labrador?* (Canadian Law Times, December, 1921, pp. 724-732).

A discussion of the dispute between Newfoundland and Canada over the ownership of the Labrador coast.

WILLISON, SIR JOHN. *The political situation in Canada* (The Nineteenth Century and After, November, 1921, pp. 764-779).

A survey of the political situation in Canada preceding the Dominion elections of December, 1921.

### III. PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL HISTORY

#### (1) The Maritime Provinces

FRASER, COL. ALEXANDER. *Nova Scotia's charter* (Dalhousie Review, January, 1922, pp. 369-380).

A paper dealing with the charter granted by James I in 1621 to Sir William Alexander, conferring on him the province of Nova Scotia.

SETH, JAMES. *Halifax revisited* (Dalhousie Review, January, 1922, pp. 333-339).

Some interesting but rather discursive reminiscences of Halifax a generation ago, by the professor of moral philosophy in the University of Edinburgh.

ROSS, EFFIE MAY. *Thomas Chandler Haliburton* (Americana, vol. xvi, no. 1, pp. 62-70).

A biographical sketch of the author of *Sam Slick*.

#### (2) The Province of Quebec

DEMERS, PHILIPPE. *La vallée du Richelieu* (L'Action Française, Décembre, 1921, pp. 727-748).

A public lecture by a French-Canadian judge on the history of the Richelieu valley.

MASSICOTTE, E.-Z. *François La Bernarde, sieur de Laprairie, premier instituteur laïque de Montréal* (Bulletin des recherches historiques, vol. xxvii, no. 12, pp. 359-360).

A note throwing some light on the life of the man who, in 1683, opened the first private school in Montreal.

——— *Les anciens cimetières de Montréal, 1648-1800* (Bulletin des recherches historiques, vol. xxvii, no. 11, pp. 341-345).

Notes on the old burying-grounds of Montreal in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

——— *Les chirurgiens et médecins de la région de Montréal* (Bulletin des recherches historiques, vol. xxvii, no. 11, pp. 325-327).

A supplement to previous articles by the author on the surgeons and physicians of the Montreal district during the French period and the early English period.

MAURALT, ABBÉ O. *Notre-Dame de Montréal: La décoration* (Revue Trimestrielle Canadienne, Septembre, 1921, pp. 269-292).

The third of a series of articles by the author on the history of the church of Notre Dame in Montreal.

MIGNAULT, HON. P.-B. *L'Autorité des arrêts* (Revue Trimestrielle Canadienne, Septembre, 1921, pp. 241-268).

A study of the effect of "judge-made law" in the civil law system of the province of Quebec.

ROY, P.-G. *Le palais occupé par M. de Tracy à Québec en 1665-1666* (Bulletin des recherches historiques, vol. xxvii, no. 12, pp. 353-358).

An identification of the "palace" in which the governor of New France lived at Quebec in 1665-1666.

ROY, P.-G. *Les résidences successives de Mgr. de Laval à Québec* (Bulletin des recherches historiques, vol. xxvii, no. 11, pp. 321-324).

A statement as to the places of residence which Bishop Laval occupied in Quebec between 1659 and 1708.

[ROY, P.-G.] *Rapport de l'archiviste de la province de Québec pour 1920-1921*. [Québec:] Ls-A. Proulx, imprimeur de sa Majesté le Roi. 1921. Pp. vii, 437.

To be reviewed later.

WOOD, WILLIAM. *Place-names of Quebec* (The Gazette, Montreal, January 6-January 12, 1922).

A series of seven papers on the Eskimo, Indian, French, and English place-names of the province of Quebec.

### (3) The Province of Ontario

CALDWELL, WILLIAM. *Impressions of Ontario* (Canadian Magazine, January, 1922, pp. 199-203).

Notes on present-day conditions in Ontario, based on observations made by the author, who is professor of philosophy in McGill University, during recent lecture tour.

DOW, CHARLES MASON. *Anthology and bibliography of Niagara Falls*. Two vols. Albany: Published by the State of New York. 1921. Pp. xvi, 1423; illustrations.

An elaborate bibliography of books, pamphlets, verses, articles, maps, and pictures relating to Niagara Falls. The titles are, as a rule, followed by descriptive notes, or by extracts reproduced in full. A useful feature of the book is an alphabetical list of authors and titles referred to.

[DUFF, LOUIS BLAKE.] *Hundredth anniversary of Trinity Church, Chippawa, established MDCCCXX: A story of the centennial ceremonies and the history of the church the past century, 1820-1920*. [Welland, Ont. 1921.] Pp. 20; illustrations.

A brief parish history, admirably illustrated.

HERRINGTON, M. ELEANOR. *Captain John Deserontyon and the Mohawk settlement at Deseronto* (Queen's Quarterly, vol. xxix, no. 2, pp. 165-180).

A piece of original research into the history of the Mohawk settlement founded in 1784 on the shores of the Bay of Quinté.

MEREDITH, ALDEN GRIFFIN. *A little journey in Glengarry* (Canadian Magazine, January, 1922, pp. 224-230).

A description of some historical landmarks in the easternmost part of the province of Ontario.

RIDDELL, Hon. W. R. *Early proposals for a court of chancery in Upper Canada* (Canadian Law Times, December, 1921, pp. 740-750).

An account of an episode in the legal history of the province of Upper Canada at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

— *Simon Girty's marriage* (Canadian Magazine, December, 1921, pp. 169-171).

A curious episode in connection with the marriage of a United Empire Loyalist which throws light on the confusion in the early marriage law of Upper Canada.

### (4) The Western Provinces

MACBETH, R. G. *Policing the plains: being the real-life record of the famous Royal North-West Mounted Police*. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1921. Pp. 320; illustrations. (15sh.)

Reviewed on page 74.

McKENZIE, N. M. W. J. *The men of the Hudson's Bay Company*. Fort William, Ontario. [1921.] Pp. 214.

Reviewed on page 76.

#### IV. GEOGRAPHY, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

ABEL, ANNIE HELOISE (ed.). *Trudeau's description of the Upper Missouri* (Mississippi Valley Historical Review, vol. viii, nos. 1-2, pp. 149-179).

A document, of some importance for the history of the western fur-trade about the year 1800, discovered during the war in the archives at Washington.

[ANON.] *Things out west* (Home Bank Monthly, January, 1922, pp. 1-33).

An account of a tour of inspection of the western provinces by a Toronto banker in the autumn of 1921.

CANADA: DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, NATURAL RESOURCES BRANCH. *Lower Athabaska and Slave River district*. Ottawa: The King's Printer. [1921.] Pp. 44.

A synopsis of available information about the valleys of the Lower Athabaska and Slave Rivers, from McMurray north to the Great Slave Lake.

COLEMAN, A. P. *The Gaspé peninsula* (Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, 3rd series, vol. xv, appendix A, pp. xxxix-lv).

"A study of the geology of the region, and its influence on the inhabitants."

DÉSY, ANATOLE. *Le Canada économique sous l'Union* (Revue Trimestrielle Canadienne, Septembre, 1921, pp. 318-329; décembre, 1921, pp. 464-475).

Some notes on the economic history of Canada between 1840 and 1867.

KINDLE, E. M. *Notes on the forests of southeastern Labrador* (Geographical Review, January, 1922, pp. 57-71).

A paper on the timber resources of Labrador, by a member of the Geographical Survey of Canada.

LEBOURDAIS, D. M. *Canadian reciprocity again?* (North American Review, December, 1921, pp. 751-760).

A discussion of the future of trade relations between Canada and the United States.

MARKHAM, Sir CLEMENTS R. *The lands of silence: A history of Arctic and Antarctic exploration*. Cambridge: At the University Press. 1921. Pp. xii, 539.

Reviewed on page 67.

MORICE, A.-G., o.m.i. *L'abbé Emile Petitot et les découvertes géographiques du Canada* (Le Canada Français, décembre, 1921, pp. 225-235).

An account of the contributions to the study of Canadian geographical history of a French priest, who died in Belgium during the war.

PULLING, A. V. S. *Forest problems of eastern Canada* (Dalhousie Review, January, 1922, pp. 381-396).

A plea for forest conservation in the Maritime Provinces, by the Professor of Forestry in the University of New Brunswick.

REED, F. R. C. *The geology of the British Empire*. London: Edward Arnold. 1921. Pp. 480; maps and sections. (40sh.)

A handbook containing 62 pages descriptive of the geology of Canada and Newfoundland.

SAINT-PIERRE, ARTHUR. *Les répercussions sociales du fait industriel* (Revue Trimestrielle Canadienne, Septembre, 1921, pp. 297-309).

A study of the influence of industrialism on Canadian society.

SHORTT, ADAM. *Founders of Canadian banking: The Hon. John Richardson, merchant, financier, and statesman* (Journal of the Canadian Bankers' Association, October, 1921, pp. 17-27).

The first of a series of biographical sketches of some of the outstanding figures in the early history of Canadian banking.

STEFANSSON, VILHJALMUR. *The friendly Arctic: The story of five years in polar regions.* New York: The Macmillan Company. 1921. Pp. xxxi, 784; illustrations, maps. (\$6.50.)

Reviewed on page 86.

*The Dominion of Canada as a market for British goods.* With introductions by Sir W. PETER RYLANDS and STANLEY MACHIN. London: Selwyn & Blount. [1921.] Pp. 242.

A guide to Canada as a market for British manufactures.

WILDMAN, M. S. *The bank as an instrument of re-adjustment* (Dalhousie Review, January, 1922, pp. 340-349).

A comparison of the comparative advantages of the banking systems of Canada and the United States, as agencies of post-war readjustment. Sir Edmund Walker adds to the paper "A Canadian comment."

## V. EDUCATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS HISTORY

BOYD, JOHN. *The university's role, an appreciation of the new chancellor of McGill university* (Canadian Magazine, January, 1922, pp. 217-222).

A pen-portrait of Mr. E. W. Beatty.

[ELLIOTT, Rev. J. A. and others.] *Herbert Symonds: A memoir.* Compiled by friends. Montreal: Renouf Publishing Co. [1921.] Pp. 319.

A memorial volume containing a biographical sketch of the late Rev. Herbert Symonds, vicar of Christ Church Cathedral, Montreal, together with the memorial sermon preached at the funeral by the Rev. Canon Shatford, a number of appreciations by various people, and a selection of Dr. Symonds's sermons and essays.

MACMILLAN, CYRUS. *McGill and its story, 1821-1921.* Toronto: Canadian Branch, The Oxford University Press. 1921. Pp. xiv, 304. (\$3.00.)

Reviewed on page 73.

MONTGOMERY, WALTER A. *Educational developments in the Dominion of Canada* (United States, Department of the Interior, Bureau of Education, Bulletin, 1919, no. 89: Biennial Survey of Education, 1916-1918, vol. ii, pp. 141-167).

A survey of education in Canada during the years 1916-1918, by "the specialist in foreign educational systems" in the United States Bureau of Education.

SANDWELL, B. K. *The Canadian Copyright Act* (Queen's Quarterly, vol. xxix, no. 2, pp. 182-188).

A lucid account of the provisions of the new Copyright Act, passed by the Canadian parliament in June, 1921.

## VI. ARCHAEOLOGY, ETHNOLOGY, AND FOLK-LORE

(Contributed by D. Jenness, Victoria Memorial Museum, Ottawa)

BARBEAU, C. MARIUS. *Anecdotes de Gaspé, de la Beauce et de Témiscouata* (Journal of American Folk-Lore, vol. 33, no. 129, July-September, 1920, pp. 173-258).

———. *Blason, géographie et généalogie populaires de Québec* (Ibid., October-December, 1920, pp. 346-356).

——— and LANCTÔT, GUSTAVE. *Chansons et rondes de La Prairie* (Ibid., pp. 336-345).

A continuation of the author's well-known researches into French-Canadian folk-lore.

BOAS, FRANZ. *Ethnology of the Kwakiutl*. (Thirty-fifth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology, 1913-14, Part I). Washington, 1920. Pp. 794.

A continuation of Dr. Boas's voluminous reports on the West Coast Indians, dealing exclusively with the arts and industries of the Kwakiutl, their methods of fishing and hunting, and of preparing food. A concluding section recounts their customs and beliefs in connection with these occupations. The Indian method of narration is followed throughout, and the original Kwakiutl text is given at the bottom of each page, making the work a very valuable one linguistically. Every topic is treated so exhaustively that the book must be considered the standard work on West Coast technology. It renders unnecessary similar researches on the same scale among neighbouring tribes, where only the variations from the Kwakiutl practices need be recorded.

BIRKET-SMITH, KAJ. *A geographical study of the early history of the Algonquian Indians* (Internationales Archiv für Ethnographie, vol. xxiv, 1918, pp. 174-222).

A sequel to Steensby's work on the Eskimos, being an attempt to trace the original home and civilization of the Algonquian-speaking tribes by analysing the geographical bases of their cultures.

BUSHNELL, DANIEL I. *Native villages and village sites east of the Mississippi*. (Bureau of American Ethnology: Bulletin 69.) Washington. 1919.

Contains an interesting note on the old Iroquois village of Hochelaga (Montreal), with an illustration of it reproduced from an old sketch.

CLOUTIER, J. E. A. *Anecdotes de L'Islet* (Journal of American Folk-Lore, vol. 33, no. 129, July-September, 1920, pp. 273-294).

COMER, G. *Notes on the natives of the northwestern shores of Hudson Bay* (American Anthropologist, vol. 23, 1921, pp. 243-244).

Contains some observations on the now extinct inhabitants of Southampton Island.

DUCHAUSSE, PÈRE. *Aux glaces polaires*. Edité à Lyons, France.

An account of missionary work among the Indians and Eskimos of the barren lands of Canada, with observations on native life and manners.

EKBLAW, W. ELMER. *A recent Eskimo migration and its forerunner* (Geographical Review, New York, vol. ix, February, 1920, pp. 142-144).

An announcement of a migration of Eskimos from Smith Sound to the north of Baffin Land, with an account of a similar migration, but in the reverse direction, during the middle of the nineteenth century.

EMMONS, GEORGE T. *Slate mirrors of the Tsimshian*. New York: Museum of the American Indian, Heye Foundation. 1921. Pp. 21.

A brief note on a curious toilet article confined to a single nation in British Columbia.

GRINNELL, G. B. *When buffalo ran*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1920. Pp. 114.

An imaginative sketch, based on scientific data, of the life of a Plains Indian during the buffalo-hunting days.

HAYWOOD, V. *Indian Lorette, Quebec* (Canadian Magazine, vol. 54, 1920, pp. 495-503).

A description of the civilized village of to-day and its industries.

HOOTON, E. A. *On certain Eskimoid characters in Icelandic skulls* (American Journal of Physical Anthropology, vol. 1, 1918, pp. 53-76).

Some striking similarities between Icelandic and Eskimo crania are discussed by the writer, who comes to the conclusion that they are due rather to similar environmental conditions than to actual racial intermixture.

IRVINE, ALBERT. *How the Makah obtained possession of Cape Flattery*. New York: Museum of the American Indian, Heye Foundation. 1921. Pp. 11.

A brief account, by a Makah Indian, of the wresting of Cape Flattery from the Nitinat Indians of S.W. Vancouver Island.

JENNESS, D. *The cultural transformation of the Copper Eskimos* (Geographical Review, New York, vol. xi, October, 1921, pp. 541-550).

An outline of the revolutionary effect on the inhabitants of Coronation Gulf of five years' contact with the fur-trade.

——— *Note on Cadzow's "Native copper objects of the Copper Eskimo"* (American Anthropologist, vol. 23, 1921, pp. 235-236).

JOYCE, T. A. *Note on a carved wooden coffer from British Columbia* (Man, January, 1921, pp. 1-2).

A description, with illustrative plate, of a typical carved box, probably of Haida manufacture.

LÖWENTHAL, JOHN. *Irokesische Wirtschaftsallertumer* (Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, 1921, pp. 171-233).

A technological study of the household utensils and implements used by the Iroquois in pre-European days.

MASSICOTTE, E.-Z. *Formulettes, rimettes, et devinettes du Canada* (Journal of American Folk-Lore, vol. 33, no. 130, October-December, 1920, pp. 299-320).

McKENNA, J. A. J. *Indian title in British Columbia* (Canadian Magazine, vol. 54, 1920, pp. 471-474).

A legal inquiry into the nature of the land titles of the Indians of British Columbia.

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- SAPIR, E. *The life of a Nootka Indian* (Queen's Quarterly, vol. xxviii, no. 3, pp. 232-243; no. 4, pp. 351-367).

The writer has drawn on his extensive ethnographical notes and the actual biographies of some of his native informants for this imaginative, but scientifically accurate, account of the life of a typical Nootka Indian.

- *A Haida kinship term among the Tsimshian* (American Anthropologist, vol. 23, 1921, pp. 233-234).

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The writer begins with an analysis of the basis of speech and outlines its various forms and processes in different parts of the world. He then attacks the current classifications of languages, pointing out their contradictions and inadequacy. An entirely new classification is proposed, based on a psychological analysis of the manner in which conceptual ideas are worked out structurally in the sentence. This is perhaps the most stimulating and original portion of the book, but the final chapters, which treat of drift in language, and language in relation to culture and race and current forms of literature, are almost equally interesting. There is no other work in the English language covering quite the same ground as this little volume; it could well be made a text-book in colleges and universities.

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